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ABSTRACT 
The purposes of this study were to examine the effects of six variables on auditor 
independence and the reliability of financial statements as perceived within the Irish 
commercial environment and to explore the reasons underlying these perceptions. The six 
variables comprised of audit firm size, audit market competition, audit committees, audit 
tenure, provision of nonaudit services (NAS) and client employment. From a combination 
of questionnaire and interview approaches, the study sought to obtain supportable and useful 
insight as to the perceptions held. The approach builds on and develops previous research 
conducted outside the Irish market. 
The results of the study showed that auditor independence and the reliability of financial 
statements were perceived to be significantly impaired when the audit was performed by a 
non-Big Six firm, the audit environment was highly competitive, no audit committee existed, 
audit tenure was long, NAS were provided by audit personnel to audit clients, and the auditor 
took up an employment position with a former audit client. 
Some of the reasons underlying these perceptions were as follows. The importance of 
reputation to, and. the international profile of, the Big Six firms allowed interviewees to have 
greater confidence in their independence. A highly competitive audit market was perceived 
to impair auditor independence by encouraging auditors to cut back on the amount of audit 
work performed in order to maintain audit fee income. Audit committees were perceived to 
enhance auditor independence by reducing the power that management could exert over the 
auditor. Long audit tenure was perceived to impair auditor independence by encouraging 
auditors to become cosy in their relationships with their clients. The lack of confidence as 
a result of NAS provision was associated with the audit firm's dependency on such services 
for fee income. Client employment was perceived to provide the ex-auditor with power to 
influence auditor-client relationships. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1: Introduction 
The importance of the audit function is said to rest on the independence of auditors in 
carrying out their work (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Woolf, 1990; Moizer, 1991; Lee, 1993). 
There is general recognition that the value of the audit report is dependent on the degree to 
which it has been independently produced. Auditors who are not independent of the audited 
would be of little value to the individuals to whom accountability was due, since there could 
be little confidence that their opinion added to what was already available (Flint, 1988). The 
auditing profession has recognised the need for auditor independence and has identified it as 
having two components, independence in fact and in appearance. The former element has 
been referred to as being a question of the auditor's mental attitude or his/her state of mind'. 
While this element of independence is important, "it is not sufficient only for auditors to be 
independent, for them to think and to act independently. They are reporting to others whose 
benefit is derived from the reassurance which they give and whose reassurance is conditional 
on belief in the auditor's independence" (Flint, 1988: 60). This is the second element of 
auditor independence, that is, the ability of the auditor to be seen by third parties to be 
independent. 
This study is concerned with this second element of auditor independence because it has been 
argued by many that perceptions, rather than reality, determine the credibility of the audit 
report (Shockley, 1981; St. Pierre, 1984; Schilder, 1992). The remainder of this chapter is 
structured as follows. The next section provides background to the problem of auditor 
independence. The nature and objectives of the study and the methodolögy employed to meet 
these objectives are then outlined. Finally the relevance of this research and the limitations 
of the study are discussed. 
'In this study, all references to the auditor will be expressed in both masculine and 
feminine terms except in the case of direct quotations or in references which relate to the 
period up to the twentieth century when auditors were male. 
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1.2: Background to the Problem 
The environment in which audits exist is constantly changing in relation to the demands 
placed on it. In light of these changes, it is worth asking whether the auditing profession is 
evolving and meeting the needs of users. Evidence would suggest that it is not, for example, 
in 1992, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) stated "in the face of substantial change both 
in the commercial environment and in the expectations of users of financial statements, the 
auditing profession has largely stuck to its roots" (APB, 1992: 1). In addition, the gap 
between what is required of the profession and what it is supplying is widening2. 
At a time when the societal role of the auditor is being challenged, independence is a major 
issue. Such challenges were made by Porter (1993) when she argued that the credibility of 
auditors is increasingly being called into question based on the widespread criticism and 
litigation directed against auditors around the world. The independence of the auditor was 
specifically challenged by those invited by the APB (1992) to critically appraise the current 
state of auditing. In summing up their comments, the APB (1992) stated: 
"The greatest concern is a perception that auditors are not sufficiently independent 
from the companies they audit, with the result that auditors have not taken a tough 
enough stand on the appropriateness of accounting policies used by companies. 
Auditors' judgements may, some suggest, be unduly influenced by the extent and 
nature of the commercial relationship they have with the company. The fact that few 
financial statements of listed companies have received qualified reports by auditors 
is also seen by some to indicate a lack of objectivity. " 
(APB, 1992: 3) 
The future of the auditing profession is dependent upon users' perceptions of auditor 
independence. Hence, it is important to establish what factors are perceived to impair auditor 
independence. A further consideration rests on the extent to which users do rely upon 
financial information in reaching their decisions. Finally, if auditors are perceived to lack 
independence, does this have any impact on users' assessment of the reliability of financial 
statements. This study attempts to address these issues. 
'For example, see Humphrey, 1991; Humphrey et al., 1992; Sikka et al., 1992 who 
have identified auditor independence as a key element of the audit expectations gap. 
2 
The need for auditor independence has been recognised by the professional accounting bodies 
worldwide. They have issued guidelines relating to the conduct of auditors in order that 
independence is maintained. These guidelines restrict specific auditor-client relationships 
which may, or may appear, to impair auditor independence. When formulating and revising 
these guidelines, Firth (1981) noted that no objective survey of the views of outside parties 
was undertaken by the professional bodies. Instead the professional bodies made a subjective 
estimate of the optimum trade-off between the costs and benefits of the guideline 
requirements. Because of the lack of objective evidence obtained by the professional bodies, 
it is not clear whether the auditor-client relationships permitted or restricted by them are 
perceived to impair auditor independence. This study, by seeking the views of third parties 
on six specific auditor-client relationships, is intended to reduce this gap in the auditor- 
independence literature. 
1.3: Nature and Objectives of the Study 
The nature of the study, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4, is such that it is concerned 
with the perceptions held within the commercial environment in Ireland. The study seeks to 
obtain supportable and useful insight from a combination of questionnaire and interview 
approaches and is intended to provide both descriptive and analytically derived knowledge 
as to the perceptions of auditor independence and financial statements reliability held within 
the Irish commercial environment. More specifically, the objectives of this study are: 
i) To examine the effects of six selected variables on perceptions of auditor 
independence held by corporate lenders, investment managers, and analysts 
in Ireland; 
ii) To examine the effects of these perceptions on the perceived reliability of 
financial statements; and 
iii) To explore the reasons for such perceptions being held by corporate lenders, 
investment managers and analysts. 
3 
The six variables selected for examination, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, are: 
audit firm size, competition for audit clients, audit committees, audit tenure, provision of 
nonaudit services (NAS) and client employment. These factors were selected because they 
satisfied the following criteria. Firstly, although the effects of each of these factors on 
perceptions of auditor independence have been investigated in previous studies, little to no 
research has been undertaken on the effects of these factors on users' assessment of the 
reliability of financial statements. Secondly, the previous studies undertaken to date are 
limited, in that, each of them has relied entirely on quantitative data. The methodology used 
in this study, which will be discussed in more detail later, combines both quantitative and 
qualitative data. Finally, no previous Irish study of this nature has been undertaken. 
Objective two entails, as in other studies3, an assessment of whether the existence of each 
of these variables leads to financial statements being perceived as more or less reliable. For 
the purposes of this study, information has the quality of reliability when it is free from 
material error and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully in terms 
of valid description that which it either purports to represent or could be reasonably be 
expected to represent (ASB, 1991). The results from all the studies reviewed and discussed 
in Chapter 3, were generally limited to showing which situations were perceived to impair 
auditor independence or the reliability of financial statements. They did not indicate directly 
how or why the participants responded in the manner that they did although a number of 
researchers conjectured as to the reasons therefore. Objective three, which tries to address 
this gap in the literature, is concerned with shedding light on the results obtained from the 
first two lines of enquiry by probing further into the reasons that corporate lenders, 
investment managers and analysts hold the perceptions that they do. This study concentrates 
on three user groups: corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts. These groups 
were selected because they were identified by the ASB (1991) as significant users of financial 
statements. 
'Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Lam and Arens, 
1975; Lam, 1976; and McKinley et al., 1985. 
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1.4: Scope and Methodology of the Study 
The review of previous studies suggested a number of methods that might be applied to 
investigate the effects of these six variables on the perceived independence of auditors and 
on the perceived reliability of financial statements. They include both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, for example, mail questionnaire surveys, structured and unstructured 
interviews, and empirical experiments. The different methodologies used in these previous 
studies indicate that both quantitative and qualitative techniques can be used in evaluating the 
perceived independence of auditors and the perceived reliability of financial statements. 
However, each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, and no single method used in 
isolation is likely to be completely successful. Studies that use only one method are more 
vulnerable to errors linked to that particular method than studies that use multiple methods 
in which different types of data provide cross-data validity checks. 
Because of the differing strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative methods, 
the use of a combination of methods, the chosen approach for this study, should provide the 
most useful results, enabling reasonable coverage to be achieved (the mail questionnaire) 
whilst at the same time the in-depth interviews allow a greater understanding to be obtained. 
This combination of methodologies is an effort to overcome the weaknesses of using either 
one of the methodologies alone and allows aspects of the phenomenon under investigation to 
be captured in a more complete and holistic manner. Hence rather than seeing quantitative 
and qualitative methods as being in competition, they should be seen as complementary. 
Qualitative work can assist quantitative work by "providing a theoretical framework, 
validating survey, data, interpreting statistical relationships and deciphering puzzling 
responses, selecting survey items to construct indices, and offering case study illustrations" 
(Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 27). 
1.5: Relevance of Topic 
While the effects of these six variables on perceptions of auditor independence have been 
investigated in previous studies (refer- to Chapter 3), the majority of these studies were based 
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in the U. S. or Canada4. It can be seen from Chapter 2, that the development of auditor 
independence in the U. S. differed to that in the U. M. Hence, it is uncertain whether the 
results from the non-U. K studies, which at times were conflicting, can be applied to Irish 
users of financial statements. In relation to the U. K. studies, the results of which could be 
applied to Irish users, only three variables were investigated: audit tenure and client 
employment by Firth (1981) and audit committees by Collier (1992). The effects of the other 
three variables, audit firm size, audit market competition and provision of NAS, on 
perceptions of auditor independence have not been previously investigated in the U. K. This 
study will help to fill this gap in the auditor-independence research literature. Further, the 
results from the study could potentially be of value to the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland (ICAI) as it seeks to restructure its rules on auditor independence. 
It has been noted by other researchers, that investors and lenders rely on financial statements 
to reach appropriate decisions and that, by adding credibility to financial statements, audits 
can improve the quality of consequent decision making (Bertholdt, 1979; Libby, 1979; 
Gwilliam, 1987; Wilson and Grimlund, 1990; Bromwich, 1992). However, the extent to 
which their reliance on financial statements is affected by the perceived independence of the 
auditor is uncertain. Only three studies, as noted previously, have investigated this issue and 
all three were non-U. K. studies. By addressing this issue, this study will contribute to our 
knowledge in this area. 
Interest in perceived auditor independence will continue because new situations which may 
be seen to threaten auditor independence will be created in the changing environment in 
which the audit operates. As the environment changes, it will be necessary to continue to 
assess whether users are maintaining their confidence in the independence of auditors. 
4Some exceptions include the studies undertaken by Firth (1981) and Collier (1992) 
which were based in the U. K., by Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981) which was based in 
Germany, and by Gul (1989) and (1991) which were based in New Zealand. 
'While the discussion of the development of auditor independence in Chapter 2, is in a 
U. K. context, it relates to Ireland as well because Ireland's auditing and financial reporting 
traditions are inextricably bound with those of Britain, both in their origins and current 
practices (McHugh, 1996). 
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1.6: Limitations of the Study 
Since the issue of auditor independence rests on the perceptions of the users of their reports, 
the most obvious limitation of the proposed study is the selection of the groups to represent 
the users. In this study, corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts were selected 
to represent users. Hence, the results of the data can not be generalised beyond these three 
groups. In addition, the sample of corporate lenders was restricted to those operating in 
Dublin because the Irish market is such that most of their decisions are made at their head 
offices which are situated in Dublin. This could limit the generalisability of the results to 
other geographical areas. Finally, the sample of users was not entirely random but rather 
reliance was placed on the individual institutions to supply a complete list of the appropriate 
persons. 
This study is also limited by the number of variables selected for investigation. In this study, 
only six variables were selected for investigation in order to keep the task manageable. Other 
variables6, which have been investigated in other studies, could also impact on perceptions 
of auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements. Hence, more research is 
needed to assess the impact of these other variables as well as follow up research to this 
particular study. 
1.7: Organisation of the Study 
The study is organised into eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the objectives of the study, 
provides background to the problem of auditor independence and highlights the relevance of 
the proposed study. The research methodology and the contextual nature of the study are also 
discussed. 
Chapter 2 discusses the concept of independence within the context of other professions 
because while independence is fundamental to the auditing profession, it is not peculiar to 
this profession and is very much a part of other professions. In light of the importance 
'Some examples of other variables that could have an impact on perceptions of auditor 
independence and the reliability of financial statements include: acceptance of gifts and 
discounts by auditors; size of audit client; and flexibility of accounting standards. 
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attached by the auditing profession to auditor independence, an attempt is also made to trace 
its development and discuss its nature in both the U. K. and the U. S., with particular attention 
being given to the appearance of auditor independence. Case Law and Department of Trade 
and Industry Inspectors' reports, which have highlighted instances where the independence 
of the auditor may have been compromised, are presented. Finally, using economic and 
ethical models, the question of independence is discussed and a review is made of the 
incentives which exist for auditors to behave independently. 
Chapter 3 examines in depth the empirical studies which have investigated perceptions of 
auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements. In particular, the theoretical 
arguments for the relevance of each of the six variables are discussed and the results of 
previous empirical research which has sought to test these arguments are presented. The 
chapter concludes with a summary and critical analysis of these empirical studies. 
Chapter 4 attempts to elaborate on how, in light of the literature review, the objectives of 
this study, may be satisfied. It examines two different methodologies available to the 
researcher: quantitative and qualitative; and discusses the research objectives which, 
according to Moser and Kalton (1979) should be the guiding force of any research 
methodology. Finally, the combination of quantitative and qualitative research, the chosen 
approach for this study, is explored. 
Chapter 5 explains the research design adopted to satisfy the stated objectives. It comprised 
two principal elements - mail questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The selection of the 
respective populations and the development and administration of the requisite instrument for 
each element are also discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 presents the results from the mail questionnaire survey. A profile of the 
respondents and an identification of their use of, and the importance that they attach to, 
financial statements for decision making purposes are presented. The general perceptions held 
by the respondents in relation to the impairment of auditor independence and specific 
instances in which a lack of auditor independence was suspected by them are also presented. 
The main part of the chapter reports on the effects of each of the six variables on perceived 
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auditor independence which are then tied into perceptions of financial statement reliability. 
The economic impact and other effects of a lack of auditor independence are then presented. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the effects of respondents' profile and their 
previous suspicions of a lack of auditor independence on the perceptions held. 
Chapter 7 presents the results from the in-depth interviews conducted. It includes a profile 
of the interviewees and an identification of their use of, and the importance that they attach 
to, financial statements. The specific instances in which interviewees suspected a lack of 
auditor independence are reported. The main part of the chapter reports on the effects of each 
of the six variables on perceived auditor independence which are then tied into perceptions 
of financial statement reliability. In an attempt to understand more fully the context in which 
these perceptions were held characteristics, specific to the Irish market, which may have 
contributed to these perceptions, are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the effects of interviewees' profile and their previous suspicions of a lack of auditor 
independence on the perceptions held. 
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings and draws conclusions based on the research 
data presented in the study. Suggestions for future research are also discussed. 
1.8: Summary 
In this chapter, it was highlighted that although the auditing profession has recognised the 
need for auditor independence by issuing guidelines which restrict specific auditor-client 
relationships, the views of third parties in the development of such guidelines were not 
sought. Hence, it is uncertain whether such guidelines are sufficient to instil in third parties 
confidence in the independence of auditors. This study, which is descriptive in nature, seeks 
to address this issue by searching out perceptions held within the Irish commercial 
environment as to the independence of auditors and the reliability of financial statements. In 
addition, it attempts to explore further the reasons underlying these perceptions. The research 
methodology employed to meet these objectives was outlined and its relevance and limitations 
discussed. The chapter concluded with an overview of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TIE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
2.1: Introduction 
The independence of the auditor is viewed by many writers to be critical to the auditing 
profession because the primary service provided by the auditor, the opinion on the financial 
statements, is furnished for the purpose of adding credibility and increasing the reliability of 
management representations directed toward third parties (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Warren, 
1976; St. Pierre, 1984; FEE, 1996). Without auditor independence, the value of the audit 
function itself is questionable. Sharaf and Mautz (1960) noted that independence is so 
important to any type of auditing work as almost to be inherent in the term auditing itself. 
In recent years, it has been argued that the concept of auditor independence has become one 
of increasing significance during a period highlighted by economic difficulties and business 
failures. 
This chapter commences with a discussion of independence within the context of other 
professions because while independence is fundamental to the auditing profession, it is not 
peculiar to this profession and is very much a part of other professions. In light of the 
importance attached by the auditing profession to auditor independence, an attempt will then 
be made to trace its development and discuss its nature in both the U. K. and the U. S.. As 
will be shown, auditor independence has two elements, independence in fact and 
independence in appearance. This latter element, which is the subject of this study, will then 
be addressed. Attention will be given to Case Law and Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) Inspectors' reports which have highlighted instances where the independence of the 
auditor may have been compromised. The chapter concludes with a review of the incentives 
which exist for auditors to behave independently by considering the question of independence 
using economic and ethical models. 
2.2: Independence within the Context of Other Professions 
Some researchers have argued that independence is an unique attribute of the auditing 
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profession. Carey (1946) argued that it is "the peculiar obligation of the certified public 
accountant, which no other profession has to impose on its members, to maintain a wholly 
objective and impartial attitude toward the affairs of the client whose financial statements he 
certifies" (p. 13). Previts (1985) shared this viewpoint when he argued that the attribute of 
independence is one of the identifying characteristics by which the public recognises the role 
of the auditor. Similarly, Gunz and McCutcheon (1991) maintained that independence is the 
unique quality of the auditing profession that distinguishes it from other professions. 
While independence is fundamental to the audit process, it is an attribute which is not unique 
to the auditing profession but is very much a part of other professions, in particular, 
medicine, law, engineering, and journalism. Bayles (1989) argued that most professional 
codes, for example those of engineers, lawyers, physicians and accountants, require their 
members to exercise independence of judgement in their services to their clients because "the 
obligation of independence of judgement goes to the nature of professionalism and the 
professional-client relationship" (p. 90). He argued that if professionals' judgements are 
biased, clients do not receive the type of advice and assistance they are seeking, and actions 
taken on the basis of these judgements may be detrimental. Wolnizer (1995) shared this 
opinion when he argued that "in the same way that the public expects that auditors should 
refrain from entering into arrangements with clients which may appear to impair their ability 
or willingness to form, an impartial opinion on the financial. statements, the public holds 
similar expectations in respect of other professional groups" (p. 59). To support his argument, 
Wolnizer (1995) provided the following examples: 
"It is commonly expected that in courts of law judges shall be free of any association 
with the plaintiff and the defendant that could cause either party to believe that the 
judgement given is influenced by factors other than the weight of evidence. In the 
practice of medicine, emotional involvement with patients is considered to be 
prejudicial to clinical judgement. " (Wolnizer, 1995: 59) 
Bayles (1989) argued that independence of judgement may be affected in three ways. Firstly, 
the professional's personal interests may adversely affect independence of judgement, for 
example: 
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"a lawyer could own property affected by a client's proposed actions or could be 
likely to be called as a witness. An accountant could own stock in a client's 
competitor. A physician could wish to conduct an experiment for which the patient 
is a potential subject or could have developed a technique or therapy he or she wants 
to promote. " (Bayles, 1989: 90) 
Secondly, independence of judgement may be affected by a conflict of interest between 
clients. To support this assertion, Bayles (1989) provided the following two examples: 
"Two persons charged with committing the same crime might believe that their 
interests do not conflict but the defense of one could be contrary to the defense of the 
other. " (Bayles, 1989: 91) 
"Suppose a physician attends both a potential recipient and a potential donor for a 
kidney transplant. The potential recipient's interest lies in receiving an organ from the 
best tissue match, usually a relative. However, the removal of a kidney is a, health 
risk to the donor. In such cases, a physician other than the recipient's should discuss 
the situation with the donor. " (Bayles, 1989: 93) 
Finally, independence of judgement may be adversely affected by third party payers. To 
illustrate how this may occur, Bayles (1989) provided the following examples: 
"Parents (paying for their children's medical treatment) of retarded children 
sometimes want them sterilised, which can be contrary to the interests of the 
children. " (Bayles, 1989: 94) 
"Accountants hired to perform public audits and lawyers hired to make an 
independent evaluation to be provided to someone else serve a client's interests only 
to the extent that a correct statement is in the client's interest. The client can have 
interests (not disclosing financial losses or pending law suits) that are contrary to the 
professional's independent judgement. In these cases, a client in effect occupies the 
position of a third party payer and must not be allowed to direct or regulate a 
professional's independent judgement. " (Bayles, 1989: 94) 
In each of these situations, Bayles (1989) argued that professionals must decide whether they 
can exercise independence of judgement in their services to their client. Where independence 
of judgement can not be exercised, he recommended that the professional should not act for 
that client. 
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Independence of judgement also features in the services provided by journalists. Harris 
(1992) argued that because "readers expect some reliability in the information presented to 
them, codes for journalists commonly require reporters to convey only material possessing 
certain of the attributes which help to ensure reliability. Reporters are required to... write 
accurately and objectively; ... to avoid bias" (p. 69). 
In relation to the profession of engineering, Johnson (1991) noted that the services provided 
by engineers require honesty, impartiality, fairness and equity. One of fundamental canons, 
outlined in the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) in the U. S., states that: 
"Engineers, in the fulfilment of their professional duties, shall ... issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. " (Johnson, 1991: 98, emphasis 
added). 
In order to fulfil this fundamental canon, the NSPE provides rules of practice which refer 
not only to actual objectivity but also to the appearance of objectivity. 
"Engineers shall disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest to their employers 
or clients by promptly informing them of any business association, interest, or other 
circumstances which could influence or appear to influence their judgement or the 
quality of their service. " (Johnson, 1991: 100, emphasis added) 
Hence, while independence is important to the auditing profession, it is not unique to this 
profession. In light of the importance attached to independence by the auditing profession, 
its development and nature will now be discussed. 
2.3: Development of Auditor Independence 
Previts (1985) maintained that the concept of an independent auditor was slow to develop in 
the United Kingdom'. Businessmen and legislators of the early nineteenth century at first held 
'As noted in Chapter 1, while this discussion of the development of auditor independence 
is in a U. K. context, it relates to Ireland as well because Ireland's auditing and financial 
reporting traditions are inextricably bound with those of Britain, both in their origins and 
current practices (McHugh, 1996). 
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the view that an auditor would be more diligent if he had an economic interest (a 
shareholding) in an enterprise because he would have an incentive to protect his own 
property. This idea was reflected in the 1845 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act which 
required the auditor to hold at least one share in the company that he audited but did not 
allow him to hold any office in the company or be in anyway interested in its concerns, 
except as a shareholder. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) maintained that "Parliament was 
merely incorporating into the law a version of practice that had existed for six hundred 
years" (p. 626). 
This practice of shareholders acting as auditors resulted in questions being asked as to their 
ability to offer an independent audit service. One such person to question their ability was 
William Quilter, a public accountant, who in 1849 testified before a Select Committee of the 
House of Lords, set up as a result of the failure of a number of railway companies. In reply 
to the question as to whether he thought the present mode of audit of railway accounts 
(mainly by representative shareholders, appointed by and acting for their fellows) afforded 
any security to the public, Quilter stated: 
"It never can, in my opinion, and especially for this reason: that all Companies make 
it a necessary qualification for an Auditor that he should be a shareholder; the 
qualification should be that he should not be a shareholder, according to my notion; 
that is, he ought to be an independent individual, not interested in putting a 
favourable appearance upon the face of the accounts. " (quoted in Parker, 1986: 27, 
emphasis added) 
In light of the evidence put before it, the Select Committee recommended not only 
independence in fact but also the appearance of independence. 
"To render any Audit efficient, and entitled to public confidence, it must be freed, 
as far as possible, from all partial influences, or even the suspicion of indirect 
motive, it should be rendered independent of all those persons whose Accounts are 
submitted to its inspection. " (quoted in Parker, 1986: 30, emphasis added) 
The Select Committee's recommendations did not lead to immediate change in legislation and 
were ignored until 1868 when further crisis, experienced by the railway companies, led to 
the Regulation of the Railways Act and the removal of the requirement for auditors to be 
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shareholders (Parker, 1986). In relation to other companies, the 1862 Acte provided an 
optional model set of articles (Table A of the Act) which permitted rather than required the 
auditor to hold a share in its auditee. While this Act did not require the auditor to be a 
professional firm, Watts and Zimmerman (1983) believed that the omission of the 
requirement that the auditor be a shareholder suggests pressure to appoint professionals 
directly. It was as late as 1979 before the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) outlawed auditors from holding shares in client companies (Edwards and 
Webb, 1985; Gwilliam, 1987)9. 
During the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a noticeable feature of British 
industries was the separation of ownership and management, as companies increasingly 
looked to the general public to provide funds needed to help finance expansion (Edwards and 
Webb, 1985). This development produced the need for a greater level of accountability from 
management (Edwards and Webb, 1985). Previts (1985) shared this viewpoint when he 
argued that only gradually, as ownership and management became separate functions, did the 
benefits of objectivity and impartiality provided by independence become clear. Parker (1986) 
maintained that "professional auditors superseded shareholder or lay auditors for two reasons: 
greater independence and superior competence" (p. 32). By 1900 most companies were 
audited by professional auditors (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). It was not until the 
Companies Act of 194810 that public companies were required to be audited by professional 
auditors. Parker (1986) argued that this change in the law in 1948 had little effect and merely 
reflected what in practice had long been the case. 
While it has been argued by some researchers (Berryman, 1974; Causey, 1979) that the call 
for an independent auditor came later in the U. S., Boocholdt (1983) provides evidence of a 
'At this time, audits were not mandatory for companies. In 1856, the requirement for a 
compulsory audit was dropped and was not re-established until 1868 for railway companies, 
1871 for water companies, 1879 for banking companies, and 1900 for other companies. 
9A similar rule, which prohibited auditors from holding shares in client companies, was 
issued at this time by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI). 
"In Ireland, the equivalent legislative change came with the enactment of the 1963 
Companies Act. 
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similar development of auditor independence to that reported in the U. K. In the early 
nineteenth century audit committees, composed of shareholders, were used to validate 
management reports. By the middle of the nineteenth century, independent accountants and 
bookkeepers were in practice in most major cities, and frequently they were engaged to aid 
audit committees in their investigations and in reporting on the company's financial status to 
stockholders (Boocholdt, 1983). It was not until 1933 that audits by professional auditors 
were required by the regulatory agencies in the U. S. which is earlier than when they were 
required by U. K. law. The requirement for an annual independent audit in the U. S. resulted 
from unsatisfactory financial reporting practices and the 1929 stock market crash which 
brought pressures for reforms that produced the Federal Securities Act of 1933 (Causey, 
1979). 
While the mandatory requirement for an independent audit came earlier in the U. S. than in 
the U. K., the actual practice by companies of using independent auditors was earlier in the 
U. K (the 1900's) than in the U. S. (the 1920's). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1983) 
while most companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange were already audited by 
professional auditors by the 1920's, only a minority of them were audited by professional 
auditors in 1900. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exerted leadership in determining what 
constituted independence placing emphasis on financial interest and on employment by the 
client of the auditor in capacities other than that of auditor. In 1933, the SEC adopted the 
following rule: 
"The Commission will not recognise any such certified accountant or public 
accountant as independent if such an accountant is not in fact independent. Unless the 
Commission otherwise directs, such accountant will not be considered independent 
with respect to any person in whom he has an interest, directly or indirectly, or with 
whom he is connected as an officer, agent, employee, promoter, underwriter, trustee, 
partner, director, or person performing similar function. " (quoted in Berryman, 1974: 
3, emphasis added) 
Although independence in fact was emphasised by the SEC, reference was also made to the 
appearance of independence when it stated that "such accountant will not be considered 
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independent ... ". It was not until 1934 that the American Institute of 
Accountants (AIA) 
made any reference to financial interest and even then it only prohibited a member from 
auditing a client's financial statements in which s/he held a substantial financial interest, not 
a, interest as specified by the SEC. Berryman (1974) noted that in 1936, the SEC amended 
its rule with respect to independence and adopted the AIA position prohibiting any substantial 
interest but returned to its original 1933 position in 1950. It took the American Institute a 
further twelve years to move to this position. In 1962, it adopted a rule on independence as 
part of its Code of Professional Ethics which prohibited direct financial interest in the client 
by a member and for the first time prohibited specific employment arrangements during the 
period of professional engagement. This rule recognised both independence in fact and 
independence in appearance. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the concept of auditor independence was 
discussed as far back as 1849. The benefits of independence were recognised first by 
businesses with independent professional auditors being appointed prior to any legislative 
requirement. The regulatory agencies and the professional auditing bodies did not always 
agree on what constituted independence and in the United States at least the professional 
bodies were slower than the regulatory agencies to adopt the more stringent independence 
rules. Having outlined the development of the concept of auditor independence, attention will 
now be given to what it means. 
2.4: Nature of Auditor Independence 
Attempts have been made by both the auditing profession and researchers to define what is 
meant by auditor independence. The auditing profession, in stressing the importance of both 
independence in fact and in appearance, recognises the concept of independence as having 
a dual connotation. Independence in fact has been defined in terms of honesty, objectivity, 
and a mental attitude. For example, in 1991, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) defined independence in fact as: 
"in all matters related to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be 
maintained by the auditor or auditors. ... To be independent, the auditor must be 
intellectually honest. " (AICPA, 1991: 161, emphasis in original) 
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The importance of independence in fact was stressed in 1995 by the Chartered Accountants 
Joint Ethics Committee (CAJEC) when it defined objectivity as: 
"a state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task in hand 
but no other. It is sometimes described as `independence of mind', a term often 
shortened to `independence'. " (CAJEC, 1995: 3) 
In 1996, the European Commission in its Green Paper noted that: 
"independence is the main means by which the statutory auditor demonstrates that lie 
can perform his task in an objective manner. " (European Commission, 1996: 21) 
and it identified and defined independence in fact as: 
"the state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to the task in hand. " 
(European Commission, 1996: 21) 
On the other hand, independence in appearance has been defined by the professional bodies 
as being free of interests in, or relationships with, clients or as avoiding any circumstances 
which would result in a third party questioning the auditor's independence. For example, the 
AICPA (1991) stated that to be recognised as independent: 
"he (the auditor) must be free from any obligation to or interest in his client, its 
management, or its owners" (AICPA, 1991: 161). 
Similarly, CAJEC (1995) stressed the importance of being free of any interest in order that 
auditors may appear to be independent. CAJEC also recognised the importance of auditors 
considering the expectations of those directly affected (and entitled to be affected) by their 
work in order to maintain their objectivity. 
"Those directly affected are likely to be concerned about the existence of any 
relationship or situation affecting a member or firm, or any business or other interest 
held by the member or firm which may threaten or appear to threaten objectivity. " 
(CAJEC, 1995: 4, emphasis added) 
Third parties were also recognised by the European Commission (1996) when it defined 
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independence in appearance as: 
"the avoidance of facts and circumstances which are so significant that an informed 
third party would question the statutory auditor's objectivity. " (European 
Commission, 1996: 21) 
Some researchers, while concentrating on independence in fact, have defined independence 
in terms similar to those used by the professional bodies. Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) 
argued that "auditor independence is a multifaceted paradigm emanating from the espoused 
precept that certified public accountants are obligated to perform their duties free of 
subjective biases and professional impropriety" (p. 228). Similarly Bartlett (1993) defined 
independence as "an unbiased mental attitude in making decisions about audit work and 
financial reporting" (p. 55). 
Other researchers have attempted to operationalise the definition of independence or, failing 
this, have at least described when independence is decreased. DeAngelo (1981a) maintained 
that "the level of auditor independence is defined as the conditional probability that, given 
a breach is discovered, the auditor will report that breach" (p. 116). A similar definition was 
provided by Watts and Zimmerman (1983) when they stated that "the probability that the 
auditors will report a discovered breach is effectively the auditing profession's definition of 
independence" (p. 615). Simunic (1984), on the other hand, described when independence 
was decreased. He argued that "any situation which increases the probability that an auditor 
will not truthfully report the results of his audit investigation can be viewed as a threat to 
independence" (p. 679). Finally, while Knapp (1985) did not explicitly define independence, 
he stated that an audit conflict is potentially a serious threat to the viability of the independent 
audit function and argued that the perceived ability of the auditor to resist management 
pressure is related to the perceived independence of the auditor. 
As these definitions illustrate, research on auditor independence either focused on an aspect 
of independence which was consistent with the auditing profession's assertion that 
independence is a state of mind that the auditor must maintain in the conduct of his/her work, 
or concentrated on the second element of auditor independence, that is, the perceived ability 
of the auditor to maintain that desired mental attitude. Because this study concentrates on the 
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latter element, perceptions of auditor independence, the importance of this element of auditor 
independence will now be discussed. 
2.5: Importance of the Appearance of Auditor Independence 
A review of the history of this concept and practice reveals its evolution from what was 
narrowly described as a state of mind to the physical appearance of independence (Lee, 
1988). During the post-World War II period, Previts (1985) argued that both the SEC and 
the auditing profession in the U. S. devoted further attention "to the dichotomy between 
independence in fact and independence in appearance; considerable lip service was given to 
the former as the latter became perceived as even more intrinsic amidst more promulgated 
and detailed rules of behaviour" (p. 80). This was also the case in the U. K. and Ireland with 
the respective Institutes issuing detailed rules for their members which dealt with the 
appearance of auditor independence. 
In addition, company legislation recognised the difficulty of maintaining the appearance of 
independence in a situation in which the auditor is verifying the accounting representations 
of the management who have the power to appoint and fire him/her and provided that the 
auditor be appointed by the shareholders with adequate rights of defence against unwarranted 
management pressure (Lee, 1988). 
Researchers have also recognised the importance of the appearance of auditor independence. 
St. Pierre (1984) argued that the appearance of auditor independence is critical because third 
parties are unable to ascertain independence in fact. Third parties act on their perceptions of 
the auditor's independence regardless of the auditor's true mental state. A similar view was 
expressed by Schilder (1992) when he argued that the independence of auditors is primarily 
an issue of perception and communication because the public can neither observe objective, 
impartial, independent-in-fact judgement nor test its quality. The public is dependent on the 
appearance of auditor independence (Schilder, 1992). This view was first expressed by Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) when they maintained that since an individual's usefulness as an auditor 
is impaired by any feeling on the part of third parties that s/he is likely to lack independence, 
s/he has the responsibility of not only maintaining independence in fact but of avoiding the 
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appearance of lacking independence. 
A natural question, therefore, is do third parties perceive auditors to be independent and what 
factors influence their perceptions. These questions are considered in detail in Chapter 3. In 
addition, it is important to ask whether there have been any previous instances in which the 
independence of the auditor may have been considered compromised. To answer this 
question, a review of the studies which have addressed this issue is presented next. 
2.6: Case Law, DTI Inspectors' Reports and Other Reports 
One such study was undertaken by Gwilliam (1988). He sought to ascertain whether, in three 
historical auditing cause celebres, there were factors which might be seen as compromising 
auditor independence. The three cases studied were London and General Bank, 1894; the 
Dumbell Bank, 1900; and Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 1931. In relation to the first case, 
Gwilliam (1988) identified two relationships, a financial interest in the bank on the part of 
the auditors and personal links between the auditors and the directors of group companies, 
which he argued "today would have been seen as compromising the independence of the 
auditor" (p. 322). Similar relationships, between the auditor and the bank, were identified in 
the Dumbell Bank case which "might be seen as compromising his (the auditor's) 
independence" (Gwilliam, 1988: 328). In the third case, Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 
"there were no such relationships" (Gwilliam, 1988: 333). He concluded that such 
relationships may result, firstly, in the auditors being "insufficiently critical in their 
acceptance of assurances and representations from dynamic management figures with 
previous records of success" (p. 333) and secondly, in a lack of independence "in the sense 
that they associate too closely with the interests of the company, as they see them, to the 
detriment of their role as an independent monitor of a company's financial reporting" 
(p. 335). 
The problems which dominant and forceful personalities present to auditors have been a 
common theme throughout past DTI' Inspectors' reports (Boys, 1986). One such dominant 
personality was Mr. Hearn, chairman and managing director of Kina Holdings Limited who 
was described by the DTI inspectors in 1981 as: 
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"the ambitious driving force behind the company's growth and the facade of 
prosperity that it presented for so long... Hearn had virtually no effective constraint 
upon him at board level. " (quoted in Boys, 1986: 90) 
In this case, a small accounting firm, Collins, Soanes & Co. (Collins), was involved in the 
audit and book-keeping and accountancy work for a large client, Kina Holdings Limited. The 
inspectors claimed that: 
"preparation of some form of acceptable accounts took precedence over and largely 
replaced the requirements of verification which formal audit demands. This might 
have been less dangerous had Collins brought adequate, independent expertise to his 
book-keeping activities but it is plain that this was not the case. " (quoted in Boys, 
1986: 10) 
Boys (1986) concluded by noting that "it may have been a deliberate policy of some 
managements to appoint auditors and advisers who are insufficiently able to carry out their 
responsibilities and who can be easily browbeaten" (p. 14). This suggestion would appear to 
be the case in Kina Holdings Limited given the weight of evidence as to Collins' failure to 
perform a satisfactory audit and their over-reliance on management representations as a 
method of substantiating transactions. The inspectors concluded in their report that: 
"His (the auditor's) evidence ... reveals how ready he was to accept completely 
unverified information. " (quoted in Boys, 1986: 101) 
Robinson (1964) provides another historical example of directors who were willing to exert 
power over the auditor. The auditor, who was at the time one of the shareholders and not 
a professional accountant, was removed from office by the directors of National Bank 
because of a disagreement that he had with the directors in relation to the manner in which 
transactions were handled in the National Bank accounts in 1894. The auditor, Mr. Roche, 
wrote to the shareholders explaining to them that he had not resigned but was removed from 
office by the directors and gave an account in his letter of the circumstances surrounding his 
removal. Extracts from his letter below indicate the power that the directors were willing to 
exert: 
"In the course of the auditing of July 1893, certain matters came under my notice 
which appeared to me to require explanation..., and I observed some entries which 
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I considered as of an unsatisfactory nature and which rendered it desirable that I 
should have the assistance of a professional accountant. I accordingly pointed out to 
the directors the necessity of calling in an accountant, but was informed by the 
chairman that I had no power to do so. 
Having being precluded from obtaining the assistance which I required and was 
entitled to, I again on the 6th December wrote to the directors, putting before them 
my views as to the manner in which the accounts were prepared, and pressing upon 
them the necessity of having the Bank accounts scrutinised by an independent 
accountant. 
My demands for further investigation of the accounts were met by an official 
intimation that 300 shares, which I had handed over to the Bank many years ago as 
collateral security for my overdraft, had been sold, so far back as August, without 
any notice to me, or without the semblance of complaint as to the state of my 
account, or any request to discharge my indebtedness to the Bank, which I could have 
done at a moment's notice, and that, having in this manner ceased to be a proprietor, 
I had ceased to be auditor. Being determined, if possible, to retain my position as 
auditor until displaced by the vote of the shareholders, and to discharge my duty to 
them by following up the investigation I had commenced, I purchased other shares, 
but the directors positively declined to register me as a shareholder. The only 
conclusion that I can reasonably draw from this action of the directors is that my 
frequently expressed desire for an independent investigation of the Bank accounts had 
become distasteful to them, and that determined to deprive me, if they could, of all 
right to urge my views upon them. " 
(Letter from P. J. Roche to the Shareholders of the National Bank Limited, 
Woodville, New Ross, taken from Robinson, 1964: 70, emphasis added) 
Robinson (1964) argued that this letter highlighted "the danger of having as an auditor, not 
a skilled independent professional man, but an unskilled shareholder at the mercy of the 
directors" (p. 71). It is, however, unclear whether the position would have been different had 
the auditor being a skilled independent professional man, given that auditors in current times, 
are required under professional rules to be skilled, independent, and professional and yet 
directors are seen to continue to exert power over auditors (Mitchell et al., 1991). 
Sikka and Willmott (1993), in their review of the DTI Inspectors' report on Roadships 
Limited in 1976, identified another instance where auditor independence may have been 
compromised. In this case, the factor contributing to a compromise in auditor independence 
was the provision of NAS to audit clients. After examining the quality of the audit by the 
auditor who had also provided NAS, the inspectors concluded: 
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"We do not accept that there can be the requisite degree of watchfulness where a man 
is checking his own figures or those of a colleague....... for these reasons we do not 
believe that (the auditor) ever achieved the standard of independence necessary for 
a wholly objective audit. " (quoted in Sikka and Willmott, 1993: 9) 
A further example where the independence of the auditor was deemed to be compromised 
by the provision of NAS to audit clients was highlighted by Mitchell et al. (1993) in their 
review of the DTI Inspectors' report on Burnholme and Forder in 1976. The inspectors 
concluded: 
"in our view the principle of the auditor first compiling and then reporting upon a 
profit forecast is not considered to be a good practice for it may impair their 'ability 
to view the forecast objectively and must endanger the degree of independence 
essential to this work. " (DTI, 1979, quoted in Mitchell et al., 1993: 17) 
Although the professional bodies require auditors to be and to be seen to be independent, the 
evidence presented above, although limited, does indicate that there have been instances in 
the past when the independence of the auditor has been seen to be compromised. In this 
context it is of interest to examine the incentives which exist for auditors to behave either in 
an independent or non-independent fashion. These can best be analyzed by reference to 
economic and ethical models. 
2.7: Economic Modelling 
The institution of external financial auditing exists in an economic setting in which auditors 
provide their services for a fee, and their services consist primarily of informing `others' 
about the reliability of information, produced by management, relating to the economic 
activities of the client firm. For `others' to place any value on the auditor's service, they 
have to believe that the auditor has acted independently and was not influenced by 
management in providing this service. DeAngelo (1981a) provides support for this assertion 
when she argued that "if the capital market expected the auditor never to deviate from 
management's position, then it would assess the value of the auditor's opinion as zero" 
(p. 116). 
To understand the incentives which exist for auditors to behave independently, researchers 
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have used the economic modelling approach which has arisen out of the study of contractual 
relationships within the agency theory framework. This framework "investigates the 
behaviour of management and auditors when both are seen as acting as agents of the same 
principal (the owners) and in an environment in which the actions (and the results of such 
actions) of management are assumed not to be directly observed by the principal but are 
observable by the auditors" (Gwilliam, 1987: 93). 
One such study was undertaken by Watts and Zimmerman (1981). They argued that because 
the agents (auditors), who take actions which reduce the value of the firm or affect the 
returns to other parties, bear the cost of those actions (through a reduction in fees), these 
agents have incentives to guarantee that they will not take such actions. In other words, 
incentives exist for auditors to show the market that they have behaved independently. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1981) identified one such incentive as the auditor's reputation for 
independence which is based on his/her past performance to fulfil contracts. Should the 
auditor fail to report a breach (their definition of independence) and it eventually became 
known, this would "cause the market to revise its assessment of the auditor's expected 
performance and the value it attaches to an audit contract with that auditor" (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1981: 9). DeAngelo (1981b) shared this view when she argued that "consumers 
view auditors with established reputations as having `more to lose' from misrepresentation" 
(p. 193). A similar view was expressed by Benston (1985). While he does not directly refer 
to auditor independence, it is implicit in his argument. 
"Those who employ the public accountant can rely on the accountant's self-interest 
in acquiring and maintaining a reputation for integrity and expertise. Should a public 
accountant be found to have been suborned (or have been negligent or inexpert in 
conducting an audit, given the fees charged), other clients and users of the client's 
financial statements will have reason to doubt the accountant's integrity or ability to 
perform an audit. " (Benston, 1985: 38) 
Watts and Zimmerman (1981) identified a further incentive, the development of a brand 
name by large audit firms, for auditors to behave independently. One example of the 
importance of brand name to audit firms, was the reluctance of Price, Waterhouse & Co. at 
the end of the nineteenth century to allow their representatives in the U. S. (Jones and Caesar) 
to use their firm name for fear of damage to their reputation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981). 
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Such firms used their brand name to signal their independence to the market. 
DeAngelo (1981b) identified, as another incentive for auditors to behave independently and 
to provide a quality audit, the collateral that audit firms build up from quasi-rents. Quasi- 
rents were defined as "the excess of a given period's revenues over the avoidable costs 
incurred in that period, including the opportunity cost of auditing the next best alternative 
client" (DeAngelo, 1981b: 188). Incumbent auditors are able to earn these quasi-rents 
because they possess cost advantages (no start-up costs) over potential competitors in future 
audits of a given client. While client-specific quasi-rents lower auditor independence with 
respect to a particular client because they provide an incentive to `cheat' in order to retain 
the client in future periods, the quasi-rents specific to other current clients of a given auditor 
provide a disincentive to `cheat' because the auditor stands to lose other clients or obtains 
lower fees from those that continue to retain him/her (DeAngelo, 1981b). Hence, she 
concluded, that "auditors with a greater number of audit clients have reduced incentives to 
`cheat' in order to retain any one client" (p. 191). This conclusion is supported by the 
empirical study undertaken by Wilson and Grimlund (1990) who obtained evidence of a 
reduction in market share and a difficulty in client retention for audit firms whose reputation 
for independence was damaged. 
Antle (1984) also used the agency theory approach to model the principal (owner) agent 
(manager/auditor) relationship. He argued that "since auditor independence concerns the 
relationship between the auditor and manager, this modelling of the auditor and manager is 
necessary to address meaningfully the concept of auditor independence" (p. 2). While Antle's 
model did not contain any forces that induce the auditor to maintain independence, he 
discussed a number of mechanisms, based on `casual empiricism' that might encourage 
auditor independence. One incentive for auditors to behave independently, which had been 
previously identified by Watts and Zimmerman (1981), was the fear of loss to auditor 
reputation from non-independent behaviour. Another incentive, identified by Antle (1984), 
for auditors to behave independently was the threat of lawsuits consequent upon negligent 
audit performance. 
FEE (1996) argued that although agency theory would suggest that market forces alone 
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provide adequate incentives for the carrying out of audits with independence and objectivity, 
the audit is not a service the specifications and provision of which may be freely negotiated 
between the provider and purchaser. Safeguards are necessary to ensure that the interests of 
other users of the audit report are respected and primary amongst these safeguards is the 
requirement that the statutory auditor possess the independence and objectivity, needed to 
perform his/her task (FEE, 1996). 
Noreen (1988), on the other hand, believed that the ethical conscience of the auditor would 
encourage him/her to behave independently. 
"While at the heart of agency theory is the assumption that people act unreservedly 
in their own narrowly defined self-interest with, if necessary, guile and deceit, casual 
observation suggests that there may be some people who are unreservedly 
opportunistic, but there are others who do constrain their own behaviour out of an 
ethical sensibility or conscience. " (Noreen, 1988: 359, emphasis added) 
By conscience, he meant "a feeling of responsibility for the effects of one's actions on 
others" (p. 367). A similar view was expressed by Gaa (1992) when he argued that economics 
focuses on choice with each individual being regarded as an atomistic, self-interested, utility 
maximiser and who makes rational decisions without regard to the impact of his/her actions 
on the welfare of others. This approach to the behaviour of auditors may be able to explain 
some (or even much) of what is observed in the practice of public accounting but it cannot 
address the role of the auditing profession in society, and the ethical obligations which attend 
that role (Gaa, 1992). This ethical incentive to behave independently is now addressed. 
2.8: Ethical Modelling 
Gaa (1992) argued that the concepts of objectivity and independence are ethical or normative 
concepts "since they concern the issue of how the auditor ought to act in the course of 
performing the audit, and in ultimately deciding on the content of the auditor's report to third 
parties" (p. 9). Gaa continued by noting that ethics and economics are similar in that they 
both concern rational choice except that "ethics focuses on the problems of choice when it 
is explicitly recognised that one's actions do have effects on others, and that those effects 
should be taken into account in deciding how to act" (p. 9). Using economics to analyze 
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auditor behaviour would prove to be difficult in trying to understand the fact that auditors 
choose and perform their actions within the context of a role. 
Auditors are often faced with situations where their actions have an impact on themselves and 
on others, and where there is no feasible course of action which will be in the short-term 
interest of all parties. In these situations, Gaa (1992) argued that "norms provide guidance 
by indicating actions which are required, allowable or forbidden in a given situation" (p. 10). 
Auditors are subject to both universal norms (which apply to people in society) and role- 
related norms (specific to those occupying a particular role in society). According to Gaa 
(1992), auditor independence is the most important role-related norm of the public auditing 
profession because "it is the only norm which refers specifically to the role of the auditor, 
and it defines and distinguishes the role of the auditor within the more general role of public 
accountant" (p. 13). 
Gaa (1992) also argued that contrary to the positive, principal-agent, conception of auditor 
decision making, an auditor is not free to decide (as a matter of maximising self-interest) 
whether to report a breach of generally accepted accounting principles, but has an obligation 
to report even if it is not in his/her self-interest to do so. "Independence requires that one 
does not put "oneself in a position where there is a significant chance of benefiting personally 
as the expense of other (external) interested parties" (Gaa, 1992: 22). However, Cushing 
(1990) maintained that "it does not make sense to assume or to believe that there is some 
`higher level' reason for auditors to behave in an independent manner, such that this reason 
is unrelated to economic benefit" (p. 259). He concluded by noting that auditor independence 
cannot be fully understood except in an economic context. 
2.9: Summary 
In this chapter, it was shown that although independence is fundamental to the auditing 
profession, it is not peculiar to this profession but it very much a part of other professions, 
for example medicine, law, engineering and journalism. 
While auditor independence is viewed by many writers to be critical to the auditing 
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profession in order that third parties can rely on their services, it was slow to develop in the 
U. K. and in the U. S.. In the early nineteenth century auditors were required under law to 
hold shares in client companies which resulted in questions being asked as to the ability of 
the auditor to offer an independent service. In the mid to late nineteenth century in the U. K., 
legislation permitted rather than required such auditor-shareholding and it was as late as 1933 
before the regulatory agencies in the U. S. outlawed this practice. Professional auditing bodies 
were slower to prohibit this practice. It was not until 1962 that the AICPA prohibited 
auditors from holding shares and as late as 1979 before the equivalent U. K. body adopted 
this rule. 
To understand what is meant by auditor independence, a review was undertaken of the 
definitions provided by both the auditing profession and researchers. The auditing profession 
recognised that independence has a dual connotation and stressed the importance of both 
independence in fact and in appearance. The former element has been defined in terms of 
honesty, objectivity, and a mental attitude while the latter element has been defined as being 
free of interests in, or relationships with, clients, or as avoiding any circumstances which 
would result in a third party questioning the auditor's independence. Over time less attention 
was given to independence in fact and more to the appearance of independence as the 
profession began to issue more detailed rules which dealt with this element. Similarly, 
researchers. recognised the importance of independence in appearance arguing that because 
third parties are unable to ascertain independence in fact, they act instead on their perceptions 
of auditor independence. 
In light of the importance attached by the auditing profession and by researchers to the 
appearance of auditor independence, a review was undertaken of studies which have 
investigated whether there were any instances in the past where the independence of the 
auditor may have been compromised with adverse effects on the quality of the audit. This 
review provided some evidence of compromises in auditor independence. The factors 
contributing to these compromises included auditors having financial interests in, or personal 
links with, audit clients, over-reliance by auditors on dominant directors for audit evidence 
and the provision of NAS by auditors to audit clients. 
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The chapter concludes with a review of the incentives which exist for auditors to be or to be 
seen to be independent using economic and ethical models. The economic models identify 
a number of incentives for auditors to behave independently including the fear of loss to 
reputation or brand name from non-independent behaviour, the collateral that audit firms 
build up from quasi-rents, and the threat of lawsuits. The ethical model, on the other hand, 
suggests that the ethical conscience of the auditor provides him/her with an incentive to 
behave independently. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
3.1: Introduction 
Since the post World War 11 period, considerable attention has been given, as was 
highlighted in Chapter 2, by the auditing profession and by researchers to the appearance of 
auditor independence. It was noted that one of the reasons for this attention was because third 
parties act on their perceptions of auditor independence regardless of the auditor's true 
mental state. As argued by Shockley (1981), credibility in audit reports "depends ultimately 
on the perception rather than on the fact of independence" (p. 785). Hence, it is natural to ask 
firstly, do third parties perceive auditors to be independent and secondly, what factors 
influence their perceptions. Both of these questions are addressed in this chapter. 
The literature concerning the appearance of auditor independence is extensive. From a review 
of this literature six factors, which are perceived to impact on auditor independence, were 
selected for this study, because they satisfied the following criteria. Firstly, although the 
effects of each of these factors on perceptions of auditor independence have been investigated 
in previous studies, little or no research has been undertaken on the effects of these factors 
on users' assessment of the reliability of financial statements. Secondly, the previous studies 
undertaken are limited, in that, each of them has relied entirely on quantitative data. The 
methodology used in this study, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
combines both quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, no previous Irish study of this nature 
has been undertaken. The six factors identified are as follows: audit firm size; audit market 
competition; audit committees; audit tenure; provision of nonaudit services (NAS); and client 
employment. In this chapter, the theoretical arguments as to the likely impact of each of the 
six factors on perceptions of auditor independence are first discussed and then the relevant 
empirical research previously carried out is reviewed. The chapter concludes with a summary 
and critical analysis of these empirical studies. 
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3.2: Audit Firm Size 
The size of the audit firm was identified by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) as an important variable 
that may affect perceptions of auditor independence. They argued that larger audit firms were 
less likely to lose independence than smaller firms because the former firms were less 
dependent on a particular client and the client's fees usually were a smaller proportion of the 
larger firm's total revenue. Hence, the impact of losing a client was not as large for the 
larger firm. 
This assertion is supported by the empirical study undertaken by Pearson (1980a). He studied 
the effects of a number of factors, including audit firm size, on auditor independence as 
perceived by Big Eight audit firms in the U. S.. A letter was mailed to the senior partner of 
each of these firms and while the sample of participants used in the study was small (eight 
partners in total), the response rate was 100 per cent. Each partner was asked to describe his 
firm's attitudes towards services other than auditing, his firm's attitudes concerning auditor- 
management relationships and possible modifications, and policies and procedures that had 
been instituted to assure partner and staff independence. Each of the participants pointed to 
their size as the most positive factor assuring auditor independence in cases of auditor- 
management conflicts. They also claimed that the loss of revenue from any single client 
would not materially affect their firm's financial position but for the smaller firms, when a 
significant portion of their revenue is received from one or only a few large clients, such 
firms could find it more difficult to withstand client pressures. 
It has also been argued that "certain characteristics of the smaller audit practices may be 
inherently dangerous to independence, for example, the nature of a typical client or the 
tendency toward a more personalised mode of service" (Shockley, 1982: 135). This is a 
viewpoint shared by Gul (1991) who identified the size of the audit firm as an important 
variable that may affect perceptions of auditor independence. He noted that "smaller audit 
firms were more likely to lose independence because they tend towards a personalised mode 
of service and a close relationship with the client" (p. 165). While the empirical research 
undertaken to date, and discussed next, provides support for the assertion that larger audit 
firms are perceived to be more independent than smaller audit firms, none of this research 
has tested whether these perceptions are related to the personalised mode of client service 
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provided by the smaller audit firm or to the development of a closer relationship by the 
smaller firm with its clients. 
Shockley (1981) investigated the effects of four variables (size of audit firm, competition, 
tenure and NAS) on perceptions of auditor independence. Audit firm size was dichotomised 
as large and small. Large audit firms were defined as those which audited SEC-registered 
corporations while small audit firms were defined as those which did not perform such 
audits. Four groups participated in the empirical experiment and included partners from Big 
Eight audit firms, partners from local or regional audit firms, commercial loan officers and 
financial analysts. Subjects were required to make a subjective estimate of the risk that an 
audit firm's independence may become impaired along a scale of one to seven in sixteen 
scenarios. Each scenario represented one of sixteen possible combinations of levels of the 
four variables. To minimise the potential for order and learning bias, the order of scenarios 
was randomised and printed separately for each subject. Out of a total of 277 research 
instruments mailed, an overall response rate of 64 percent was obtained. The results showed 
that all of the participants, except partners from local or regional audit firms, perceived that 
smaller auditing firms were more likely to lose their independence than were larger audit 
firms. In relation to perceptions held by the partners from local or regional offices, Shockley 
concludes that it "possibly reflects a defensive attitude on the part of the smaller CPAs" 
(p. 794). 
Pearson and Ryans (1981/82) selected four groups (management accountants; chartered 
financial analysts; Big Eight audit partners and non-Big Eight audit partners) for inquiry 
regarding their perceptions of auditor independence and auditor-management relationships. 
A questionnaire, which included eighteen statements, was mailed to a random sample of 100 
persons in each of the four groups and an overall response rate of 62 per cent was obtained. 
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each 
statement. One of the statements included on the questionnaire was "economically marginal 
CPA firms are more vulnerable to company management pressures than economically 
stronger CPA firms" (p. 4). The results showed that the majority of participants agreed with 
this statement. However, the words used by Pearson and Ryans (economically marginal/ 
economically stronger) to describe audit firms may have influenced the responses that they 
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received, in that, the word `stronger' may have been interpreted by the respondents as having 
a greater ability to withstand pressure. This potential bias is not discussed by the researchers. 
As in Shockley's (1981) study, when the responses of the four groups were compared, a 
higher percentage of non-Big Eight partners compared to Big Eight partners disagreed with 
the statement. Similar to the suggestion made by Shockley (1981), the authors suggested that 
this finding may have been caused by the fact that some of the non-Big Eight firms may fall 
within the category of economically disadvantaged firms and, therefore, may be less likely 
to point an accusing finger at such firms. 
Jackson-Heard (1987) undertook experimental research which attempted to assess the effect 
of five factors (audit firm size, audit committees, tenure of audit firm, NAS, and size of 
client) on the independence of the auditor as perceived by 100 financial analysts. Audit firm 
size was dichotomised as Big Eight and non-Big Eight. Subjects were asked to respond on 
a ten-point scale (0 - no confidence to 10 - high confidence) to show their level of confidence 
in the independence of the auditor in thirty-two scenarios. Each scenario represented one of 
thirty-two possible combinations of levels of the five variables. Unlike the attempt made by 
Shockley (1981) to minimise order and learning bias, Jackson-Heard made no attempt to 
minimise this potential bias and presented the thirty-two scenarios in the same order to each 
subject. A response rate of 23 per cent was obtained. The results, which are consistent with 
those found by Shockley (1981), indicated that respondents had significantly higher 
confidence in Big Eight auditors than in non-Big Eight auditors. 
A New Zealand study undertaken by Gul (1989) provides additional evidence on the impact 
of five variables (audit firm size, competition, audit committees, financial condition of client, 
and NAS) on bankers' perceptions of auditor independence. Data for the experiment was 
gathered using a questionnaire which was mailed to 64 loan officers and a response rate of 
76 per cent was obtained. The experimental task, which was similar to that used by Shockley 
(1981), required subjects to make a subjective estimate of the relative strength of eight 
different scenarios along a seven point scale from 1 (little to no confidence in the auditor's 
independence) to 7 (very high confidence in the auditor's independence). Two of the 
variables, audit committee and the financial condition of the client were treated as between- 
subject variables. The three other independent variables, audit firm size, NAS, and 
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competition were treated as within-subjects variables. The size of the audit firm was 
restricted to two levels, large or small. Large firms were defined as those which had the 
resources to service the requirements of large corporations listed on the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange and small firms were defined as those firms which did not have the resources to 
service the needs of large corporations. The size of the audit firm was found to impact on 
the bankers' perceptions of auditor independence, with bankers having more confidence in 
an audit firm which was large than one which was small. 
A second study was undertaken by Gul (1991) which examined the effects of four factors 
(size of audit firm, NAS, competition, and size of audit fees) on bankers' perceptions of the 
auditor's ability to resist management pressure in an audit conflict situation. Audit firm size 
was defined in the same way as in his previous 1989 study. Data was collected using a 
questionnaire which was mailed to seventy-two bank lending officers and a response rate of 
67 per cent was obtained. The experimental task required subjects to estimate the likelihood, 
on a seven point scale, that management would obtain its preferred resolution to a dispute 
between the auditor and the client, concerning the materiality of certain unrecorded liabilities. 
Subjects were required to make this estimate for sixteen cases, each of which contained one 
of sixteen possible combinations of the four variables. To minimise the potential of order and 
learning effects of the four experimental variables, the order of the scenarios and variables 
within the scenarios were randomised and printed separately for each subject. The results 
showed that smaller audit firms were perceived to be more likely to resolve the conflict in 
favour of the client than larger audit firms. 
It has also been argued that the confidence placed in the information generated by financial 
statements is related to the size of the firm which undertakes the audit. Goldman and Barley 
(1974) opined that one of the reasons that companies tended to choose large auditing firms 
when they went public was that users of financial statements, such as banks and financial 
analysts, appeared to place greater confidence in the reports produced by large auditing 
firms. Support for this assertion is provided by the empirical experiment undertaken by 
McKinley et at. (1985). They examined the influence of audit firm type and office size (Big 
Eight with 450 professionals, Big Eight with 60 professionals, and local non-Big Eight firm 
with 60 professionals) on loan officer lending decisions and perceptions of financial statement 
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reliability and auditor independence. The experimental task required subjects to review a loan 
application from forecasted and historical financial statements as well as other background 
information on the loan applicant. Subjects were also informed about the type and size of the 
audit firm. Each subject received one of six versions of the research instrument. After 
reviewing the loan application, subjects were asked to make a loan decision (accept/reject), 
to evaluate the reliability of the historical financial statements on a scale of 1 (no confidence) 
to 10 (extreme confidence), and to evaluate the audit firm's independence on a similar scale. 
Out of a total of nine hundred research instruments mailed, an overall response rate of 29 
per cent was obtained. The results indicated that the type-size of the audit firm was 
significant in the subjects' assessment of auditor independence with subjects perceiving Big 
Eight auditors from large and small offices (450/60 professionals) as more independent than 
non-Big Eight firms. In relation to financial statement reliability similar results were 
obtained. Subjects perceived that financial statements audited by a non-Big Eight audit firm 
to be more likely to include undetected fraud (one of the surrogates used to measure the 
reliability of financial statements) than financial statements audited by a Big Eight audit firm. 
In relation to the second surrogate measure of financial statement reliability, adherence to 
GAAP, subjects perceived financial statements audited by either large or medium sized Big 
Eight audit firms as more reliable than those audited by a non-Big Eight audit firm. These 
perceptions, however, did not result in significantly different loan decisions. 
The above studies show that the size of the audit firm impacts on perceptions of auditor 
independence with larger audit firms perceived to be more independent than smaller audit 
firms. While it has been suggested that these perceptions are as a result of smaller audit firms 
being more dependent on clients for fee income than larger audit firms, and/or smaller firms 
providing a more personalised mode of client service and having a closer relationship with 
their clients than larger audit firms, there is little or no empirical support for these assertions. 
Pearson (1980a) provides some support for the first of these assertions but this study was 
only concerned with the perceptions held by Big Eight auditors and not with third party 
perceptions. In addition, it has been argued that audit firm size impacts on the perceived 
reliability of financial statements. The results from the study undertaken by McKinley et al. 
(1985) showed that financial statements audited by larger firms were perceived to be more 
reliable than those audited by smaller firms. Once again, no research has been undertaken 
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to investigate why these perceptions were held. 
3.3: Audit Market Competition 
The market for audit services has been described as being "dominated by the large 
international firms and their affiliates" (Walker and Johnson, 1996: 2). This concentration 
has increased in recent years due to the mega-mergers" of the late 1980s and "seems to be 
generating more, rather than less, competition" (McHugh, 1996: 10). Simunic (1980)' found 
that the market for audits was competitive in the U. S., with economies of scale for large 
audit firms (evidenced by lower audit fees than for their smaller competitors). Simunic's 
study was the first of its kind and led to many replications and extensions in audit markets 
of other countries. Each of these studies indicate that non-U. S. audit markets are also 
competitive12. McHugh (1996) argued that "if anything, competition in the audit industry is 
set to intensify further in the 1990s" (p. 10). The nature of this competitive audit environment 
has caused much concern. 
Carey (1946) expressed concern over the practice of competitive bidding by the accounting 
profession for professional accounting engagements. He believed that "with competitive 
bidding, there is a strong temptation for the less scrupulous accountant to submit a lower bid 
than is justified by the requirements of adequate performance and when the work is awarded 
to him, he then finds himself in a position where, if he is to make a profit, or avoid losing 
money, he must curtail the scope of the examination.. ." (p. 104). A similar view was 
expressed by the Cohen Commission (AICPA, 1978) when they concluded that excessive 
competition was presenting an independence problem to the U. S. accounting profession. They 
noted that the pressure to acquire and maintain audit clients had adversely impacted on the 
quality of audit work performed. The Cohen Commission attributed this competition to 
intensive pricing practices and time and budget pressures. 
"Beattie and Fearnley (1994) argued that the scale of the mergers of Ernst & Whinney/ 
Arthur Young in 1989 and of Coopers & Lybrand/ Deloitte Haskins & Sells in 1990 was 
such that they have been termed `mega-mergers'. 
"Refer to Walker and Johnson (1996) for a detailed critical analysis of these non-U. S. 
studies. 
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A study similar to that of the Cohen Commission was undertaken in Canada at this time 
which reported that "the escalation in audit fees over the last few years seems to have 
fostered `comparison shopping' by audit clients which sometimes produces severe fee 
competition" (Adams Committee, 1978: 57). They agreed with the Cohen Commission that 
such competition would result in intensive pricing practices and time and budget pressures. 
This view point was shared by Pearson (1980b) when he commented that the time pressure 
was so severe in the accounting environment that auditors were being tempted to omit audit 
procedures that should be performed, and that instead of basing their opinions on objective 
evidence, auditors were subjectively relying on management representations. Two studies 
have investigated whether time and budget pressures are perceived to impair auditor 
independence. 
The first study was undertaken by Pearson (1980a)13. The results showed that each of the 
regional Big Eight senior audit partners were aware of the existence of price competition in 
the auditing profession but none of them believed that fee pressure had any adverse impact 
on their time budgets, the quality of their audits or their independence. The second study 
which investigated this issue was undertaken by Pearson and Ryans (1982). They mailed a 
questionnaire to random samples of 100 financial analysts, 100 management accountants, 100 
partners from Big Eight firms and 100 partners from non-Big Eight firms and obtained an 
overall response rate of 66 per cent. Subjects were asked to indicate their level of agreement 
with eight statements dealing with audit market competition. The results indicated that while 
very few of the non-auditor respondents seemed concerned with the level of price competition 
in the auditing profession, a large percentage of auditors were concerned and, in particular, 
partners from the Big Eight firms considered price competition to be excessive. In addition, 
contrary to the results obtained by Pearson (1980a), the majority of auditor respondents 
agreed that unrealistic time budgets were often used to counteract the impact of price 
competition but, consistent with Pearson's (1980a) finding, they did not believe that such 
time pressures were the primary cause of independence conflicts. Pearson and Ryans argued 
that these two findings were inconsistent because if an unrealistic time budget exists, then 
"one could certainly contend that the potential exists that strong pressure is effectively being 
13See p. 32 above for details of his study. 
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exerted on the external auditors to cut corners and perhaps place significant emphasis on the 
subjective representations of management (the latter resulting in an independence conflict)" 
(p. 54). 
The ability of the auditor to resist management pressure has also been associated with the 
level of competition in the audit market. Shockley (1982) argued that an increase in 
competition may result in auditor independence being lost because "as competition increases, 
it becomes more likely that a CPA will be replaced by an auditor more compliant with the 
client's wishes and knowing this, the CPA's power over the client decreases" (p. 136). In a 
similar vein, Mitchell et al. (1991) asserted that "competition leads to compliance with the 
wishes of the companies which audit is meant to invigilate, and to the over-ready acceptance 
of dubious accounting" (p. 5). Two studies have investigated the effects of audit market 
competition on the auditor's ability to resist management pressure. 
The first study was undertaken by Knapp (1985). He examined how four factors, including 
audit market competition, would affect bankers' perceptions of the auditor's ability to resist 
client pressure. Competition in the audit services market was set at the levels high and low. 
The experiment involved a full-factorial, repeated measures design with four independent 
variables, each of which had two treatment levels. Subjects (70 loan officers) were presented 
with sixteen cases, resulting from all possible combinations of the treatment levels of the 
independent variables and a short, narrative explanation of each case. They were asked to 
record the perceived likelihood, on a scale of 1 (very low likelihood) to 7 (very high 
likelihood) that management would obtain its preferred resolution to the dispute. Half of the 
cases involved a conflict issue over the disclosure of a subsequent event (an issue dealt with 
quite explicitly by the technical standards) and the remainder of the cases involved the 
materiality of a financial statement amount (an issue not dealt with as explicitly by the 
technical standards). An overall response rate of 61 per cent was obtained. The results 
showed that the degree of competition did not significantly influence bankers' perceptions of 
the auditor's ability to resist management pressure. 
The second study which examined the effects of audit market competition on the perceived 
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ability of auditors to resist management pressures was undertaken by Gul (1991)14. Similar 
to Knapp (1985), Gul set competition at the levels high and low. High competition was 
described in the study as "a large number of auditing firms aggressively pursuing expansion 
programs in terms of increasing their client numbers" and low competition was described as 
"a few or no competing firms in the audit market" (p. 171). Contrary to Knapp's findings, 
Gul found that when competition was high, bankers perceived that the auditor was more 
likely to resolve the conflict in favour of the client, than when competition was low. Gul 
concluded that this result may have been caused by bankers believing that "the client may 
be tempted to replace the auditor with a more compliant auditor and the auditor who is 
concerned about being replaced is less likely to resist management pressure" (p. 169). 
It has also been argued that excessive competition may encourage the practice of low-balling 
which several authors claim is a practice that is prevalent in the market for audit services" 
Low-balling has been defined as the practice of "setting audit fees below total current costs 
on initial audit engagements" (DeAngelo, 1981a: 113). Conflicting opinions have been voiced 
in the literature as to whether low-balling impairs auditor independence. DeAngelo (1981a) 
argued that low-balling does not impair independence because initial fee reductions are sunk 
costs and are, therefore, irrelevant for future actions or decision-making. Low-balling, she 
maintained, is a response to competitive forces and is the process by which auditors compete 
for expected future quasi-rents. Grout et al. (1994) supported DeAngelo's view by arguing 
that banning low-balling may in fact reduce auditor independence rather than increase it 
because such a ban "will tend to increase rather than decrease quasi-rents accruing to the 
incumbent auditors and thereby increase the stake that they have already in the continuation 
of the client company" (p. 343). However, Kunitake and White (1986) asserted that auditors 
who expect later recoupment of fees may go beyond ethical boundaries to please that client. 
On the basis of previous research on the psychology of sunk costs, Simon and Francis (1988) 
suggested that contrary to the predictions from economic theory, sunk costs do significantly 
affect subsequent decision making. They argued that because a considerable investment is 
14See p. 35 above for details of his study. 
"For examples of the extensive literature on the prevalence of low-balling in the audit 
market see Baker (1974); Bernstein (1978); Cohen Commission (1978); Andreder (1979); 
Francis and Simon (1987); Simon and Francis (1988); and Brinn and Peel (1993). 
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made to obtain the new client, the prior decision to discount the fee could, therefore, 
motivate the auditor's desire not to lose the client, even in the presence of serious 
disagreements. This desire not to lose the client could, they argued, lead to "an additional 
independence problem during the period of investment recovery" (p. 266). A similar view was 
expressed by Steele (1992) who was concerned with the practice of low-balling. He argued 
that "the auditor has made a commercial investment in a client, of which the profitable 
realisation depends on maintaining the goodwill of the directors in a way that is incompatible 
with professional independence" (p. 17). Two studies have investigated whether the practice 
of low-balling is perceived to impair auditor independence but their results conflict. 
The first such study was undertaken by Pearson and Ryans (1982)16. They defined low- 
balling as "the offering of services at low fees in early years with the expectation of 
recovering these lower revenues with fees in later years" (p. 54). Their results indicated that 
while the majority of auditor respondents did not consider an auditor's independence to be 
impaired from the practice of low-balling, the majority of non-auditor respondents did. 
Pearson and Ryans concluded by stating that "low balling may not affect a firm's 
independence in fact, but an important part of the financial community is indicating its 
concerns with such a practice" (p. 55). 
Lindsay et al. (1987) also investigated the effects of low-balling on perceptions of auditor 
independence. Mail questionnaires, depicting fifteen auditor-client relationships, one of which 
included low-ball bidding, were sent to 400 auditors, 400 financial analysts and 400 loan 
officers across Canada and an overall response rate of 38 per cent was obtained. To examine 
the effects of low-balling on auditor independence, subjects were asked to indicate whether 
they perceived the audit firm to be independent (yes/no) with respect to the financial 
statement audit when it "has made an arrangement with a new client company whereby audit 
fees will be fixed at a lower than normal rate for the first two years' audit" (p. 175). The 
results from the study showed that the majority of respondents in each of the three groups 
did not perceive the auditor's independence to be impaired where low-balling occurred. 
"Low-balling was one aspect of competition investigated by Pearson and Ryans (1982). 
See p. 38 above for details of their study. 
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While the results for the auditor respondents are consistent with those obtained in the study 
undertaken by Pearson and Ryans (1982), the results for the non-auditor respondents conflict 
with those obtained by Pearson and Ryans. 
Two studies which examined the effects of competition on perceptions of auditor 
independence at a general level, were those undertaken by Shockley (1981) and by Gul 
(1989). These studies too provided conflicting results. Shockley studied the perceived effects 
of four variables, including competition, on auditors' independence". Competition was set 
at two levels, high and low. The results showed that for all four groups, high levels of 
competition increased the perceived risk that independence may be impaired. Of the four 
factors studied, competition was considered to be the greatest threat to independence. 
The study undertaken by Gul (1989) was similar to that undertaken by Shockley (1981) 
except Gul studied the effects of five variables, including competition, on only one group's 
(bankers) perceptions of auditor independence18. Once again, competition was set at two 
levels, high and low and defined by Gul in the following way. High competition was 
described as "a large number of auditing firms aggressively pursuing expansion programs in 
terms of increasing their client numbers" and low competition was described as "a few or 
no competing firms in the audit market" (Gul, 1989: 50). The results from his study 
indicated that competition affected bankers' perceptions of auditor independence but not in 
the predicted direction. Bankers in this study saw the existence of competition as increasing 
auditor independence. This finding is inconsistent with the finding obtained by Shockley 
(1981), which showed a negative relationship between competition and auditor independence. 
These conflicting results may, according to Gul, have been caused by "cultural differences 
between New Zealand bankers and bankers in the US" (p. 49). 
In summary, the results from the above empirical studies provide conflicting evidence as to 
the effects of audit market competition on perceived auditor independence whether at the 
general level (Shockley, 1981; Gul, 1989) or at the more specific levels (auditor's ability to 
"See p. 33 above for details of his study. 
18See p. 34 above for details of his study. 
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withstand management pressure: Knapp, 1985; Gul, 1991 and the practice of low-balling: 
Pearson and Ryans, 1982; Lindsay et al., 1987). 
3.4: Audit Committees 
An audit committee, was defined by the Accountants International Study Group (AISG) 
(1977) as a "committee of directors of a corporation whose specific responsibility is to 
review the annual financial statements before submission to the board of directors" (para. 1). 
The AISG continued by noting that an audit committee "generally acts as a liaison between 
the auditor and the board of directors and its activities may include the review of nomination 
of the auditors, overall scope of the audit, results of the audit, internal financial controls and 
financial information for publication" (para. 1). 
Mautz and Neumann (1970) maintained that an audit committee, by holding the auditor 
directly accountable to the board of directors, strengthens their independence of management 
and this is one of the most useful contributions the committee can make. Support for this 
assertion is provided by the empirical study undertaken by Pearson (1980a)19. The results 
from his study showed that the Big Eight partners believed that putting the external auditors 
in touch with an audit committee of outside directors, lessened the auditor's reliance on 
management and, in this way, strengthened the auditor's independent position. 
It has also been argued that an audit committee can enhance auditor independence by being 
responsible for the selection, remuneration and dismissal of the auditor. Goldman and Barley 
(1974) maintained that management's power over the auditor would be limited if audit 
committees were established to deal with the selection of auditing firms, the negotiation of 
fees, and participating in matters regarding the auditor's replacement. A similar view was 
held by Lam (1975) when he noted that because in practice, the auditor's appointment and 
removal is often a management decision, pressure is placed on the auditor to follow the 
dictates of management if s/he wants to be appointed or re-appointed. To emphasise his 
independence, Lam asserted that "it would be more practical to have an audit committee of 
19See p. 32 above for details of his study. 
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outside directors appoint him and to have the shareholders approve the appointment" (p. 38). 
Three empirical studies have investigated whether an audit committee, by being responsible 
for the selection, remuneration and dismissal of auditors, is perceived to enhance auditor 
independence. 
The first study was undertaken in the U. S. by Pearson and Ryans (1981/82)20. They found 
that the majority of respondents from each of the four groups perceived that the independence 
of the auditor would be enhanced if the audit committee, rather than management, was 
responsible for the determination of audit fees. In addition, the non-auditor respondents were 
more fearful than the auditor respondents that the auditor's independence could be impaired 
where management was involved in the selection and remuneration of auditors. 
Similar results were obtained in the second U. S. study undertaken by Schleifer and Shockley 
(1990). The objective of this study was to investigate accountants' (Big Eight and non-Big 
Eight) and financial statement users' (bank loan officers and certified financial analysts) 
reactions to fourteen policies, one of which related to audit committees, designed to enhance 
auditor independence. The policy relating to audit committees stated: "auditors should be 
selected and retained by an audit committee made up of independent (non-management) 
members of the firm's board of directors" (p. 12). Subjects were asked to indicate whether 
or not they agreed that such policies would enhance auditor independence. While the sample. 
of participants used in the study was small (seventy professionals in total), the response rate 
was 100 per cent. The results showed that the majority of respondents in each group, except 
in the loan officer group where the majority disagreed, agreed that auditor independence 
would be enhanced if the audit committee was responsible for hiring auditors. 
The third study was undertaken by Collier (1992). A mail questionnaire was used to gauge 
the then present state of audit committees in the U. K. for 202 industrial companies and 44 
financial institutions. An overall response rate of 80 per cent was obtained. The results 
showed that audit committees were more widespread in financial institutions than industrial 
corporations which Collier considered was "because the institutional and regulatory 
20See p. 33 above for details of their study. 
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framework surrounding financial institutions encourages the formation of audit committees" 
(p. 154). One of the motives, although not the strongest, for having an audit committee was 
that it enhanced the independence of the external auditor. Only one third of the respondents 
in each of the two groups reported that the audit committee nominated the auditor. However, 
those organisations whose audit committee did nominate the auditor, stressed its importance 
as a means of ensuring auditor independence. 
While the above empirical studies have shown that auditor independence is perceived to be 
enhanced where the audit committee is responsible for the selection and remuneration of 
auditors, involvement in such issues was not seen by the participants in the study undertaken 
by Lam and Arens (1975) to be the audit committee's primary purpose. In this study, a 
questionnaire which sought information on the use and effectiveness of audit committees was 
mailed to four groups: corporate chief executive officers; members of corporate audit 
committees; practising chartered accountants; and financial analysts. Out of a total of 819 
questionnaires mailed, an overall response rate of 78 per cent was obtained. The 
questionnaire identified eight purposes of an audit committee and each respondent was asked 
to rate these purposes in terms of importance. The results showed that the majority of 
respondents from each group rated "to relieve the board of directors, as a whole, of details 
regarding the nomination of auditors" as the least important purpose of the audit committee 
(p. 52). 
It has also been argued that by opening up a direct channel of communication with the board, 
an audit committee gives the auditor a forum independent of management, to discuss 
significant issues (Lam, 1975). By regularly reviewing and discussing audit issues with the 
audit committee, management is likely to be more objective and less dominating and, 
therefore, the auditor's relationship vis-a-vis management is strengthened (Lam, 1975). 
Christofi (1977) shared this viewpoint when he stated that "the most vital benefit of the audit 
committee is that it enhances the independence of the auditor by providing direct formalised 
contact with the directors of the company" (p. 6). Similarly, the Adams Committee (1978) 
argued that the audit committee provided "an additional buttress to auditor's independence 
in the event of disagreement with management by providing them with a forum to air their 
concerns with those who are in a position to require management to take any necessary 
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action" (p. 40). The Cadbury Committee (1992) shared this opinion when it maintained that 
audit committees had the potential to strengthen the position of the external auditor by 
proving a channel of communication and forum for issues of concern and a framework within 
which the external auditor can assert his/her independence in the event of a dispute with 
management. This benefit of an audit committee is supported by the empirical study 
undertaken by Pearson (1980a)21. One of the reasons that the Big Eight partners in his study 
perceived the auditor's independence to be enhanced when the company had an audit 
committee was that they viewed the audit committee as an objective forum, independent of 
client management, where accounting and auditing concerns, problems and results could be 
discussed. 
The effects of an audit committee on general perceptions of auditor independence in the U. S. 
and in New Zealand were investigated by Jackson-Heard (1987) and Gul (1989) respectively. 
Jackson-Heard (1987) studied the impact of five factors, including audit committees, on the 
independence of the auditor as perceived by selected users of financial statements". Audit 
committee status was dichotomised that of the client having or not having an audit 
committee. The results indicated that perceptions of auditor independence were enhanced, 
but not to a marked degree, when an audit committee existed. Similarly, in the study 
undertaken by Gul (1989), audit committee status was again dichotomised that of the client 
having or not having an audit committee23. The results showed that bankers' perceptions of 
auditor independence were unaffected by an audit committee. Gul suggested that this lack of 
effect may have been because "there was little awareness of the role and importance of audit 
committees amongst New Zealand bankers because relatively few companies in New Zealand 
have set up audit committees" (p. 48). 
In addition to enhancing the independence of the auditor, it has been argued that audit 
committees can also enhance the reliability or credibility of financial statements. The AICPA 
(1967), when recommending that all publicly owned corporations appoint audit committees, 
21See p. 32 above for details of his study. 
22See p. 34 above for details of her study. 
23See p. 34 above for details of his study. 
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argued that this would result in the continuing improvement of corporate financial reporting 
to the investing public by giving added assurance to stockholders as to the objectivity of 
corporate financial statements. A similar view was expressed by Auerbach (1973) when he 
stated that "in the long run, the establishment of audit committees will give stockholders 
greater confidence in the reliability of the financial statements" (p. 104). However, Lam 
(1975) and the AISG (1977) argued that the reliability of the financial statements will be 
enhanced by the establishment of an audit committee, only if the audit committee is 
composed of outside directors and is independent of management. By permitting a more 
thorough probing into all issues and a proper questioning of management decisions affecting 
the financial statements, Byrd (1977) believed that an audit committee would enhance the 
credibility and objectivity of financial statements. Wolnizer (1978) asserted that the primary 
benefit associated with the establishment of an audit committee is the expected improvement 
in the credibility and reliability of financial statements which is achieved by ensuring that the 
external auditor is free from the influence of management and, therefore, independent. Other 
writers have also asserted that the reliability of financial statements is enhanced by the 
establishment of audit committees24. 
One empirical study, undertaken by Lam (1976), has investigated directly whether the 
existence of an audit committee is perceived to enhance the reliability of financial statements. 
A questionnaire, with two questions specifically designed to elicit opinions on the 
enhancement of financial statement reliability by the audit committee, was mailed to 276 
financial analysts. An overall response rate of 75 per cent was obtained. In response to the 
first question "do you feel that the annual financial statements are more reliable for those 
corporations which have audit committees", the majority of analysts replied in the 
affirmative, which suggested to him that "the injection of this independent third party, 
constituted from the highest hierarchy of the corporation, would keep management, and 
perhaps auditors, honest" (p. 20). In response to the second question "do you feel that an 
ineffective corporate audit committee has an adverse effect on the credibility of the 
corporation's financial statements", over half of the respondents stated that it would not. 
24Refer to Chazen and Landis (1976), Robertson (1976), Williams (1977), the Cadbury 
Committee (1992), and Collier (1992). 
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However, in relation to those analysts responding in this manner, one third of them stated 
-either that there was no reasonable means to ascertain whether an audit committee was 
ineffective, or if the ineffectiveness was known, then there would be an adverse effect. Lam 
concluded by noting that "the impact of an ineffective audit committee on the credibility of 
the company's financial statements depends on the statement user's knowledge of such 
ineffectiveness" and argued that "if the ineffectiveness is known, there would be some 
adverse effect" (p. 22). 
In summary, although studies which investigated the effects of an audit committee on general 
perceptions of auditor independence found no, or an insignificant effect, on perceived auditor 
independence (Jackson-Heard, 1987; Gul, 1989), the results from Pearson's (1980a) study 
showed that audit committees were perceived to enhance auditor independence in specific 
ways, for example, by holding auditors accountable to a board independent of management 
and by providing the auditor with an additional communication channel. While it was found 
that the selection and remuneration of the auditor was not seen as the primary purpose of an 
audit committee (Lam and Arens, 1975), when audit committees performed such roles, 
auditor independence was perceived to be enhanced (Pearson and Ryans, 1981/82; Schleifer 
and Shockley, 1990; Collier, 1992). Finally, it was shown that audit committees were 
perceived to enhance the reliability of financial statements (Lam, 1976). 
3.5: Audit Tenure 
The length of time an audit firm acts for the same client, and the effects this may have on 
perceptions of auditor independence has received much attention in the auditing literature. 
Mautz and Sharaf (1961) argued that complacency, lack of innovation, and less rigorous audit 
procedures may arise after a long association with the client. A similar concern was noted 
by Burton and Roberts (1967) who argued that "the employment of the same CPA firm year 
after year tends to reduce the independence of the auditor because the partners of the CPA 
firm become friends with the financial executives of the client" and in addition may "prevent 
the auditor from taking a fresh look at the company's financial and accounting practices" 
(p. 31). This concern was shared by Shockley (1982) when he argued that after long 
association with an audit client, an audit firm may "become so closely connected with 
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management that it subconsciously (or even consciously) loses objectivity necessary for 
independence" (p. 137). Three studies have investigated the effects of a long association 
between the auditor and the client on perceptions of auditor independence. 
The first study was undertaken by Firth (1981). He investigated whether U. K. bankers' 
perceptions of auditor independence were affected by long association between the auditor 
and the client. Questionnaires, which included a set of financial statements, an unqualified 
audit report and other financial information pertaining to a hypothetical company, were 
mailed to a random sample of 1,700 bankers. Attached to the audit report were details of an 
auditor-client relationship. Eight hundred of the sample received information on two auditor- 
client relationships, one of which was an independent auditor-client relationship and the other 
was one of eight auditor-client relationships, which based on previous studies, were 
considered to be non-independent auditor-client relationships. The remaining 900 participants 
were presented with one of the nine auditor-client relationships. The experimental task 
required subjects to review the information and state the maximum amount that they would 
be prepared to lend to the company. An overall response rate of 74 per cent was obtained. 
The means of the responses for each relationship were calculated and were compared with 
the mean response for relationship one (independent auditor-client relationship). Any 
significant differences were attributed solely to the specific auditor-client relationship. In 
order to examine the impact of a long association between the auditor and the client, subjects 
were presented with the following relationship "an audit partner has been in sole charge of 
a large audit (taking up 3 months of the partner's time) for the past ten years" (p. 181). The 
results showed that the majority of respondents perceived the auditor to be independent when 
such a relationship existed between the auditor and the client. Firth proposed that the lack 
of concern with such a relationship suggests that the possible increased expertise of the 
partner far outweighed the possible bias due to his/her knowing the management personalities 
so well. While the amount of the loan was less when this relationship existed than when it 
did not, the difference was found not to be significant. 
The second study was undertaken by-Shockley (1981)15. Audit tenure was set at two levels: 
"See p. 33 above for details of his study. 
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five or fewer years and more than five years. The results showed that audit tenure was not 
significant in the respondents' assessment of the risk that independence may be impaired. The 
third study which investigated the effects of a long association between the auditor and the 
client on perceptions of auditor independence was undertaken by Jackson-Heard (1987)26. 
Similar to Shockley (1981), audit tenure was dichotomised as over five years and not over 
five years. The results, which supported those of Shockley's, showed that respondents did 
not perceive the independence of the auditor to be affected by the length of time that the 
audit firm acted for the same client. 
It has also been argued that long association between the auditor and the client may result 
in the development of a psychological attachment (Corless et al., 1990). Such an attachment, 
they argued, may "make the auditor favourably inclined toward the client" (p. 7). Bates et al. 
(1982) investigated whether a psychological dependence develops when an auditor has a long 
association with a client. This study, however, is concerned with actual rather than perceived 
psychological dependence because it investigates actual auditor decision making. Using an 
experimental approach, Bates et al. tested whether an auditor's judgement differs when the 
auditor is presented with new information about an established client versus new information 
about a new client. Subjects (sixty-seven auditors) were required to make quantitative 
materiality judgements about a lawsuit contingency disclosure. The variable of concern was 
the amount at which they perceived the contingency to be sufficiently material to require 
disclosure. Subjects were presented with a background description of the client company, 
information on the client-auditor history, the current balance sheet and income statement of 
the client and a contingency disclosure case. Information relating to the auditor-client history 
dealt with the group to which the participant was assigned. These groups differed only in 
terms of the length and type of association between the auditor and the client in terms of 
rotation of audit firm, rotation of audit partner, and no rotation. The results showed that the 
materiality level was significantly greater for the 'no rotation group' than for the two auditor 
rotation groups. Bates et al. (1982) concluded by stating that "these results indicate a 
potential need for rotation to mitigate the psychological effect developed from long-term 
auditor-client relations. Rotation of the audit partner, however, was as effective in 
26See p. 34 above for details of her study. 
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eliminating this bias as was the rotation of the audit firm" (p. 62). 
To ensure that independence is not lost because of long associations between the auditor and 
the client, some have argued in favour of mandatory audit firm rotation. The Metcalf Report 
(1976) favoured the mandatory rotation of audit firms every three to five years. Similarly, 
Pearson (1980b) while not specifying any particular time period, recommended the 
introduction of mandatory audit firm rotation to at least aid the auditor in maintaining his/her 
independence. Simon (1980) favoured the introduction of a non-cancellable, non-renewable 
fixed audit term of seven to ten years while in this vein Stettler (1980) proposed a tenure 
period of seven years arguing that longer periods would tie a client to a given auditor for an 
unreasonable length of time. 
Equally, however, there have been a number of arguments, proposed over the years, against 
audit firm rotation. The Cohen Commission (1978) asserted that rotation would cause an 
increase in audit costs because of frequent start-up and learning times and may lead to 
substandard audits, which its findings suggested occurred in the first or second year audits. 
In addition, the Cohen Commission argued that rotation would intensify competition, and 
thereby, would contribute to the independence problem27. The Adams Committee (1978) also 
considered rotation to be unduly expensive and counter-productive and argued that "a 
continuing relationship with the client is the most effective way for the auditor to develop 
more extensive knowledge of the client's business" (p. 56). The efficiencies and cost savings 
generated from a long association between the auditor and the client may, in Shockley's 
(1982) opinion, lead to a more valuable auditor in the client's eyes and an increase in the 
client's dependency on the auditor. By increasing the client's dependency on the auditor, the 
auditor's ability to withstand client pressure will increase and the risk that the auditor will 
lose its independence will decrease (Shockley, 1982). 
Two studies, both of which were based in the U. S., have investigated the effects of rotating 
audit firms on perceptions of auditor independence. The first study, undertaken by Pearson 
and Ryans (1981/82), investigated the effects of a number of auditor-client relationships, 
'Refer to earlier discussion under `Audit Market Competition'. 
51 
including audit tenure, on perceptions of auditor independence held by four respondent 
groups28. The results showed that the statement "publicly-held companies should institute a 
policy that they will change CPA firms periodically to assure auditor independence" was not 
supported by any of the four groups and Big Eight auditor respondents disagreed more 
strongly with firm rotation than any of the other three groups. The second study, which was 
similar to that of Pearson and Ryans (1981/82), was undertaken by Schleifer and Shockley 
(1990)29. The results, which are also similar to those obtained by Pearson and Ryans, showed 
that the majority of respondents did not perceive that the policy of rotating audit firms every 
three to five years would enhance auditor independence. 
As an alternative to audit firm rotation, it has been suggested by many that the advantages 
of rotation can be realised more practically by regular rotation within a firm of personnel 
responsible for the audit work of each client. The Cohen Commission (1978) argued that the 
rotation of audit personnel, without specifying any particular personnel, would achieve many 
of the advantages of firm rotation. Similarly, the Adams Committee (1978) considered it 
desirable that audit firms rotate personnel, and in particular, their partners and managers, on 
engagements from time to time. The Cadbury Committee (1992) recommended that in the 
case of listed companies, a periodic change of audit partners be arranged. A similar 
recommendation was made by CAJEC (1995) which specified that the change should occur 
every seven years. 
Pearson and Ryans (1981/82) and Schleifer and Shockley (1990) investigated the effects of 
rotating audit personnel on perceptions of auditor independence. In relation to the study 
undertaken by Pearson and Ryans, the results showed that the majority of respondents in each 
of the four groups, supported the statement that "CPA firms should periodically, rotate 
personnel assigned to specific clients as a means of assuring auditor independence" (p. 8). 
Similar results were obtained by Schleifer and Shockley (1990) with the majority of 
respondents agreeing that the policy of "rotating audit personnel so that the same auditors do 
not audit the same client for too many consecutive years" would enhance auditor 
28See p. 33 above for details of their study. 
29See p. 44 above for details of their study. 
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independence (p. 12). 
Based on the above empirical studies, it can be seen that long association between the auditor 
and the client is not perceived to impact on auditor independence (Firth, 1981; Shockley, 
1981; Jackson-Heard, 1987) even-though such an association may result in the auditor 
becoming psychologically attached to the client (Bates et al., 1982). It can also be observed 
that the policy of rotating audit personnel is preferred to the policy of audit firm rotation as 
a method of enhancing the perceived independence of the auditor (Pearson and Ryans, 
1981/82; Schleifer and Shockley, 1990). 
3.6: Provision of NAS 
Among all the factors identified in the literature which might threaten the perceived 
independence of the auditor, the provision of NAS to audit clients has been the subject of the 
most heated debate. The controversy surrounding an audit firm providing NAS to its audit 
clients centres around the ability of accounting firms to evaluate objectively the client's 
financial statements while simultaneously providing consulting services to the client. Carey 
and Doherty (1966) argued that "so long as the CPA confines management services to 
advice, and does not participate in the final decision making processes of the client, his 
independence need not be affected" (p. 40). This viewpoint was taken by the ICAI (1995) 
when it noted that "there is no objection in principle to a practice providing to a client 
services additional to the audit. However, care must be taken not to perform management 
functions or to make management decisions" (p. 13). CAJEC (1995) agreed with this opinion 
when it stated that "there is no objection to a firm providing advisory services to a company 
which are additional to the audit but care must be taken to ensure not to perform management 
functions or make management decisions" (p. 17). Similarly, the European Commission 
(1996) stated that "in all cases the auditor should ensure that he and his firm are not involved 
in the management or decision making of his client" (p. 23). 
Schulte (1966) challenged the conventional wisdom when he questioned whether an 
accountant can act as a consultant and an auditor without creating a conflict between his/her 
personal interest and the interest of third parties to whom s/he has a direct fiduciary 
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responsibility in conjunction with an independent audit. He maintained that when an auditor 
tries to fulfil both roles, audit and consulting, independence may become impaired as a result 
of the consultant becoming effectively a decision maker, an employee of the client, or a 
client's advocate. Similar views were put forward by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) and by 
Shockley (1982) and are supported by the empirical studies undertaken by Schulte (1965) and 
Dermer et al. (1971). 
To investigate whether a reasonable observer would consider a conflict of interest with 
auditor's independence where the auditor rendered NAS, Schulte (1965) mailed 
questionnaires to four groups of third parties who rely on audit reports in making financial 
decisions. The four groups comprised of research and financial analysts of brokerage firms, 
commercial loan and trust officers of banks, investment officers of insurance companies, and 
investment officers of domestic mutual funds. Out of a total of 1,260 questionnaires mailed, 
Schulte obtained an overall response rate of 50 per cent. The main findings from his study 
indicated that the majority (66 per cent) of the respondents perceived that management 
consulting, a term used by Schulte instead of NAS but not clearly defined by him, would not 
impair an auditor's independence and over 40 per cent of the respondents indicated that the 
expansion of auditors into the field of management consulting had no effect on their 
confidence in audit reports. There were several factors underlying respondents' confidence 
in auditor independence, but the factor which was ranked highest was that the auditor's role 
in NAS was advisory only. Schulte also elicited reasons for the lack of confidence in auditor 
independence when NAS was offered. These reasons, in order of frequency included: the 
degree of closeness between the client and the auditor which results; the position of advocacy 
which is established between the consultant and the decision maker; the extent to which the 
auditor becomes a decision maker; and the stake that the auditor has in the outcome of 
his/her recommendations as a consultant. 
Dermer et al. (1971) attempted to discover the extent to which the perceived independence 
of Canadian auditors was affected by the dual practices of auditing and NAS. Questionnaires 
were mailed to representatives from seven groups: brokerage firms, investment counsellors, 
mutual funds, the government, trust companies, insurance companies and banks. Out of a 
total of 300 questionnaires mailed, a response rate of 30 per cent was obtained. The main 
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findings from their study indicated that the majority (60 per cent) of the respondents 
considered it possible for the auditor to remain independent and perform both audit and NAS. 
The reasons underlying this confidence were identical, in both nature and in order of 
frequency, to those obtained by Schulte. Dermer et al. also elicited reasons from those (26 
per cent) who perceived that it was not possible for the auditor to remain independent where 
both services were provided. Once again, the reasons underlying this lack of confidence were 
identical to those obtained by Schulte except that their ordering was different. The 'degree 
of closeness between the client and the auditor which results' was ranked second in this 
study, whereas it was ranked first in Schulte's study and the `establishment of an advocacy 
position between the consultant and the decision maker' was ranked first in this study and 
second in Schulte's study. When the auditor was considered to be independent, the majority 
of respondents (72 per cent) made no adjustment to the financial statements and equally when 
the auditor was considered not to be independent, the majority (68 per cent) relied on the 
financial statements to a lesser extent. 
To fully understand the implications of NAS on independence, Goldman and Barley (1974) 
argued that it was not enough to consider, as Schulte (1966) did, the self-interest conflict 
alone. They believed that the effects on the firm-auditor conflict should also be assessed3o. 
They asserted that because most consulting type services are nonroutine and benefit the client 
directly, the provision of NAS "increases the auditor's bargaining position, he is better 
equipped to resist interference in the performance of his auditing duties and is more likely 
to retain his independence" (p. 715). This was one of the issues investigated in the study 
undertaken by Pany and Reckers (1983). 
In this study, questionnaires were mailed to a total of 600 directors and an overall response 
rate of 15 per cent was obtained. Participants were asked to evaluate eighteen proposals to 
engage the auditor for NAS and indicate their "perception of the auditing firm's continuing 
ability to remain independent in the conduct of the corporation's annual audit while also 
"Goldman and Barley (1974) argued that the firm-auditor conflict arises because the 
firm's management wants to present favourable results, including a clean auditor's report, 
to third parties but despite management pressure for a clean audit report, auditors must 
produce a report on the basis of professional standards. 
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serving in the proposed nonaudit capacity" (Pany and Reckers, 1983: 48). To evaluate the 
audit firm's continued audit independence if engaged, a seven point response scale 
(1 =extremely inadequate; 7=extremely adequate) was provided. The proposals consisted of 
manipulations along three dimensions: - type of service, magnitude of current NAS proposal, 
and magnitude of past NAS. Respondents were also informed that the proposed NAS would 
be performed by personnel not involved in the audit. Three types of services were tested: tax 
preparation, acquisition review and systems design. They hypothesised, based on Goldman 
and Barley's (1974) argument, that "the occasion of systems design work would detract from 
independence less than would the other services, especially the tax service" because "the 
systems design work constituted a clearly less routine task than tax preparation and probably 
less so than acquisition work" (p. 50). The results showed that, contrary to expectations, 
systems design services were considered to have a more negative effect on perceived auditor 
independence than either tax preparation or acquisition review services. The results also 
showed that as the amount of NAS income increased, from 10 to 40 per cent, the participants 
considered that there, was a greater risk of independence being impaired and that the past 
level of NAS income, although important, was not as important as the current level. Finally, 
the study found no relationship between respondents' knowledge of the audit function and 
their concern for independence where audit firms provided NAS to audit clients. 
Nichols and Price (1976) disagreed that the nonroutine nature of NAS increased the auditor's 
power. They believed that the provision of NAS, in addition to the audit, would only 
increase the power of the auditor if the firm perceived that such NAS had some unique value 
which could not be obtained from other consultants. This assertion has not been tested 
empirically. 
It has also been argued that the provision of NAS by audit firms can be beneficial, in that, 
it can increase the auditor's knowledge about the client and allow him/her to perform a better 
audit. The Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (1987), 
maintained that "the provision of some NAS by the auditor will often assist the auditor to 
perform the task effectively, by adding to his knowledge of relevant aspects of the business 
affairs and given that the objective of the independence requirements is to support the quality 
of audit services provided, a ban on the provision of other services could, therefore, be 
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counter-productive" (p. 5). Support for this assertion is provided by the study undertaken by 
Pearson (1980a)31. The results showed that Big Eight partners favoured their right to perform 
NAS and they claimed that knowledgeable people do not perceive a compromise to 
independence. They argued that providing NAS had a "positive, and certainly not a negative, 
impact on the effectiveness of audit performance because the knowledge obtained from MAS 
aided auditors in better understanding their clients' businesses, in making judgements 
concerning internal control systems, and in determining whether the financial statements are 
fairly presented" (p. 11). 
It has been argued forcibly that major UK auditing firms have been using audits as loss 
leaders in the hope that, having got a foot in the door, they will then secure lucrative non- 
auditing work (Mitchell et al., 1993: 16). Mitchell et al. suggest that the provision of NAS 
by auditing firms leads to unfair competition because "it is an abuse of the statutory 
monopoly of the external audit function and disadvantages those firms that cannot use audits 
as a market stall for selling other wares" (p. 16). They recommended that auditors should act 
exclusively as auditors and be prohibited from providing NAS to their audit clients. Hillison 
and Kennelley (1988) identified, as an alternative to a total ban on NAS, the spinning off of 
NAS to a separate division. They believed that this alternative would enhance the 
independence of the auditor. A similar recommendation was made by CAJEC (1995) when 
it noted that "if the firm has designed or recommended any part of the system of controls on 
which the audit relies, it may be advisable, perhaps in the case of larger companies, to 
arrange for little or no common membership between the systems work and the audit team" 
(p. 18). Support is provided for this alternative by the study undertaken by Schulte (1965). 
While Schulte did not make it explicit in his questionnaire the possibility of NAS being 
provided by personnel separate to audit personnel, several respondents recognised the benefits 
of such separation in maintaining auditor independence. They believed that large audit firms 
were less likely, than smaller audit firms, to impair their independent status because they can 
afford a special, qualified, separate staff for NAS which was neither possible nor feasible for 
the smaller firm. Similarly, in the study undertaken by Dermer et al. (1971), several 
respondents voluntarily indicated that the size of the accountancy firm was an important 
31See p. 32 above for details of his study. 
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factor in judging the compatibility of NAS and auditor independence which Dermer et al. 
believed supported practice at the time in Canada, where larger firms separated both services 
(audit and NAS) in an attempt to protect the professional image of the auditor. While neither 
of these two studies had set out to test whether the separation of audit services from NAS 
would enhance perceptions of auditor independence, support was provided for such 
separation. Two studies which did set out to test the effectiveness of keeping NAS and audit 
services separate were those undertaken by Titard (1971) and Pany and Reckers (1984). 
The objective of the study undertaken by Titard (1971) was to provide evidence, based on 
the opinions of financial statement users, regarding the independence of auditors who perform 
NAS for audit clients and for those who considered independence to be lessened, to 
determine the degree of their concern. Questionnaires, which listed thirty-three specific types 
of NAS in which it was known that some auditors participate, were mailed to financial 
analysts, trust officers and commercial loan officers. Out of a total of 223 questionnaires 
mailed, an overall response rate of 72 per cent was obtained. Titard tried to avoid the 
criticisms levelled at Schulte (1965) for his use of the term management consulting32. The 
results from the study indicated that almost half of the respondents believed that an auditor 
providing one or more of the listed services to his/her audit clients may result in some loss 
of auditor independence. However, none of the thirty-three NAS caused concern to more than 
32 per cent of the respondents. To judge the seriousness of respondents' concern over the 
loss of auditor independence, Titard asked whether such services should be prohibited. He 
found that where the NAS and audit functions were separated, fewer respondents favoured 
prohibition than when no separation existed, and even then less than half of the respondents 
favoured prohibiting one or more services. 
Pany and Reckers (1984) surveyed 200 chartered financial analysts and 200 stockholders by 
means of a mail questionnaire and an overall response rate of 28 per cent was obtained. 
Subjects were asked to evaluate the audit firm's independence on a scale of 1 (extremely 
inadequate) to 7 (extremely adequate) for each of ten sets of circumstances in which various 
"Refer to discussion by Carey and Doherty (1966) who argued that the term management 
consulting may be too broad or ill-defined to lead to meaningful responses (p. 41). 
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NAS were reported to have been performed. These services were performed either- by an 
individual involved in the audit or by a member not involved in the audit. The types of NAS 
tested included "executive recruiting, actuarial services, purchase acquisition assistance, 
market feasibility studies, redesign of an accounting system, and independent board of 
director recruiting" (Pany and Reckers, 1984: 92). The results of the study showed that 
independence concerns decreased when NAS were conducted by a separate division, and in 
particular, when accounting-oriented services (systems design) were provided. 
Hillison and Kennelley (1988) identified three further alternatives to a total ban on NAS: - 
offer NAS to non-audit clients only; prohibit certain NAS; or allow all types of NAS but 
require full disclosure. They believed that although prohibiting all NAS would have the 
greatest positive impact on perceptions of auditor independence, it would be the most drastic 
action. They favoured full disclosure because not only would it meet with the least resistance 
from practitioners, but it could be effective in monitoring audit clients' purchase of NAS and 
they conjectured that companies would not oppose such disclosure. 
The auditing profession has also considered the option of prohibiting audit firms from 
providing certain NAS. The AICPA (1969) recommended that audit firms should consider 
seriously whether or not they render peripheral NAS (those not related logically either to the 
financial process or to broadly defined information and control systems) because such 
services seem to dilute the image of the firm as auditor. The Metcalf Report (1976) believed 
that the best policy was "to require independent auditors of publicly owned corporations 
perform only services directly related to accounting (provision of certain computer and 
systems analysis that are necessary for improving internal control procedures)" and to 
discontinue with "non-accounting management services (executive recruitment, marketing 
analysis, product analysis, actuarial services) which are incompatible with the public 
responsibilities of independent auditors" (p. 17). In Ireland, although there is no objection in 
principle to a practice providing NAS to audit clients, the ICAI (1995) recommended that a 
practice should not participate in the preparation of accounts and accounting records for listed 
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or other public interest companies33. While to date, no study has investigated the impact of 
offering NAS to non-audit clients only, only one study (Schleifer and Shockley, 1990) has 
investigated whether the other two alternatives to a total ban on NAS, identified by Hillison 
and Kennelley (1988), enhance the perceived independence of auditors. 
Schleifer and Shockley (1990) investigated the effects of three NAS policies, designed to 
enhance auditor independence34. The three policies comprised of (i) prohibit audit firms from 
providing recruitment services to audit clients, (ii) prohibit audit firms from helping their 
former employees find employment with audit clients, and (iii) require companies to disclose 
in their financial statements, the nature of NAS provided by the auditor. The Big Eight group 
was the only group which disagreed that disclosing the nature of NAS rendered to a client 
would enhance auditor independence. Schleifer and Shockley suggested that this disagreement 
may be because the Big Eight group would be most affected by such a policy. The majority 
of loan officers agreed that prohibiting audit firms from providing recruitment services and 
helping their former employees find employment with audit clients would enhance auditor 
independence while the opposite opinion was held by the majority of the Big Eight 
respondents. No consensus was reached for the smaller audit firms and the financial analyst 
group. 
A number of other empirical studies have investigated the impact of the provision of. NAS 
on perceptions of auditor independence. These studies have attempted to overcome the 
criticisms made by Carey and Doherty (1966) at Schulte's (1965) study for his use of a broad 
or ill-defined term, by either specifying particular NAS or defining NAS. 
A study similar to that undertaken by Schulte (1965) was undertaken by Briloff (1966). This 
study elicited, using a mail questionnaire, the views of members of the financial community 
33The ICAI (1995) further recommended that "a firm should not audit a client's financial 
statements which include the product of a specialist valuation carried out by it or by an 
associated practice or organisation in the same country or overseas" (p. 14) nor should a firm 
"underwrite or promote an issue of shares or securities of a company on which it has 
reported or is to report" (p. 35). 
34See p. 44 above for details of their study. 
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and the accounting profession on whether the performance of NAS by auditors would 
adversely affect their independence. Like Schulte, Briloff did not specify whether NAS was 
performed by personnel separate to those performing the audit, or by the same personnel. 
However, he did revise his study to take into account two criticisms made about Schulte's 
research. He used management services instead of management consulting, and he allowed 
respondents to express their views on specific management services, by presenting them with 
twelve services. While Briloff indicated the number of responses he obtained, he did not 
indicate how many questionnaires were initially mailed. Hence, it is unclear what response 
rate was obtained by him and the results should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. The 
results from his study showed that the majority of the respondents from the financial 
community believed that the presence of NAS would detract from the significance of the 
auditor's opinion, the duality of functions by auditors was incompatible with the auditor's 
traditions and independence, and this duality should be discouraged and restricted. A much 
lower percentage of respondents from the accounting profession replied in this manner. There 
were also differences in opinions within the accounting profession. While none of the Big 
Eight respondents believed that NAS would detract from the auditor's opinion or that dual 
involvement in NAS and auditing was incompatible with auditor's independence, 29 per cent 
of the non-Big Eight respondents considered this to be the case. 
Five other studies (Lavin, 1976; Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981; Reckers and Stagliano, 1981; 
Lindsay et al. 1987; and Bartlett, 1993) investigated the effects of specific NAS on 
perceptions of auditor independence. Lavin (1976) examined twelve auditor-client 
relationships, four of which related to the provision of NAS. Questionnaires depicting each 
of the relationships were sent to 330 loan officers, 181 research financial analysts and 365 
auditors and an overall response rate of 46 per cent was obtained. Subjects were asked to 
determine for each auditor-client relationship whether, in their opinion, an accounting firm 
could be independent with respect to the audit. A dichotomous measure of independence, 
independent and not independent, was used. At the time of the study, the AICPA considered 
that the auditor could remain independent where such NAS were provided, whereas the SEC 
believed that independence would be adversely affected by the provision of such NAS to 
audit clients. Lavin's objective was to evaluate whether there was a consensus of opinion 
among third parties and auditors regarding each of the twelve relationships and to ascertain 
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whether third parties and auditors tended to align themselves with the AICPA or the SEC. 
Consensus was reached that the auditor was independent in all but one of the four NAS 
auditor-client relationships. Further, Lavin found that respondents tended to agree more with 
the AICPA's position than with the SEC's position which Lavin interpreted as indicating that 
the SEC's rulings on independence were more conservative than the respondents' attitudes. 
Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981) sought, by using a mail questionnaire, to obtain the views of 
380 German auditors regarding the independence of auditors in ten auditor-client 
relationships. These relationships were identical to ten of those used in Lavin's (1976) study. 
An overall response rate of 28 per cent was obtained. Four of the auditor-client relationships 
depicted, related to the provision of NAS to audit clients which, if provided by the auditor, 
would according to the SEC cause him/her not to be independent. The results indicated that 
the majority of the respondents considered the auditor to be independent in the same three 
relationships identified by Lavin (1976). No consensus was reached in one of the 
relationships. Hence, similar to Lavin's (1976) results, this study showed that the SEC was 
more conservative than auditors in their rulings on independence. 
Reckers and Stagliano (1981) attempted to investigate whether the potential conflict between 
NAS and the audit function decreases as user knowledge and sophistication increases. To 
investigate this issue they distributed a case survey questionnaire to 50 chartered financial 
analysts (the sophisticated group) and to 50 MBA students (the naive group) and responses 
were obtained from all participants. Subjects were asked to indicate the degree of confidence 
they had that the accounting firm could maintain its independence in the conduct of the audit 
where five different NAS were provided (acquisition search, pension and actuarial services, 
systems design, tax planning, and tax preparation). A set of thirty two cases were developed 
where the five types of NAS were randomly assigned a relatively low or relatively high 
percentage value. In no case, however, did any single NAS activity exceed 12 percent of the 
total, but unspecified, audit cost but the total NAS costs ranged from 8 per cent to 51 per 
cent of audit costs. The results, which are contrary to the later findings of Pany and Reckers 
(1983), indicated that the less knowledgeable group of participants (MBA students) when 
compared with the knowledgeable participants (financial analysts) tended, for each case 
presented, to express lower average confidence in the auditor's ability to remain independent. 
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However, consistent with the later results obtained by Pany and Reckers (1983), they found 
that as the total level of NAS increased, the level of confidence in the independence of the 
auditor decreased. They concluded, however, that the level of NAS that resulted in a total 
loss of confidence in the independence of the auditor was relatively high (exceeded 50 per 
cent of audit fees). 
Three of the fifteen auditor-client relationships examined by Lindsay et at. (1987) dealt with 
the provision of NAS3S. The three auditor-client relationships depicted included the provision 
of a recruitment service to an audit client, the setting up of the client's accounting system, 
and out of the total fees received from the client, 25-30 per cent were for the performance 
of NAS. The majority of respondents from each of the three groups perceived the auditor to 
be independent where the audit firm was involved in either the provision of a recruitment 
service to the audit client or in setting up the client's accounting system. However, when the 
performance of NAS generated fee income between 25-30 per cent of the total fees, only the 
auditor respondent group considered the auditor to remain independent. Both sets of users 
considered this relationship to impair auditor independence. 
The final study, Bartlett (1993), asked 300 lending officers and 300 auditors, by way of a 
questionnaire, to indicate their perceptions of auditor independence on a scale of 0 (not 
independent at all) to 100 (completely independent) in ten auditor-client relationships. Four 
of the ten situations related to the provision of NAS and included assistance in: the design 
and implementation of accounting systems for control of inventories; executive search and 
hiring of a chief financial officer; investigation of significant acquisition; and accounting for 
complex transactions. An overall response rate of 40 per cent was obtained. The results 
showed that in each of these situations, lending officers perceived significant reductions in 
auditor independence compared to auditors. In addition, accounting education did not 
significantly affect respondents' perceptions of auditor independence which is consistent with 
the results obtained by Pany and Reckers (1983) but contrary to those obtained by Reckers 
and Stagliano (1981). 
"See p. 41 above for details of their study. 
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Four further studies have also investigated the effects of the provision of NAS by audit firms 
on perceptions of auditor independence, but instead of specifying particular types of NAS, 
they defined NAS in a particular way. The first study was undertaken by Shockley (1981)36 
He defined NAS as the "design and installation of financial and cost accounting systems, 
budget and inventory control systems, and other accounting-related information systems" 
(p. 788). NAS was restricted to two levels, provided and not provided. The results from his 
study indicated that audit firms which provided NAS to audit clients were considered more 
likely to lose independence than those which did not. The NAS-size interaction was not 
important to third parties which according to Shockley suggests that "separation of the two 
functions is not likely to improve third parties' perceptions of independence" (p. 798). This 
suggestion conflicts with the results obtained by Titard (1971) and Pany and Reckers (1984) 
which showed a decrease in independence concerns when NAS were conducted by a separate 
division. 
McKinley et al. (1985) examined the influence of a number of variables, including the 
provision of NAS, on bank officers' decisions, their perceptions of financial statement 
reliability and their perceptions of auditor independence". NAS was defined as "the provision 
of services to improve existing internal control procedures and were performed by CPA firm 
personnel not involved in the audit of the company" (p. 890). The NAS factor reflected either 
that no NAS were performed in the past or that performance was at a fee level approximating 
30 per cent of the audit fee for each of the last three years. Each subject was presented with 
only one level of NAS. The results from the study indicated that the provision of NAS 
affected neither the loan decision nor the interest rate significantly. However, respondents 
had more confidence that the financial statements were free of the existence of fraud (the 
surrogate used to measure the reliability of financial statements) where the audit firm 
provided NAS. McKinley et al. suggested that this could have been caused by respondents 
believing that "NAS performance led to tighter controls" (p. 893). The provision of NAS did 
not significantly affect respondents' perceptions of auditor independence. 
36See p. 33 above for details of his study. 
37See p. 35 above for details of their study. 
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In the study undertaken by Pany and Reckers (1987), NAS was defined as "internal control 
design services performed for the purpose of improving existing controls by audit firm 
professionals not also involved with the audits" (p. 45). They used three distinct 
methodological approaches to consider whether auditor performance of NAS affected loan 
officers' and financial analysts' perceptions of auditor independence. The methodological 
approaches included two within-subject approaches (where subjects were asked to respond 
to more than one level of one or more manipulated variables) and one between-subject 
approach (where subjects were asked to respond to only one level of the manipulated 
variable). In each approach, subjects were asked to indicate their confidence on a scale of 
0 (no confidence) to 10 (extreme confidence) in the independence of the auditor. The 
objective of the study was to determine whether the method used to elicit responses on the 
issue of auditor provision of NAS drove the results obtained. 
The first approach, a within-subject context free questionnaire, required subjects to indicate 
their belief that the audit firm was independent when various levels of NAS were performed. 
It was a context free questionnaire, in that, no financial or other information about the client 
or the auditor was provided to the subjects. The second approach, a within-subject loan 
application/equity investment form, required subjects to review a loan application/equity 
investment form and to evaluate the audit firm's independence under various levels of NAS 
performance. The third and final approach, four between-subjects loan application and equity 
investment forms, corresponded to the second approach except that subjects were required 
to respond to one of four levels of the NAS variable. In all three approaches, the NAS 
variable was tested at four levels: no NAS; and NAS income set at 25 per cent, 60 per cent 
and 90 per cent of audit fees. Out of a total of 3,000 research instruments mailed, they 
obtained an overall response rate of 11 per cent. 
When asked to directly compare auditor independence with and without the performance of 
NAS, the results indicated that in the two within-subject designs, subjects perceived that NAS 
performance impaired auditor independence. However, in the between-subjects design, the 
mean responses as to perceived auditor independence did not differ regardless of whether 
NAS had been performed. Pany and Reckers concluded that "the design used in research of 
this type may drive the results obtained" (p. 50). Their results were consistent with past 
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studies employing within-subject designs and led them to question whether there may have 
been demand effects38 in those past studies. Such an occurrence might negate some of the 
conclusions that certain variables have a significant impact on perceived auditor 
independence39. 
Pany and Reckers (1988) extended their 1987 study by investigating the effects of NAS 
performance on investment decisions and on perceived financial statement reliability for 
varying levels of NAS (no NAS; and NAS set at 25 per cent, 60 per cent and 90 per cent 
of the average audit fee). Their definition of NAS was identical to that used in their 1987 
study. A sample of loan officers and financial analysts were provided with by mail a loan 
application/stock recommendation and financial statement data. Each subject was asked to 
evaluate the loan application/stock recommendation when one of the tested levels of NAS was 
performed by the audit firm. Each subject was exposed to only one level of NAS so as to 
avoid any demand effects. The results showed that loan officers, receiving the instrument 
where NAS income amounted to 25 per cent of audit fees, were more likely than the other 
groups (no NAS; 60 per cent NAS and 90 per cent NAS) to grant the loan. Neither the 
independence nor the reliability scales, which were the same as those used in their 1987 
study, evidenced any abberation of comparable proportion. Pany and Reckers asserted that 
"given that no cogent explanation comes to mind, our inclination would be to attribute the 
result to chance" (p. 37). The only item significantly affected by NAS for the financial 
analysts subjects was the stock's 12-month investment safety, where it was found that 12- 
month safety for 90 per cent NAS was significantly lower than for the other three levels of 
NAS. In summary, Pany and Reckers concluded that auditor performance of NAS "exerts 
little, if any effect on typical investment or credit granting decisions, on perceptions of 
38Pany and Reckers (1987) explained their notion of demand effects as follows: "because 
the subject knows that he or she is involved in an experiment, he or she may reply differently 
than in a `real world' situation. For example, there may be a tendency to `help' the 
experimenter by replying in the manner which the subject perceives that the experimenter 
desires. " (p. 41). 
39Within-subject designs were used by Reckers and Stagliano (1981) and by Pany and 
Reckers (1983) and the results from both of these studies were similar to those obtained by 
Pany and Reckers (1987) in their within-subject designs. A between-subject design was used 
by McKinley et al. (1985) and their findings were again similar to those obtained by Pany 
and Reckers (1987) which used this design. 
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financial statement reliability, or on perceptions of auditor independence" (p. 38). 
In the study undertaken by Gul (1989), NAS was defined as "the design and installation of 
financial and cost accounting systems, budget and inventory control systems and other related 
information systems provided by a separate department within the audit firm" (p. 43)40. NAS 
was restricted to two levels, provided or not provided. Bankers' perceptions of auditor 
independence were affected by the provision of NAS but not in the predicted direction. The 
results showed that bankers had more confidence in auditors who provided NAS. Gul 
believed that these results supported the argument for nonroutine NAS expressed by Goldman 
and Barley (1974). Gul also believed that the performance of NAS by a separate department 
within the audit firm may have contributed to the increase in confidence in auditor 
independence, a suggestion which is supported by the studies undertaken by Titard (1971) 
and Pany and Reckers (1984). 
Finally, two studies which also defined NAS investigated the impact of NAS on the ability 
of the auditor to resist management pressure in a conflict situation. The first study was that 
undertaken by Knapp (1985)41. He defined NAS as "management consulting project on the 
client's cost accounting system" (p. 210). He tested whether bankers perceived management 
to be more likely to obtain its preferred resolution in a conflict situation when the audit firm 
provided a significant amount (40 per cent of audit fees) of NAS to the client as opposed to 
providing no NAS. The results showed that the provision of a significant amount of NAS by 
an audit firm slightly increased the apparent likelihood of a conflict being resolved in favour 
of the client. 
The second study was that undertaken by Gul (1991) which evaluated the impact of NAS, 
among other variables, on bankers' perceptions of the auditor's ability to resist management 
pressure in an audit conflict situation42. NAS was restricted to two levels, provided and not 
provided and was defined as "the design and installation of a new financial and cost 
"See p. 34 above for details of his study. 
41See p. 39 above for details of his study. 
42See p. 35 above for details of his study. 
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accounting system" (p. 164). Gul found stronger evidence that auditors providing NAS were 
perceived to be more likely to resolve the conflict in favour of the client than auditors not 
providing NAS. Gul proposed that the adverse effects on auditor independence caused by the 
provision of NAS to audit clients may be due to "the concern that the auditor may in effect 
become an employee of the client, or be placed in a position of auditing their own decisions" 
(p. 168). He concluded by noting that further research should attempt to investigate the 
reasons for NAS generating concerns with regard to the auditor's ability to resist 
management pressure. 
The above empirical studies have produced conflicting evidence as to the effects of the 
provision of NAS on perceptions of auditor independence. A number of studies indicated an 
impairment of perceived auditor independence (Briloff, 1966; Shockley, 1981; Pany and 
Reckers, 1987), other studies showed no impairment (Schulte, 1965; Dermer et at., 1971; 
Lavin, 1976; Dykxhoorn and Sinning, 1981; McKinley et at., 1985; Pany and Reckers, 
1987) and one study indicated an enhancement of perceived auditor independence (Gul, 
1989). The effects of such conflicting evidence is summarised succinctly by Wolnizer (1987) 
who stated "that the studies report conflicting results is, however, indicative of the 
indeterminate nature of the `scope of services' debate" (p. 145). However, what is consistent 
in the empirical research is that the risk of impairment of auditor independence is decreased 
where personnel providing NAS and audit services are kept separate (Schulte, 1965; Dermer 
et at., 1971; Titard, 1971; Pany and Reckers, 1984). In addition, as the level of NAS 
increases, the greater the perceived risk that independence will be impaired (Reckers and 
Stagliano, 1981; Pany and Reckers, 1983). While it has also been argued in the literature that 
the impact on perceived auditor independence is related to the type (accounting/non- 
accounting) or nature (routine/ nonroutine) of NAS or to respondents' knowledge of the audit 
function, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Finally, conflicting evidence was also found 
in relation to the effects of the provision of NAS on the perceived reliability of financial 
statements (McKinley et at., 1985; Pany and Reckers, 1988) 
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3.7: Client Employment 
Research has shown that it is not an uncommon occurrence for an auditor to take a position 
with a client for whom s/he has carried out the financial statement audit (Imhoff, 1978; 
Lindsay et al., 1987; Corless et al., 1990). One potential problem with this practice, 
identified by Imhoff (1978), occurs during the period before the new job is taken - during 
the audit of the prospective employer. He argued that "in instances where the auditor uses 
auditing experience as a means of obtaining a managerial position with a client firm, a 
shadow is cast on the auditor's ability to attest independently to a prospective employer's 
financial statements" (p. 870). Lindsay et al. (1987), who shared this concern, questioned an 
auditor's ability to keep an independent attitude with respect to the management and the 
company with whom s/he may soon be affiliated. Similarly, Corless et al. (1990) argued that 
"if an auditor is working hard to look good in the eyes of the client, hoping to gain 
employment with that client, that auditor's independence is definitely impaired, indeed the 
auditor is almost the same as a client's employee" (p. 9). The potential threat to auditor 
independence from an audit partner or senior employee participating in the conduct of an 
audit in the knowledge that s/he is to join the client was also recognised by CAJEC (1995) 
when they recommended that "the individual notify the audit firm immediately and that the 
firm remove that individual from the audit team, coupled with a review of any significant 
audit judgements made by such an individual" (p. 14). 
Lindsay et al. (1987) investigated whether perceptions of auditor independence are affected 
by an auditor considering a job offer from an audit client. They examined, using a mail 
questionnaire, the effects of a number of variables, including client employment on 
accountants' and users' perceptions of auditor independence43. To examine the effects of 
client employment on auditor independence, subjects were asked to indicate whether they 
considered the public accounting firm to be independent when "X is a chartered accountant 
with an accounting firm and is supervising the audit of the client company and at this time, 
is considering a job offer from the client" (p. 178). The majority of bankers and financial 
analysts considered the auditor not to be independent in this situation. However, no 
consensus was reached by the accountants. 
43See p. 41 above for details of their study. 
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A second problem with client employment, identified by Imhoff (1978) and Koh and 
Mahathevan (1993), relates to the ability of the auditor to remain independent when dealing 
with top managers who were previously fellow auditors. This issue was indirectly 
investigated by Firth (1981) when the auditor-client relationship presented to subjects was one 
where the ex-auditor had previously acted as audit partner, or more specifically, "the recently 
appointed financial director of a company is responsible for producing its financial 
statements. He was previously a partner (for ten years) in the accounting firm which does 
the audit" (p. 463)44. The results showed that in this situation, bankers were concerned as to 
whether the auditor could remain completely unbiased in dealing with a former partner who 
now works for the client firm. Firth suggested that "the problems of strong personal 
relationships and the knowledge that the financial director has of the auditing firm's 
techniques, could well lead to biased audits if the company and its financial directors wanted 
to take advantage of the situation (e. g. showing a more healthy financial position so as to 
obtain bank loans on more favourable terms)" (p. 186). 
A related issue, identified by Firth (1981) and Koh and Mahathevan (1993) is whether the 
knowledge of the ex-auditor pertaining to the audit methodology used by an audit firm in any 
way hinders an independent audit from being carried out. While reference to this issue has 
been made in these two studies, neither study has tested it empirically. 
The length of time between accepting a position with an audit client and auditing the client's 
financial statements and the nature of the ex-auditor's position (supervisory/non-supervisory) 
on perceptions of auditor independence have been investigated by three further studies 
(Warren, 1976; Imhoff, 1978; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993). Warren (1976) mailed a 
questionnaire to 330 people in the U. S., comprising of financial analysts, bankers and 
auditors and an overall response rate of 42 per cent was obtained. Subjects were presented 
with a hypothetical audit case in which an auditor accepts a position with a former client. 
They were informed about the auditor's previous role on the audit (supervisory/non- 
supervisory) and about the length of time that had elapsed since completing the audit and 
taking up the position with the audit client (less than 6 months; 6-18 months; 18-30 months; 
See p. 49 above for details of his study. 
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and 30-42 months) and were asked to indicate whether they considered the auditor to be 
independent (yes/no). The results showed that the majority of respondents, although the 
auditor group to a lesser degree, perceived the practice of auditors accepting positions with 
former clients as a threat to auditor independence and, in particular, when the auditor accepts 
a position with a client less than six months after the completion of the audit and was 
previously a supervisor on the audit. Warren argued that although users were more critical 
than auditors of the effects of client employment on auditor independence, "the fact that 
auditors question the appearance of auditor independence at all, may imply that in some 
situations, actual independence rather than the appearance of independence is being violated" 
(p. 616). 
A similar study was undertaken by Imhoff (1978). A questionnaire was mailed to 110 
bankers, 110 financial analysts and 110 auditors which described a hypothetical situation in 
which an auditor accepts a position with a client firm which the auditor had previously 
audited. In addition, participants were informed of the time lapse between auditing and 
working for a client firm (6 months or less, 7-18 months, 19-30 months, and 31-42 months), 
and the rank which the ex-auditor held in the audit of that client (supervisor/non-supervisor) 
and were asked to indicate (yes/no) whether they perceived the auditor to be independent. 
An overall response rate of 43 per cent was obtained. As in Warren's study, both variables 
were found to influence both users' and auditors' responses. As the time lapse interval 
between auditing and working for a client firm decreased, the auditor's independence was 
doubted more. In addition, the threat to independence was perceived to be greater where the 
auditor acted in a supervisory role than in a non-supervisory role. When a comparison was 
made between users' (bankers/financial analysts) and auditors' perceptions, the results, which 
were consistent with those of Warren's study, showed that both bankers and financial analysts 
perceived client employment to be a greater threat to auditor independence than auditors did. 
The final study, which investigated the effects of client employment on perceptions of auditor 
independence, was undertaken by Koh and Mahathevan (1993). In addition to the two 
variables examined by Warren (1976) and Imhoff (1978), time lapse and nature of position, 
Koh and Mahathevan assessed the impact of the current position held by the ex-auditor in the 
client firm (preparer of financial statements and non-preparer) and the type of audit opinion 
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(qualified and unqualified) issued by the ex-auditor prior to accepting employment with the 
client. A case study questionnaire methodology was employed in the study with a between- 
subject design. A total of twenty four cases were developed and each case had a unique 
combination of the above four variables. Subjects were asked to rank their perception of 
auditor independence on a scale of 1 (not independent) to 7 (very independent). A total of 
540 case questionnaires were sent to middle-level managers in Singapore and an overall 
response rate of 73 per cent was obtained. The results, which are consistent with those found 
by Warren (1976) and Imhoff (1978), showed that the independence of the subsequent audit 
was questioned more when the ex-auditor was in a supervisory position compared to a non- 
supervisory position. 
In addition, consistent with previous findings, the shorter the time lapse between auditing and 
joining the client's workforce, the more independence was questioned by the managers in this 
study. A possible reason for this finding, suggested by Koh and Mahathevan, may be that 
managers in their study considered the chances of employment negotiations being underway 
greater when the time lapse was shorter and this may have caused them to consider the ex- 
auditor to be more compromising in order to secure a job with the client. They also found 
that the current position of the ex-auditor in the client firm significantly affected the 
perceived independence of the subsequent audit, with independence being questioned more 
when the ex-auditor accepted a position as a preparer as opposed to a non-preparer of 
financial statements. This, they believed, could have been caused by the ex-auditor, as a 
preparer of financial statements, continuing to deal closely with the new auditors and, 
therefore, the managers in their study viewed them as having a greater opportunity to impair 
the independence of the subsequent audit. Finally, they found no significant effect on auditor 
independence associated with the last audit opinion issued by the ex-auditor's firm. 
The above studies have shown that subsequent client employment adversely affects 
perceptions of auditor independence. In particular, the threat to auditor independence is 
perceived to be greater the shorter the time lapse between completing the audit and taking 
up the position with the client (Warren, 1976; Imhoff, 1978; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993), 
when the previous position on the audit was as audit supervisor than as non-supervisor 
(Warren, 1976; Imhoff, 1978; Koh and Mahathevan, 1993), and when the new position is 
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as a preparer of financial statements than as a non-preparer (Koh and Mahathevan, 1993). 
Perceptions of auditor independence were also affected by an auditor considering a job offer 
with an audit client (Lindsay et al., 1987) and by possible relationships which current 
auditors had with ex-auditors (Firth, 1981). 
3.8: Summary and Limitations of Empirical Research 
The empirical research, undertaken to date and reported upon above, which has investigated 
perceptions of auditor independence falls into two categories, mail surveys and experimental. 
Table 3.1 summarises those studies which used mail surveys, and Table 3.2 summarises 
those which used an experimental approach. In addition to the difference in methodology 
adopted, it can be seen from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, that studies differed in relation to (i) the 
type of independence response requested (dichotomous/scaled), (ii) the subjects from whom 
responses were sought, (iii) the response rate obtained, and (iv) whether independence was 
defined or not. 
The limitations of the studies reviewed in this chapter relate primarily to the methodology 
that they adopted. Non-response bias is a problem with questionnaires and experiments which 
are mailed. It can be seen from Tables 3.1 and 3.2 that the response rate obtained in some 
studies was very low and hence the results from such studies must be interpreted with 
caution. The results from experiments which use factorial designs, are limited to the factors 
investigated. Normally, the number of variables and levels of factors are kept small in order 
to keep the experimental task manageable. In addition, those experiments which use a within- 
subject approach may have an added drawback in that demand effects may be present". 
Because there are weaknesses inherent in any one methodology, the multi-method approach, 
which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, to research is an important alternative and 
has been used for the purposes of this research. 
It can be seen from Tables 3.1 and 3.2, that a number of studies used dichotomous response 
45Refer to Pany and Reckers (1987) for a discussion of demand effects in within-subject 
experiments. 
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measures (independent/not independent). Such studies, therefore, assumed that independence 
is absolute and that there were no degrees of independence. As highlighted by Carmichael 
and Swieringa (1968) "like all aspects of professionalism, independence is a matter of 
degree" (p. 705). For the purposes of this study, independence is assumed to be a matter of 
degree. In addition, as indicated in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, several studies did not define auditor 
independence. Hence, they did not control for how participants interpreted the concept. This 
study sought to overcome this weakness by providing a definition of auditor independence. 
The results from all these studies reviewed are generally limited to showing which situations 
are perceived to impair auditor independence but they do not indicate how or why the 
participants responded in the manner that they did. A number of researchers conjectured 
about the reasons for their results. To explain why auditors were perceived more likely to 
resolve a conflict in favour of a client when competition was high than when it was low, Gul 
(1991) suggested that subjects in his study may have believed that "the client may be tempted 
to replace the auditor with a more compliant auditor and the auditor who is concerned about 
being replaced is less likely to resist management pressure" (p. 169). Firth (1981) suggested 
that the lack of concern expressed by the participants in his study with long audit tenure was 
because the possible increased expertise of the partner was perceived to far outweigh the 
possible bias due to his knowing the management so well. McKinley et al. (1985) explained 
that the reason that respondents in their study had more confidence that the financial 
statements were free of fraud where the audit firm provided NAS was that respondents may 
have believed that "NAS performance led to tighter controls" (p. 893). To explain why 
subjects questioned independence more when the ex-auditor was in a supervisory position 
compared to a non-supervisory position, Koh and Mahathevan (1993) suggested that "(i) the 
ex-auditor who was previously in a supervisory position may be viewed by managers as 
having greater knowledge of the audit methodology and hence impairing independence of 
subsequent audits and (ii) the ex-auditor may be perceived as exercising personal power and 
undue influence over the new auditors" (p. 238). This study attempts to overcome this 
problem of conjecture by using follow-up in-depth interviews with a sample of participants. 
These interviews allowed the researcher to probe issues further in an attempt to understand 
how or why the participants responded in the manner that they did. 
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3.9: Summary 
Research undertaken on the impact of audit firm size on perceptions of auditor independence 
has shown that users of financial statements perceived larger audit firms as being less likely 
to lose their independence than smaller audit firms. This, as argued by Mautz and Sharaf 
(1961) may be caused by users perceiving larger firms as less dependent on a client than 
smaller firms due to the client's fees being a smaller proportion of their total revenue and, 
as a result, the impact of losing a client being less for a larger firm. Alternatively, it may 
be as a result of users considering the service offered by smaller firms to be more personal 
than that offered by larger firms or by smaller firms having a closer relationship with their 
clients than larger firms. In addition, the empirical research has shown that financial 
statements audited by larger audit firms are perceived to be more reliable than those audited 
by smaller audit firms. 
It has been argued that auditor independence is impaired by a highly competitive audit market 
because, in such an environment, the auditor is forced to rely more heavily on management 
representations when faced with time and budget pressures and has a lower ability to 
withstand management pressures. In addition, high competition has been seen as encouraging 
the practice of low-balling which according to some researchers impairs auditor 
independence. However, the studies which have investigated the impact of competition on 
perceptions of auditor independence have produced conflicting evidence both at the general 
level and at the more specific levels (low-balling and auditor's ability to withstand 
management pressures). 
It has been argued that the existence of an audit committee enhances the perceived 
independence of auditors because management's power over the auditor is limited where the 
audit committee is held responsible for the selection of auditing firms, the negotiation of fees 
and participating in matters concerning the auditor. Normally, where such decisions are left 
in the hands of management, pressure may be seen to be placed on the auditor to follow the 
dictates of management if they wish to be re-appointed. While the empirical research showed 
that the selection and remuneration of auditors was not commonly the function of the audit 
committee, when audit committees performed such roles, auditor independence was perceived 
to be enhanced. In addition, it has been argued that audit committees can strengthen the 
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position of the auditor by providing auditors with a forum to air their concerns and a 
framework within which the auditor can assert his/her independence in the event of a dispute 
with management. Such assertions have found support in the empirical studies undertaken in 
this area. Finally, it was shown that audit committees were perceived to enhance the 
reliability of financial statements. 
The length of time an audit firm acts for the same client, and the effects this may have on 
auditor independence has received much attention in the auditing literature. Some have 
argued that a long association with an audit client may result in complacency, lack of 
innovation, and less rigorous auditing procedures. To counteract such problems, rotation of 
audit firms has been suggested. However, the results from the empirical studies undertaken 
to date indicated that users of financial statements did not consider that this policy would 
enhance auditor independence. As an alternative to audit firm rotation, it has been suggested 
by many and supported by empirical research, that the advantages of rotation can be realised 
more practically by regular rotation within an audit firm of personnel responsible for the 
audit work of each client. 
Among all the factors identified in the literature which might threaten auditor independence, 
the provision of NAS to audit clients has been the subject of the most heated debate. The 
empirical research has produced conflicting evidence as to the effects of the provision of 
NAS on perceptions of auditor independence. Some studies indicated an impairment of 
perceived auditor independence, other studies showed that the provision of NAS to audit 
clients had no impact on auditor independence and one study indicated an increase in 
perceived auditor independence where NAS was provided. These conflicting results suggest 
that a total ban on the provision of NAS to audit clients might prove counter-productive in 
terms of enhancing auditor independence. As an alternative, it has been proposed that 
personnel involved in the audit should be separate to those involved in NAS. This proposal 
is supported by the empirical research findings which have shown that the risk of impairment 
of auditor independence is decreased where both services are provided by separate personnel. 
In addition, as the level of NAS provided decreases, the threat to auditor independence is 
perceived to decrease. While it has also been argued in the literature that the impact on 
perceived auditor independence is related to the type (accounting/non-accounting) or nature 
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(routine/non-routine) of NAS or to respondents' knowledge of the audit function, the 
empirical evidence is inconclusive. Conflicting results have also been produced in relation 
to the effects of NAS provision on the perceived reliability of financial statements. 
Research has shown that it is not an uncommon occurrence for an auditor to take a position 
with a client for whom s/he has carried out the audit. However, it has been found that client 
employment adversely affects perceptions of auditor independence. The risk of auditor 
independence impairment was shown to be greater when (i) the time lapse between accepting 
a position and last auditing the client was short rather than long, (ii) the auditor held a 
supervisory, rather than a non-supervisory, position on the audit prior to accepting 
employment with the client; and (iii) the auditor accepted a position as preparer, rather than 
as a non-preparer, of financial statements with the client. Perceptions of auditor independence 
were also adversely affected by an auditor considering a job offer from an audit client and 
by personal relationships which were perceived to exist between current auditors and ex- 
auditors. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Questionnaire Research 
Study Type of Independence 
Response Defined 
Respondents Response 
Rate 
Schulte Degree of beliefs No 
(1965) (independence) 
Briloff Dichotomous No 
(1966) response (I/NI) 
Dermer et Degree of beliefs Yes 
al. (1971) (independence) 
Titard Indication of No 
(1971) which NAS may 
result in loss to 
independence 
Lam & Rate function of N/A 
Arens AC in terms of 
(1975) importance 
Lam Dichotomous N/A 
(1976) response (F. S 
reliable/not reliable) 
Lavin Dichotomous No 
(1976) response (I/NI) 
Pearson Degree of beliefs No 
(1980a) (independence) 
Dykxhoorn Dichotomous No 
& Sinning response (I/NI) 
(1981) 
N/A Not applicable 
I/NI Independent/ Not Independent 
loan officers, 50% 
investment officers, 
analysts (n=1,260) 
analysts, Not 
executives, reported 
accountants 
brokerage firms, 30% 
mutual funds, 
the government, 
insurance & trust 
companies, banks, 
investment 
counsellors (n=300) 
loan officers, 72% 
trust officers, 
analysts (n=223) 
CEOs, analysts 78% 
members of AC, 
accountants (n=819) 
analysts 75 % 
(n =276) 
loan officers, 46% 
accountants, 
analysts (n=876) 
Big Eight 100% 
partners (n=8) 
German auditors 28% 
(n=380) 
AC Audit committee 
F. S. Financial statements 
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Table 3.1: Continued 
Study Type of Independence Respondents 
Response Defined 
Pearson Strength of No 
& Ryans belief 
(1981/82) (independence) 
Pearson Strength of Yes 
& Ryans belief 
(1982) (independence) 
Pany & Scaled response No 
Reckers (independence) 
(1983) 
Pany & Scaled response No 
Reckers (independence) 
(1984) 
Lindsay et Dichotomous No 
al. (1987) response (I/NI) 
Schleifer & Strength of No 
Shockley belief 
(1990) (independence) 
Collier Rank the 
(1992) function of 
AC in terms 
of importance 
Bartlett Scaled response Yes 
(1993) (independence) 
Response 
Rate 
accountants, analysts 62% 
audit partners from 
Big 8 and non-Big 
8 firms (n=400) 
as above 66% 
directors 15 % 
(n = 600) 
analysts, 28% 
stockbrokers 
(n=400) 
auditors, analysts, 38% 
loan officers 
(n=1,200) 
analysts, loan 100% 
officers, partners 
from Big 8 and non- 
Big 8 firms (n=70) 
industrial companies, 80% 
financial institutions 
(n=246) 
N/A 
loan officers, 40% 
auditors 
(n=600) 
N/A Not applicable 
I Independent 
NI Not independent 
AC Audit committee 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Experimental Research 
Study Type of Independence Respondents Response 
Response Defined Rate 
Warren Dichotomous No analysts, bankers, 42% 
(1976) response (I/NI) auditors (n=330) 
Imhoff Dichotomous No analysts, bankers, 43 % 
(1978) response (I/NI) auditors (n=330) 
Firth State maximum N/A bankers 
(1981) amount prepared (n=1,700) 
to lend 
74% 
Reckers & scaled response No MBA students, 100% 
Stagliano (independence) analysts (n=100) 
(1981) 
Shockley scaled response No loan officers, 64% 
(1981) (independence) analysts, partners 
from Big 8 and non- 
Big 8 firms (n=277) 
Bates et State if 
al. (1982) contingency 
requires 
disclosure 
N/A auditors 
(n=67) 
100% 
Knapp scaled response Yes loan officers 61% 
(1985) (independence) (n=70) 
N/A not applicable 
I Independent 
NI Not independent 
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Table 3.2: Continued 
Study Type of Independence Respondents Response 
Response Defined Rate 
McKinley scaled response Yes loan officers 29% 
et at. (independence & (n=900) 
(1985) reliability of F. S. ) 
Jackson- scaled response Yes analysts 23% 
Heard (independence) (n = 100) 
(1987) 
Pany & scaled response Yes loan officers, 11 
Reckers (independence) analysts 
(1987) (n=3,000) 
Pany & scaled response Yes loan officers, Not 
Reckers (independence & analysts reported 
(1988) reliability of F. S. ) 
Gul scaled response Yes loan officers 76% 
(1989) (independence) (n= 64) 
Gul scaled response Yes loan officers 67% 
(1991) (independence) (n=72) 
Koh & scaled response No middle managers 73% 
Mahathevan (n =540) 
(1993) (independence) 
N/A 
F. S. 
Not applicable 
Financial statements 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1: Introduction 
All researchers face decisions about the most appropriate means of collecting information for 
their research topic. The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on how, in light of the 
literature review, the objectives of this thesis, which were outlined in Chapter 1, may be 
satisfied. This chapter commences with an examination of two different methodologies 
available to the researcher: quantitative and qualitative; followed by a discussion of the 
research objectives which, according to Moser and Kalton (1979) should be the guiding force 
of any research methodology. Finally, the combination of quantitative and qualitative 
research, the chosen approach for this study, is explored. 
4.2: Quantitative and Qualitative Methodologies 
Philosophers of science and methodologists have been engaged in a long-standing debate 
about how best to conduct research. This debate has centred on the relative value of two 
fundamentally different and competing paradigms: logical-positivism and phenomenological 
(Patton, 1990: 37). The hallmarks of positivism is its insistence on explanation, prediction 
and proof whereas the phenomenological approach is a focus on understanding the meaning 
events have for persons being studied (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 3). The former 
approach uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical-deductive 
generalisations while the latter approach uses qualitative and naturalistic methods to 
inductively and holistically understand human experience in context-specific settings (Patton, 
1990: 37). As Fielding and Fielding (1986) point out "qualitative work is inductive rather 
than deductive. One does not start with a hypothesis, but rather generates hypotheses from 
the data" (p. 44). 
The term qualitative covers a range of approaches. Van Maanen (1985) sees it as "an 
umbrella term covering an array of interpretative techniques which seek to describe, decode, 
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translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more 
or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world" (p. 9). Patton (1990) sees 
qualitative measures as "longer, more detailed and variable in content; analysis is difficult 
because responses are neither systematic nor standardised" (p. 24). The data which results 
from such measures is renowned for its richness and depth. 
Quantitative measures, on the other hand, are "succinct, parsimonious, and easily aggregated 
for analysis" (Patton, 1990: 24). They rely on "the use of instruments that provide a 
standardised framework in order to limit data collection to certain predetermined response 
or analysis categories" (Patton, 1990: 14). The resulting information provides a "static" 
account of social life, "an account of the regularities and hence patterns of structure" 
(Bryman, 1988: 140). Such an approach is essential in large scale surveys where a great deal 
of information is being collected and where it is important that follow-up studies can be 
undertaken. 
Qualitative and quantitative methods constitute alternative, but not mutually exclusive, 
strategies for research (Patton, 1990: 14). Patton (1990) recommends that rather than 
believing that one must choose to align with one paradigm or the other, the decision must 
be whether one has made sensible methods decisions given the purpose of the inquiry, the 
questions being investigated, and the resources available. 
4.3: Objectives 
The objectives of this study, which were presented in Chapter 1, are three-fold: 
i) To examine the effects of selected variables on perceptions of auditor independence 
held by corporate lenders, investment managers, and analysts in Ireland; 
ii) To examine the effects of these perceptions on the perceived reliability of financial 
statements; and 
iii) To explore the reasons for such perceptions being held by corporate lenders, 
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investment managers and analysts. 
The selected variables, referred to in objective one, include: audit firm size; competition in 
the audit market; audit committees; audit tenure; provision of nonaudit services (NAS) and 
client employment. Objective one is concerned with assessing whether auditors were 
perceived to be more or less independent when any one of these variables was present. 
Objective two entails, as in other studies (McKinley et al., 1985; Lam, 1976; and Pany and 
Reckers, 1988) an assessment of whether the existence of each of these variables leads to 
financial statements being perceived as more or less reliable. Objective three is concerned 
with shedding light on the results obtained from the first two lines of enquiry by probing 
further into the reasons that corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts hold the 
perceptions that they do. 
The nature of this study is such that it is concerned with the perceptions of auditor 
independence and the reliability of financial statements held within the commercial 
environment in Ireland. Rather than focusing the research on the development and testing of 
specific detailed, and necessarily restricted, hypotheses, this study will seek to obtain 
supportable and useful insight from a combination of questionnaire and interview approaches. 
The study is intended to provide both descriptive and analytically derived knowledge as to 
the perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements held by 
corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts in Ireland. It will seek to identify the 
underpinnings of these perceptions and will investigate whether there are any characteristics 
specific to the Irish market which may have contributed to these perceptions. The approach 
builds on and develops previous research conducted outside the Irish market and it is hoped 
that it will stimulate further research. 
There are a number of methods, based on the previous studies discussed in Chapter 3, that 
might be applied to investigate the effects of these variables on perceptions of auditor 
independence and on the perceived reliability of financial statements. They include both 
quantitative and qualitative methods,, for example, mail questionnaire surveys46, structured 
46Refer to Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. 
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and unstructured interviews47, and empirical experiments48. The different methodologies used 
in these previous studies indicate that both quantitative and qualitative techniques can be used 
in evaluating the perceived independence of auditors and the perceived reliability of financial 
statements. However, each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, and no single 
method is likely to be completely successful. 
It has been argued that qualitative studies allow a greater richness and depth in the analysis 
of the data but one common concern, is that such studies contain an implicit researcher bias 
which reduces the objectivity of the research findings. On the other hand, while precision and 
accuracy is conveyed in statistical data generated by quantitative research studies, the 
construction of questionnaires to produce the raw data on which the statistical calculations 
are based, is open to bias in the same way as asking questions at an interview. Patton (1987) 
stressed that "numbers do not protect against bias: they sometimes merely disguise it. All 
statistical data are based on someone's definition of what to measure and how to measure it" 
(p. 166). Clearly, a major trade-off between quantitative methods and qualitative methods is 
a trade-off between breadth and depth (Patton, 1990: 165). Breadth is facilitated by the 
quantitative approach, in that, it allows the researcher to measure the reactions of many 
subjects but at a cost to depth because questions must be limited. The opposite is true of 
qualitative methods which generate a wealth of detailed information about a much smaller 
number of subjects. 
Fielding and Fielding (1986) argued that "it is impractical and unwise to list all the available 
means of data collection and analysis and use as many as possible. What is important is to 
choose at least one method which is specifically suited to exploring the structural, aspects of 
the problem and at least one which can capture the essential elements of its meaning to those 
involved" (p. 34). In this study, it was decided to use both mail questionnaires and in-depth 
interviews. The mail questionnaire would provide breadth to the study, by seeking the 
perceptions held by a large sample of respondents and in that way address both objectives 
one and two. In-depth interviews with selected corporate lenders, investment managers and 
"'Collier (1992) used follow-up interviews in his study on audit committees. 
48Refer to Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. 
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analysts would provide a rich seam of detail to the study and would allow the researcher to 
probe further into why these perceptions were held and thereby address objective three. 
Patton (1990) points out that follow-up interviews with a sub-sample of respondents can 
provide meaningful additional detail to help make sense out of and interpret survey results. 
Because of the differing strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative methods, 
the use of a combination of methods should provide the most useful results, enabling 
reasonable coverage to be achieved (the mail questionnaire) whilst at the same time allowing 
some in-depth understanding to be obtained (in-depth interviews). According to Patton (1990) 
"qualitative data can put flesh on the bones of quantitative results, bringing the results to life 
through in-depth case elaboration" (p. 132). This combination of methods, the chosen 
approach for this study, is discussed further below. 
4.4: Methodological Mixes 
One important way to strengthen a study design is through triangulation which is defined by 
Jick (1985) as "the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon" 
(p. 136). Hence rather than seeing quantitative and qualitative methods as being in 
competition, they should be seen as complementary. Fielding and Fielding (1986) see 
qualitative work as assisting quantitative work by "providing a theoretical framework, 
validating survey data, interpreting statistical relationships and deciphering puzzling 
responses, selecting survey items to construct indices, and offering case study illustrations" 
(p. 27). Triangulation is seen as "capturing a more complete, holistic, and contextual 
portrayal of the unit(s) under study and may be used not only to examine the same 
phenomenon from multiple perspectives but also to enrich our understanding by allowing for 
new or deeper dimensions to emerge" (Jick, 1985: 138). 
This combination of methodologies is an effort to overcome the weaknesses of either one of 
the methodologies used in isolation. Patton (1990) sees the use of multiple methods and a 
variety of data types as contributing to methodological rigour and believes that studies that 
use only one method are more vulnerable to errors linked to that particular method than 
studies that use multiple methods in which different types of data provide cross-data validity 
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checks. However, Fielding and Fielding (1986) stress that "what is involved in triangulation 
is not the combination of different kinds of data per se, but rather an attempt to relate 
different sorts of data in such a way as to counteract various possible threats to the validity 
of the analysis" (p. 24). It has been argued that the effectiveness of triangulation rests on the 
premise that the weaknesses in each single method will be compensated by the counter- 
balancing strengths of the other (Dick, 1985: 138). In summary, triangulation provides a 
number of opportunities for the researcher: firstly it can increase researcher confidence so 
that findings may be better imparted to the audience and lessen recourse to the assertion of 
privileged insight (Fielding and Fielding, 1986: 25); secondly the creation of inventive 
methods can be stimulated (Dick, 1985: 145); and finally it can lead to each approach 
enriching and validating the other (Faulkner, 1982: 87). 
4.5: Summary 
This chapter discussed both quantitative and qualitative approaches to research and 
highlighted the underlying theoretical perspectives of each approach which gave rise to 
different methodologies. Positivism uses quantitative methods, including instruments such as 
questionnaires and surveys while the phenomenological approach pursues the qualitative path, 
relying on in-depth interviews and other methods that yield rich and descriptive data. In order 
to decide on which approach to adopt, the objectives of the study were presented. As both 
approaches, quantitative and qualitative, have their own strengths and weaknesses, the use 
of a combination of methods, mail questionnaires and in-depth interviews, was explored. The 
next chapter will discuss the development, refinement and administration of these two 
research instruments. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1: Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design adopted to satisfy the stated 
objectives. As indicated in the previous chapter, the research design comprised two principal 
elements - mail questionnaires and in-depth personal interviews. The selection of the 
respective populations and the development and administration of the requisite instrument for 
each element are discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
5.2: Population 
The population chosen for this study comprised of corporate lenders, investment managers 
and analysts. These groups were chosen based on previous research which has identified 
them as the primary users of financial statements (ASB, 1991) and has shown that they rely 
on financial statements to reach appropriate decisions (Bertholdt, 1979; Libby, 1979; Chang 
et al., 1983; Berry et al., 1987; Bromwich, 1992). In addition, these groups have been 
identified in previous' studies as sophisticated users (Lee and Tweedie, 1981) and on that 
basis their perceptions of auditor independence and the impact that such perceptions have on 
their assessment of the reliability of financial statements are worthy of study. 
A list of banking institutions who were members of the Irish Bankers Federation was 
obtained (appendix A). Colleagues in the accounting department at Dublin City University 
and connections with the accounting profession provided a contact name in each institution. 
These persons were then contacted and asked to provide a list of their firm's corporate 
lenders. Corporate lenders are defined as those lending to the Irish business community. Out 
of a total of twenty one institutions contacted, eighteen agreed to participate and two stated 
that it was against company policy to participate in such studies. The loan book of the final 
institution had been acquired, subsequent to the date that the listing was published, by 
another bank, which had already agreed to participate in the study (appendix A). In addition, 
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in March 1996 one of the banks which stated that it was against its company policy to 
participate in such studies was acquired by another bank, whose participation had been 
obtained (appendix A). Each of the eighteen institutions furnished lists of names of their 
corporate lenders who operated in Dublin which resulted in 141 corporate lenders. As a 
result of the preliminary interviews with corporate lenders, which are discussed later, the 
sample of corporate lenders was restricted to those operating in Dublin. 
The investment manager population was based on the Irish Association of Investment 
Managers list of institutional members, which comprised of a total of seventeen members 
(appendix B). The secretary of the Association provided a contact name for each institution 
and allowed her name to be used as a basis for introduction to the institution and to 
encourage participation in the study. Each institution was then contacted by letter. Co- 
operation was obtained from fifteen members who furnished a list of names of their 34 
investment managers. Two members were unwilling to participate for the following reasons: 
one stated that it was against company policy to participate in such studies; and the other 
stated that he was the only investment manager in his firm and that he did not believe that 
he would have any useful contributions to make to the study because he relied totally on 
brokers' reports for investment information. 
The final group of 21 analysts came from the four largest stockbroking firms in Ireland 
(appendix Q. Size is based on their dealings in Irish equity market shares which in 1995 
amounted to approximately 91 per cent and approximately 95 per cent in 1996 (Finance 
Stockbroking Survey, 1996). Colleagues in the finance department at Dublin City University 
provided a contact name in each stockbroking firm and allowed the use of their names as a 
basis for introduction to the firms and to ask for their participation. Full co-operation was 
obtained from each of the four firms. 
5.3: Collection of Information 
The collection of data was in three stages: preliminary interviews with fellow academics and 
a small number of corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts; mail questionnaires 
to 196 individuals already described; and in-depth interviews with selected corporate lenders, 
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investment managers, and analysts. 
5.3.1: Preliminary Interviews 
The first stage was undertaken in May and June 1995 and involved interviews with fellow 
academics, with interests in both questionnaire design and the general area of research 
enquiry, and with six potential respondents: three corporate lenders, two investment 
managers, and one analyst. Berdie et al. (1986) argued that every possible effort should be 
made to know the population that is being studied. They recommended as a means of 
achieving this objective, soliciting input from potential respondents and knowledgeable 
persons regarding the topic of the survey, their reaction to the method that will be used, and 
their opinion on other study design considerations. Fellow academics were chosen to 
represent `the knowledgeable persons' referred to by Berdie et al. (1986) and the three 
corporate lenders, two investment managers, and one analyst were chosen to represent the 
`potential respondents'. The aim of these interviews was to identify any problems with the 
language used in the draft questionnaire and covering letter and to ensure that the questions 
included in the draft questionnaire were relevant and clear. In addition the interviews with 
the six potential respondents were used to obtain a clearer understanding of the make-up of 
the population being studied. As a result of these interviews revisions were made to both the 
questionnaire and the sample of corporate lenders. In relation to the questionnaire, changes 
were made to the wording and layout of some questions, the deletion of other questions 
which were seen as ambiguous, and the inclusion of some additional questions. The sample 
of corporate lenders was restricted to those operating in Dublin because the nature of the 
Irish lending market is such, that most corporate lending decisions are made at the banks' 
head offices in Dublin. The final version of the questionnaire is included, together with the 
covering letter sent, as appendix D. 
5.3.2: Mail Questionnaire 
The final version of the questionnaire, together with the covering letter and stamped 
addressed envelope, were mailed to 196 individuals on 27 October 1995. The version of the 
questionnaire included as appendix D was that which was mailed to corporate lenders and 
was identical to that mailed to investment managers and analysts except for minor changes 
to the wording of questions 1,2,9,10,11,14, and 15 in order to reflect the specific nature 
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of their work (appendix E). The design and layout of questionnaires are of paramount 
importance to the achievement of a high response rate. Berdie et al. (1986) noted that the 
appearance of the questionnaire frequently determines whether it is read or discarded because 
once the respondent takes the effort to read it, s/he has made some psychological 
commitment to complete it. Every effort was made to produce a questionnaire that was 
attractive, interesting and easy to complete. The services of a printing company were engaged 
to ensure that the questionnaire appeared both attractive and professional. A booklet form 
was used and no question spilled over to a succeeding page. The questionnaire which was 
fifteen pages long, including a front and back page and a page which included definition of 
terms used in the questionnaire, complied with the upper limit for length suggested by 
Sudman and Bradburn (1982). A closed question format was used wherever possible because 
closed rather than open ended questions are more suited to mail questionnaires (Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1982). 
The purpose of the first five questions was to obtain background information on the 
respondents and included standard questions on length and nature of work experience, age, 
and accounting experience. This information would be used later to test whether there was 
any difference in perceptions across these different variables. 
Questions 6,7 and 8 were an attempt to introduce the respondents to the study by stimulating 
their interest in the topic. Question 6 was intended to investigate a variable which had not 
been previously addressed in the literature on auditor independence, respondents' past 
suspicions of a lack auditor independence. The responses to this question would be used later 
to test whether there was any difference in perceptions of auditor independence between those 
who had and those who had not suspected a lack of auditor independence in the past. 
Questions 7 and 8 were asked in order to probe further as to the circumstances giving rise 
to suspicions of a lack of auditor independence and to ascertain perceptions as to whether 
non-independent auditor behaviour was becoming more or less common. 
Questions 9 to 17 were intended to provide information on the use and importance of audited 
financial statements as a decision making tool. Such information would be used to assess the 
importance of perceived auditor independence in the evaluation of the reliability of audited 
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financial statements and in respondents' decision making. 
Questions 18 to 28 comprised of forty four attitudinal statements to assess respondents' 
agreement, on a five point scale, on the effects of five factors: audit firm size; competition 
in the audit market; audit committees; audit tenure; and the provision of NAS on perceived 
auditor independence. Some of these statements were drawn from previously published 
research, others were specifically designed for this study. In constructing these scale items, 
a conscious effort was made to ensure brevity and clarity, to avoid neutral statements, and 
to ensure a balance between positive and negative items in order to minimise the effects of 
a response set towards either agreement or disagreement with whatever statement was made 
(Oppenheim, 1966; Moser and Kalton, 1979). The sixth factor, client employment, was 
excluded from this section of the questionnaire because it was not possible to explain it in 
statements that were considered brief and clear. As can be seen in appendix D, a five point 
rating scale followed each statement. The suitability of a five point scale for mail 
questionnaires in particular had been noted by Berdie et al. (1986) who argued that "the five 
response options works well with mail because the respondent can see the options and, 
therefore, keep them mentally present" (p. 17). 
Questions 29 to 36 referred to a variety of audit situations and respondents were asked to 
assess for each situation the frequency, on a five point scale, that they would perceive the 
auditor to be independent. Again, every effort was made to minimise response set as outlined 
above. Questions 29 to 31 were concerned with the effects of audit tenure on perceived 
auditor independence. To address this, respondents were presented with different audit firm 
rotation policies: no rotation; rotation of audit firm; and rotation of audit personnel. A policy 
of no rotation was where the same audit firm or the same audit personnel were involved in 
the audit for twenty years. The second policy, rotation of audit firm, was dichotomised as 
ten years or less than ten years. The ten year mark was chosen because it was suggested by 
Simon (1980). The policy of rotating audit personnel was addressed at two levels, the 
seniority of personnel (audit partner/audit manager) and time (seven years/less than seven 
years). Although a number of previous studies have looked at the effects of rotating audit 
partners on perceived auditor independence (Firth, 1981; Bates et al., 1982; Schleifer and 
Shockley, 1990), no study has considered the effect of audit manager rotation. The seven 
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year mark was chosen because CAJEC (1995) considered it desirable that no audit partner 
remain in charge of the audit of any listed company for a period exceeding seven consecutive 
years. 
Questions 32 to 36 were intended to provide information on the 'effects of client employment 
on perceived auditor independence. More specifically, the effects of the time lag between 
auditing and working for a client firm and the nature of the auditor's responsibility 
(supervisory role/ non-supervisory role) prior to accepting employment were investigated. 
These two variables, time lag and nature of responsibility, were previously studied by 
Warren (1976), Imhoff (1978) and Koh and Mahathevan (1993). A further variable, the 
current position held by the ex-auditor in the client firm (financial controller/non-financial 
position) was examined because the research carried out by Koh and Mahathevan (1993) 
suggests that this can have a significant impact on perceived auditor independence. 
Questions 37 to 48 presented a variety of audit situations and respondents were asked to 
assess for each situation the frequency, on a five point scale, that they would consider the 
financial statements to be reliable. Reliability was one of the terms defined in the 
questionnaire (appendix D). This definition was identical to that outlined by the ASB (1991). 
The audit situations presented to the respondents covered the six factors of the study: audit 
firm size; competition in the audit market; audit committees; provision of NAS; audit tenure 
and client employment. 
The size of the audit firm was restricted to two levels, Big Six and non-Big Six audit firms, 
and what was meant by each was outlined in the definition of terms included with the 
questionnaire (appendix D). Taking into account subsequent mergers of audit firms this was 
a similar definition of audit firm size to that used in earlier studies (Shockley, 1981; Pearson 
and Ryans, 1981/82; McKinley et al., 1985; Jackson-Heard, 1987; Gut, 1989; Gut, 1991). 
Question 38 was concerned with competition in the audit market and presented respondents 
with two situations, high and low levels of competition. These levels were chosen because 
they had been used by Knapp (1985), Gul (1989) and Gut (1991). Question 39 examined the 
effect of audit committees on the reliability of financial statements and included two 
situations: one where an audit committee existed and the other where no audit committee 
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existed. This had been explored previously by Jackson-Heard (1987) and by Gul (1989). 
Audit committees are a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland with most Irish listed 
companies establishing one so as to comply with the recommendations made by the Cadbury 
Committee (1992) and with the Statement of Best Practice issued by the ICAI (1992). An 
explanation of what was meant by an audit committee was included with the questionnaire 
(appendix D) because the preliminary interviews showed that some of the interviewees were 
not familiar with the term. This definition was similar to that outlined by the AISG (1977). 
Question 40 presented four audit situations dealing with the provision of NAS. To overcome 
some of the criticisms levelled at previous empirical studies, an outline of what was meant 
by NAS was included with the questionnaire (appendix D). This definition was based on the 
nonaudit services most frequently provided by audit firms in the U. K. (Ezzamel et al., 1996). 
Although it would have been more appropriate to look at the provision of such services in 
an Irish context, this information was not available because Irish companies are not required 
to disclose fees paid for nonaudit services. The four situations presented were identified by 
Hillison and Kennelley (1988) as alternatives to a total ban on the provision of NAS. 
Questions 41 to 48 dealt with audit tenure and client employment, and were identical to those 
presented in questions 29 to 36. 
Of the total 196 questionnaires mailed, 155 were returned, a response rate of 79.1 per cent. 
However, one of these included a respondent who was unwilling to participate, stating that 
he was not interested in the study. A further six were unable to participate for the following 
reasons: one stated that because he was not an accountant, he felt that he was not in a 
position to authoritatively respond to the questionnaire; another explained that he did not lend 
on the Irish market; two stated that they did not use Irish financial statements and felt that 
their opinions would not be of value to the research; another outlined that "I have no opinion 
of auditors whatsoever... never had any dealings, good or bad, with auditors on which I 
could form any opinion as to how they operate"; and one believed that he would not be of 
any great assistance because he did not consider the independence of the auditor when 
making investment recommendations. This gave an overall response rate of 75.5 per cent. 
This response rate resulted from the initial mailing at the end of October 1995, two follow-up 
mailings, in the second and fourth weeks of November 1995 and follow-up telephone calls 
in the second week of December 1995. A summary of the responses is shown in Table 5.1. 
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The questionnaire response was very satisfactory. It was much higher than normally can be 
expected in a mail questionnaire and many respondents provided comments and opinions 
which were additional to the information directly sought. A great deal of interest was 
expressed in the research, with approximately 80 per cent of respondents requesting a 
summary of the results. 
Table 5.1: Timing of Responses 
Number of Response 
responses rate %* 
First mailing 66 33.7 
Second mailing 58 44.6 
Third mailing 19 26.4 
Follow-up telephone call 9.4 
148 
Overall response rate 75.5% 
* Calculated by reference to the residual population, e. g., second mailing 
(58/196-66) = 44.6% 
Although this high response rate suggests that non-response bias is unlikely to be a problem 
nevertheless whenever less than one hundred per cent response is obtained, there is a danger 
of some non-response bias, that is, a possibility that non-respondents may differ from 
respondents. Oppenheim (1966) recommends the following two tests to find out whether and 
in what way a bias has been introduced: a comparison of respondents with non-respondents 
(in terms of characteristics not dependent on a response being received); and a comparison 
of `early' and `late' respondents (in terms of the answers to the questionnaire). 
In order to compare respondents with non-respondents and to test whether the responses from 
the two groups were significantly different, two characteristics, which were not dependent 
on a response being received, were identified: group (corporate lender; investment manager; 
and analyst) and gender. Non-parametric tests were used because they do not require the 
restrictive assumptions associated with parametric tests. The results from the Chi-Square tests 
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of the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between respondents and non- 
respondents are shown in Table 5.2. The tests of association were based on the Chi-Square 
test because only nominal measurement had been achieved and the power distribution of the 
Chi-Square test tends to 1 for moderately large samples (Siegel, 1956: 179). The null 
hypothesis that respondents and non-respondents have the same distribution is not rejected 
for the gender variable but is rejected for the group variable. 
Table 5.2: Comparison of Respondents and Non-Respondents 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Value D. F. Significance 
Group 6.60355 2 0.03682* 
Gender 0.19093 1 0.66214 
* Significant at p <0.05 
Further analysis of the group variable indicated that a higher response rate was obtained from 
corporate lenders (80.1 per cent) than from investment managers (67.6 per cent) or from 
analysts (57.1 per cent) which may indicate some bias in the results. 
In light of these results, further assurance was sought by comparing early and late 
respondents because "it has been found that respondents who send in the questionnaires very 
late are roughly similar to non-respondents" (Oppenheim, 1966: 34). To compare early and 
late respondents and to test whether the responses from the two groups were significantly 
different, early responses were defined as those received from the first mailing and late 
responses were defined as those received from subsequent mailings and follow-up. As shown 
in Table 5.1, there were 66 early responses and 82 late responses. In order to compare early 
and late respondents, it is necessary to identify a number of characteristics and test whether 
the responses from the two groups are significantly different. The following eight 
characteristics were selected: group; gender; length of work experience (Q1); nature of 
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experience (Q2); age (Q3); accounting knowledge (Q4); previous experience with auditor 
independence (Q6); and request for summary of survey findings (asked at the end of 
questionnaire). The first two characteristics were not dependent on a response being received 
but were of relevance in later testing. The remaining six characteristics were dependent on 
a response to the indicated questions included on the questionnaire (appendix D). Wallace 
and Mellor (1988) argued that because non-respondents are usually quite different in several 
respects from those who answer questionnaires, the characteristics selected for testing must 
adequately describe the nature of these apparent differences. Some of the differences 
identified by Wallace and Mellor (1988) and tested in this study, included education, age 
profile, and interest in the study. 
Once again, non-parametric tests were chosen because they do not require the restrictive 
assumptions associated with parametric tests. The results from the Chi-Square tests of the 
null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between early and late respondents are 
shown in Table 5.3. As before, the Chi-Square test was used because only nominal 
Table 5.3: Comparison of Early and Late Respondents across 8 Variables 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Value D. F. Significance 
Group 0.99772 2 0.60722 
Gender 0.99645 1 0.31817 
Length of work experience 1.14263 2 0.56478 
Nature of work experience 0.03784 2 0.98126 
Age 0.99778 2 0.60721 
Accounting knowledge 0.01374 1 0.90670 
Previous experience with 
auditor independence 0.06520 1 0.79846 
Summary of results 0.32149 1 0.57072 
97 
measurement had been achieved and the power distribution of the Chi-Square test tends to 
1 for moderately large samples (Siegel, 1956: 179). 
The null hypothesis that early respondents and late respondents have the same distribution 
was not rejected for any of the variables tested (at p<0.05). If one accepts that late 
respondents are surrogates for non-respondents, then the results suggest that the respondents 
are representative of the population. Wallace and Mellor (1988) argued that the surrogate 
method may be considered reasonable where the response rate is high, which is the case in 
this study. 
5.3.3: In-depth Interviews 
The mail questionnaire provided a great deal of quantitative data, but as previously indicated 
in Chapter 4, there are considerable benefits to be gained from the mixing of quantitative and 
qualitative information. The plan for this stage of the research was to conduct an in-depth 
interview with a number of corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts. From the 
list of names obtained fifteen corporate lenders, ten investment managers, and ten analysts 
were selected based on the size of the individual institution/ firm. Williamson et al. (1982) 
noted that "the typical intensive interview study is based on fewer than fifty respondents" 
(p. 184). Hence the total of thirty five respondents was in keeping numerically with the 
general approach to an in-depth study. 
The first step was to contact each individual to explain briefly the nature of the interview and 
to seek their co-operation. In the case of the corporate lenders contacted, the response was 
positive and their full co-operation was obtained. Out of the ten investment managers 
contacted, eight agreed to participate. ' The remaining two comprised of one who did not deal 
with Irish equities and therefore, had no direct dealing with Irish auditors, and one who felt 
that he would have nothing additional to contribute based on the interview scheduled with one 
of his colleagues. To confirm that this was the case, agreement was obtained from his 
colleague to send a copy of her interview transcript to him. He was invited to make changes 
and additional comments as deemed necessary. When followed up, he said no changes were 
necessary and that the transcript reflected his views. Seven of the ten analysts contacted were 
willing to participate in the interviews. The remaining three stated that they did not have the 
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time to participate and were unwilling to comment over the telephone on the issue. Although 
attempts were made to schedule the interviews at a date which was more convenient, an 
unwillingness to participate was detected. 
All interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality at the outset of the fieldwork and promised 
that neither they nor their organisations would be individually identified in the research. This 
was done in order to elicit open and unguarded responses to the questions asked during the 
course of the individual interviews. At the commencement of each interview and before 
embarking on the collection of data sought, the researcher outlined the purpose of the study 
and stressed the importance of their opinions. In addition, each interviewee was invited to 
seek further clarification on any issue of the study that might be of concern to him/her. This 
approach assisted in the establishment of rapport with individual interviewees. Williamson 
et al. (1982) argued that "it is important for the intensive interviewer to nurture rapport with 
the other party within the framework of an appropriate degree of objectivity" (p. 181). In 
addition, this rapport ensured full and open discussion on the specific issues addressed, as 
detailed later in the research findings. A measure of the overall success of the interviews, 
in terms of rapport and goodwill, was that each interviewee offered further access should any 
additional information be required. 
A semi-structured interview approach with the use of an interview guide (appendix F) was 
adopted and interviews ranging from one to two hours were conducted. The semi-structured 
interview approach was used because, as outlined by Smith (1972), the semi-structured 
interview is "a process in which the interviewer focuses her questions on some limited 
number of points. She may range quite widely around a point, but this would be done only 
as a means of getting the required information on that particular point" (p. 119). Hence, as 
this study was concerned with a number of specific topics, this approach was more 
appropriate than either the unstructured or structured interview approaches. The unstructured 
interview was deemed inappropriate because it assumes that questions and topics emerge 
from the immediate context and are not determined in advance (Patton, 1990). The structured 
interview approach was not used because the mail questionnaire had already collected the 
type of information generated from such an approach. Fontana and Frey (1994) described the 
structured interview as "an interviewer asking each respondent a series of predetermined 
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questions with a limited set of response categories" (p. 363). The interview guide allowed 
information about the same topics to be obtained from all respondents without the order of 
questions and extent of probing and exploration being dictated in advance (Smith, 1972; 
Patton, 1990). This allowed the researcher to use her working knowledge of the focus of 
inquiry without losing the freedom to ask questions and probe for information in her own 
way (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). 
Interviewees were asked at the commencement of the interviews, if they would allow the 
interviews to be recorded by tape. Accurate recording of data was important because as 
stressed by Patton (1990) "no matter what style of interviewing is used, and no matter how 
carefully one words interview questions, it all comes to naught if the interviewer fails to 
capture the actual words of the persons being interviewed" (p. 347). In addition to increasing 
the accuracy of data collection, the use of a tape recorder permits the interviewer to be more 
attentive to the interviewee and ensures that the interactive nature of the in-depth interview 
is not interfered with (Patton, 1990). However, one of the problems associated with the use 
of tape recorders is that it may interfere with the rapport, and in turn, with the openness and 
depth of discussion. To ensure that this did not occur, Smith (1972) recommended that the 
researcher explain to the respondent why the interview is being recorded. It was explained 
that the tape recorder was used purely to ensure accurate recording and that if at any time 
during the interview they wished the tape recorder to be switched off, this would be done. 
They were each promised a copy of the recorded transcript, at which stage they could make 
any changes necessary. Except for one interviewee, all interviewees allowed their interviews 
to be recorded by tape. To ensure accuracy and comprehension of the interview data at the 
analysis stage, immediately after each interview, the tapes were transcribed and a copy was 
sent to the interviewees for their comments and approval. Except for minor grammatical 
changes, no adjustments were made to the transcripts. 
5.4: Summary 
This chapter has described the stages involved in the design and execution of the research 
into perceived auditor independence and the perceived reliability of financial statements. The 
study involved the use of three different populations: corporate lenders (defined as those who 
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were members of the Irish Bankers Federation); investment managers (defined as those who 
were members of the Irish Association of Investment Managers); and analysts from the four 
largest Irish stockbroking firms. Information for this research was collected using a 
combination of mail questionnaires and in-depth interviews which should increase the 
likelihood that the picture which emerges from this research represents a reasonable cross- 
section of the perceptions held by corporate lenders, investment managers and analysts in 
relation to auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
MAIL QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS 
6.1: Introduction 
The results from the mail questionnaire survey, a copy of which is included as appendix D, 
are presented in this chapter. These results were analyzed using SPSS. The sample for this 
survey comprised of 196 individuals and included corporate lenders, investment managers 
and analysts, as outlined in Chapter 5. This chapter includes a profile of the respondents and 
an identification of their use of, and the importance that they attach to, financial statements 
for decision making purposes. It reports on the general perceptions held by the respondents 
in relation to the impairment of auditor independence and specific instances in which a lack 
of auditor independence was suspected by them. The main part of the chapter reports on the 
effects of each of the six factors, identified in Chapter 3, on perceived auditor independence 
which are then tied into perceptions of financial statement reliability. The potential economic 
and other effects of a lack of auditor independence are then presented. 
6.2: Profile of Respondents 
Full responses were received from 148 individuals (a response rate of 75.5 per cent). As 
Table 6.1: Demographics relating to Respondents 
Group: #% 
Corporate lenders 113 76.4 
Investment managers 23 15.5 
Analysts 12 8.1 
148 100.0 
Gender: 
Male 130 87.8 
Female 18 112 
148 100.0 
Age: 
Under 30 years 25 16.9 
Between 30 and 40 years 88 59.5 
Over 40 years L 23.6 
148 100.0 
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shown in Table 6.1, the majority of respondents were male and worked in a lending 
environment. This information was available from sources outside of the questionnaire. Over 
half of the respondents were aged between thirty and forty years. 
Table 6.2 shows that the nature of work undertaken by the respondents varied with a 
minority (n=42) having complete authority to sanction loans/ investments. It was more 
common for respondents to review loan/ investments proposals and to refer the final decision 
to a higher authority. In some cases, respondents performed both roles, i. e., sanctioned 
loans/ investments below a specified amount and referred all those beyond this amount to a 
higher authority for approval. The majority of respondents (n=114) were experienced in 
their current role having worked in it for more than five years. 
Table 6.2: Respondents' Work Experience 
Nature of Work Experience: #% 
Responsible for sanctioning proposals (i) 42 28.4 
Review proposals but final decision is 
referred to a higher authority (ii) 82 55.4 
Combination of (i) and (ii) 24 16.2 
148 100.0 
Length of Work Experience: 
Under 5 years 34 23.0 
Between 5 and 10 years 63 42.6 
Over 10 years L1 34.4 
148 1® 
The majority of respondents, as illustrated in Table 6.3, had some accounting knowledge 
(n=125). This knowledge was quite varied with some respondents having studied a course 
in accounting at college while others were qualified accountants, having obtained a chartered, 
certified or management accounting qualification49. In relation to those respondents who were 
chartered accountants, 80 per cent trained with a Big Six audit firm. 
49The category `other' shown in Table 6.3, represented those respondents who had 
studied a course in accounting which was examined by the Institute of Bankers and/or the 
Chartered Institute of Secretaries. 
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Table 6.3: Accounting Knowledge and Training of Respondents 
Accounting Knowledge: #% 
None 23 15.6 
Accounting course at college 70 47.3 
Qualified accountant 48 32.4 
Other 7 4.7 
148 100.0 
Training of Chartered Accountants*: 
Big Six firm 16 
Non-Big Six firm 3 
Industry 1 
20 
80.0 
15.0 
JL. 
-Q 1® 
* The term `chartered accountant' is used to represent those individuals 
who obtained their accounting qualification from the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Ireland. 
6.3: Use and Importance of Financial Statements 
Table 6.4 reveals that over 60 per cent of the respondents stated that they `always' use 
financial statements for decision making purposes and a further 30 per cent stated that they 
use them `often'. It is worth noting that two respondents, a corporate lender and an 
investment management, stated that they `rarely' or `never' use financial statements for 
decision making purposes. Those who had responded in this manner were not required to 
respond to questions 9 to 17 inclusive (refer to questionnaire, appendix D). 
It can also be seen from Table 6.4 that over half of the respondents (n=80) considered the 
financial statements to be `very important' for decision making purposes and approximately 
36 per cent considered them to be `important'. It is of interest to note that six of those 
respondents who used financial statements `always' or `often' only considered them to be 
`moderately' or `slightly' important. 
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Table 6.4: Use and Importance of Financial Statements 
Frequency that financial statements are 
used for decision making purposes: it % 
Always 93 62.8 
Often 45 30.4 
Sometimes 8 5.4 
Rarely 1 0.7 
Never 1 0.7 
148 1 
Importance attached to financial statements 
for decision making purposes: 
Very important 80 54.8 
Important 52 35.6 
Moderately important 12 8.2 
Slightly important 2 1.4 
Unimportant QM 
146* 100.0 
* Two respondents, as shown above, who `rarely' or `never' use financial 
statements were not required to respond to this question. 
6.4: General Perceptions of Independence Impairment 
Table 6.5 shows that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that an 
auditor's independence is likely to be impaired if the auditor succumbs to management 
pressures in relation to the treatment of contentious issues (n=144), becomes dependent on 
the audit client (n=139), or becomes closely connected with client management (n=126). 
These results suggest that the greatest threat to auditor independence is when the auditor 
succumbs to management pressures in relation to the treatment of contentious issues. 
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Table 6.5: General Perceptions of Independence Impairment 
An auditor's independence is likely to be 
impaired if the auditor: 
#% 
becomes dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 139 93.9 
Undecided 8 5.4 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 1 0,7 
148 10® 
becomes closely connected with client 
management. 
Strongly agree/ agree 126 85.1 
Undecided 16 10.8 
Disagree/ strongly disagree fi 4, -1 148 1 
succumbs to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 144 97.3 
Undecided 4 2.7 
Disagree/ strongly disagree Q 0.0 
148 100.0 
6.5: Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor Independence 
When respondents were asked whether there were any specific instances in which they had 
previously suspected a lack of auditor independence, more than half of them replied in the 
affirmative (n=79). The most frequent circumstances associated with such suspicions, as 
presented in Table 6.6, were the provision of NAS to audit clients (n=42) and the 
performance of the audit by a non-Big Six audit firm (n=36). 
Although noted less frequently, respondents also associated the performance of an audit by 
a Big Six audit firm with suspicions of a lack of auditor independence. As Table 6.6 shows, 
other circumstances associated with their concerns included "close relationship between 
auditor and audit client" and "strange accounting policies". 
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Table 6.6: Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor Independence 
Circumstances associated with suspicions of 
a lack of auditor independence: ý% 
Auditor provided NAS to audit client 42 21.9 
Audit performed by a non-Big Six audit firm 36 18.8 
Audit tenure greater than 10 years 24 12.5 
Disproportionate audit fee income 24 12.5 
No audit committee present 23 12.0 
Audit performed by a Big Six audit firm 19 9.9 
Strange accounting policies 9 4.7 
Audit tenure less than 10 years 6 3.1 
Close relationship between auditor and audit client 6 3.1 
Other reasons a 1.5 
192* 100.0 
* Number of times noted by 79 respondents 
Change in suspicions over the past 5 years: 
Suspicions have increased significantly 1 1.3 
Suspicions have increased to some extent 19 24.1 
Suspicions have remained constant 26 32.9 
Suspicions have decreased to some extent 25 31.6 
Suspicions have decreased significantly $ 101 
22 100.0 
The category `other', presented in Table 6.6, included the following three additional reasons 
expressed by respondents: "knew there was a problem"; "auditors using unfair influence to 
get auditors changed to themselves"; and "reservations expressed in management letters did 
not lead to a qualification of the financial accounts". Little consensus was reached as to 
whether the number of cases where they had suspected a lack of auditor independence had 
increased (n=20), decreased (n=33) or remained constant (n=26) over the past five years 
but the results would appear to suggest that their suspicions have decreased slightly. 
6.6: Effects of the Selected Variables on Perceptions of Auditor Independence 
The six variables selected for the study, as identified in Chapter 3, included audit firm size, 
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competition in the audit market, audit committees, audit tenure, provision of NAS, and client 
employment. The effects that each of these variables had on the perceived independence of 
the auditor are presented below. 
6.6.1: Audit Firm Size and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When an audit is performed by a non-Big Six audit firm, more than half of the respondents, 
as shown in Table 6.7, strongly agreed or agreed that the auditor may become dependent on 
Table 6.7: Audit Firm Size and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When the audit is performed by a non-Big Six 
audit firm, the auditor is more likely to: # 
become dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 87 
Undecided 29 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 
148 
58.8 
19.6 
21-6 
100., 0 
become closely connected with client 
management. 
Strongly agree/ agree 79 53.4 
Undecided 33 22.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 26 2112 
148 100.0 
succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 69 46.6 
Undecided 37 25.0 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 42 28A 
148 100.0 
Non-Big Six audit firms when compared with 
Big Six audit firms: 
are less independent. 
Strongly agree/ agree 74 50.0 
Undecided 45 30.4 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 19.6 
149 1 
tend towards a more personalised mode 
of client service. 
Strongly agree/ agree 125 84.4 
Undecided 18 12.2 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 3,4 
148 1®0.0, 
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the audit client (n=87) or closely connected with client management (n=79). A lower 
number of respondents agreed that the performance of an audit by a non-Big Six firm would 
lead to the auditor succumbing to management pressures. It is worth noting the consistency 
in responses across these three statements with fifty respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing with all three statements while the same fourteen respondents remained undecided 
and the same sixteen respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with each of these three 
statements. 
Half of the respondents, as revealed by Table 6.7, strongly agreed or agreed that non-Big 
Six audit firms were less independent than Big Six audit firms while almost 20 per cent of 
them disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Over 80 per cent of the respondents 
strongly agreed or agreed that non-Big Six audit firms tended towards a more personalised 
mode of client service when compared with Big Six audit firms. 
6.6.2: Audit Market Competition and Perceived Auditor Independence 
Table 6.8 shows that when the audit market is highly competitive, a greater number of 
respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the auditor was more likely to become dependent 
on the audit client (n=104), to succumb to management pressures (n=99) or to become 
closely connected with client management (n=81). Hence the existence of a highly 
competitive audit market is perceived to weaken auditor independence. 
There was some consistency in responses across each of the three potential threats to auditor 
independence resulting from a competitive environment, with sixty-six respondents agreeing 
or strongly agreeing in each instant, while eleven respondents remained undecided and 
thirteen respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that competition may impair auditor 
independence. 
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Table 6.8: Effects of Audit Market Competition on Independence Impairment 
When the audit market is highly competitive, the 
auditor is more likely to: 
ý% 
become dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 104 70.2 
Undecided 22 14.9 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 
148 100 0 
become closely connected with client 
management. 
Strongly agree/ agree 81 54.7 
Undecided 38 25.7 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 19.6 
148 1000 
succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 99 66.9 
Undecided 33 22.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree h 1ý$ 
148 1® 
Table 6.9 shows that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the 
greater the level of competition in the auditing environment, the more likely it was that the 
auditor would tender artificially low audit prices to obtain the audit (n=110). More than half 
of the respondents believed that this competitive environment would result in the auditor 
being less independent (n=88) and relying on management representations (n=82). While 
forty-nine respondents expressed agreement to each of these three statements, the number 
disagreeing or remaining undecided in respect of these three statements were four and six 
respectively. There was no consensus present as to whether a high level of competition in 
the audit market would lead to the auditor omitting audit procedures that should be performed 
or to the auditor being replaced by a less rigorous auditor. However, there was some 
consistency in terms of the replies obtained with forty-two respondents agreeing with both 
statements, thirty-one respondents remaining undecided, and eighteen respondents disagreeing 
with both statements. 
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Table 6.9: Audit Market Competition and Perceived Auditor Independence 
The greater the level of competition which exists 
in the auditing environment, the more likely it is 
that auditors will: 
#% 
be less independent. 
Strongly agree/ agree 88 59.5 
Undecided 37 25.0 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 15 
148 l, ®0 
omit audit procedures that should be 
performed. 
Strongly agree/ agree 58 39.2 
Undecided 50 33.8 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 40 2M 
148 100 
. 10 rely on management representations. 
Strongly agree/ agree 82 55.4 
Undecided 37 25.0 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 19.6 
148 10®0.0 
be replaced by less rigorous auditors. 
Strongly agree/ agree 66 44.6 
Undecided 57 38.5 
Disagree/ strongly disagree L 169 
.0 
148 100 
tender artificially low prices to obtain the audit. 
Strongly agree/ agree 110 74.3 
Undecided 28 18.9 
Disagree/ strongly disagree g 
148 100,0 
6.6.3: Audit Committees and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When a company does not have an audit committee, over one third of the respondents, as 
shown in Table 6.10, remained undecided as to whether this would lead to the auditor 
becoming dependent on the audit client (n=57), becoming closely connected with client 
management (n=60), or succumbing to management pressures in relation to the treatment 
of contentious issues (n=69). In each case, however, more respondents agreed rather than 
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disagreed that the lack of an audit committee could result in the auditor behaving in such 
manners. 
Table 6.10: Effects of a Lack of an Audit Committee on Independence Impairment 
When the client does not have an audit committee, 
the auditor is more likely to: 
ý{ % 
become dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 61 41.2 
Undecided 57 38.5 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 29 2u 
148 l® 
become closely connected with client 
management. 
Strongly agree/ agree 67 45.3 
Undecided 60 40.5 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 21 14.2 
148 100.0 
succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 56 37.8 
Undecided 69 46.6 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 j 
148 1® 
In relation to each of the three statements included in Table 6.10, once again, there was some 
consistency in the replies obtained. Thirty-three respondents agreed with each of the three 
statements, while thirty-nine respondents remained undecided and thirteen respondents 
disagreed. 
The majority of the respondents, as illustrated in Table 6.11, agreed or strongly agreed that 
the independence of the auditor would be enhanced if the company's audit committee was 
responsible for the selection of the auditor (n=121), dismissal of the auditor (n=110), and 
determination of the auditor's fees (n=101). These results suggest that auditor independence 
is enhanced to a greater extent if the audit committee is responsible for selecting the auditor 
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rather than for his/her dismissal or for the determination of his/her fees. While only a 
minority of respondents remained undecided as to the effects that an audit committee would 
have on the independence of the auditor, it is worth noting that nineteen respondents 
remained undecided in respect of each of the three suggested roles. 
Table 6.11: Audit Committees and Perceived Auditor Independence 
The independence of the auditor is enhanced if a 
company's audit committee is responsible for the: 
#% 
selection of the auditor. 
Strongly agree/ agree 121 81.8 
Undecided 23 15.5 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 4 zZ 
148 1® 
determination of the auditor's fees. 
Strongly agree/ agree 101 68.2 
Undecided 34 23.0 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 1 $$ 
148 100 
dismissal of the auditor. 
Strongly agree/ agree 110 
Undecided 26 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 12 
148 
The existence of an audit committee in a company 
ensures that the auditor is less likely to: 
74.3 
17.6 
8.1 
10ý0.0 
be independent. 
Strongly agree/ agree 8 5.4 
Undecided 35 23.6 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 145 71.0 
rely on management representations. 
0 148 1-00.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 61 41.2 
Undecided 51 34.5 
24.3 Disagree/ strongly disagree L6 
148 100.0 
As Table 6.11 shows, over 70 per cent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed 
that the existence of an audit committee would lead to the auditor becoming less independent. 
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There was no consensus present as to whether the existence of an audit committee would 
ensure that the auditor did not rely on management representations. 
6.6.4: Audit Tenure and Perceived Auditor Independence 
Table 6.12 shows that when the auditor continues in office for the same client over a 
prolonged period of time, a greater number of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the 
auditor was more likely, as a result of this long tenure, to become closely connected with 
client management (n= 114) than to succumb to management pressures (n=88) or to become 
dependent on the audit client (n=73). These results suggest that long audit tenure is seen to 
affect auditor independence. 
Table 6.12: Effects of Audit Tenure on Independence Impairment 
When the auditor continues in office for the same 
client over a prolonged period of time, the auditor 
is more likely to: 
#% 
become dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 73 49.3 
Undecided 45 30.4 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 3-Q 20.3 
148 100®. 0 
become closely connected with client 
management. 
Strongly agree/ agree 
Undecided 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 
114 77.0 
22 14.9 
12 8.1 
148 100.0 
succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 88 
Undecided 40 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 20 
148 
59.5' 
27.0 
13.5 
100.0 
Table 6.13 reveals that less than half of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the 
auditor is less independent when s/he continues in office for the same client over a prolonged 
period of time (n=63). Approximately two thirds of the respondents believed that this 
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situation would lead to the client considering the auditor as more valuable (n=98) and to an 
increase in the client's dependence on the auditor (n=99). In addition, more than half of the 
respondents (n=81) strongly agreed or agreed that when the auditor continues in office for 
the same client over a prolonged period of time, the auditor would be less innovative 
regarding auditing techniques. 
Table 6.13: Audit Tenure and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When an auditor continues in office for the same 
client over a prolonged period of time, the: 
ý/ % 
auditor will be less independent. 
Strongly agree/ agree 63 42.5 
Undecided 46 31.1 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 26.4 
148 1 
client will consider the auditor as 
more valuable. 
Strongly agree/ agree 98 66.2 
Undecided 36 24.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree L4 91.5- 
148 1_ 
client's dependence on the auditor will 
increase. 
Strongly agree/ agree 99 66.9 
Undecided 33 22.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 16 10.8 
auditor will be less innovative regarding 
auditing techniques. 
148 100.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 81 54.7 
Undecided 39 26.4 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 2$ 
,, 
Q 
148 10®0.0 
Table 6.14 shows the frequencies that the auditor was considered to be independent when the 
length of time, that the same audit firm acted on the audit, was varied. When the company 
had the same audit firm for twenty years, approximately 35 per cent of the respondents 
considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent. 
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Table 6.14: Impact on Perceived Auditor Independence of Changing the Length of 
Time that the Same Audit Firm Acts on the Audit 
Auditor considered to be independent when the 
company has had the same audit firm for: #% 
20 years. 
Always 4 2.7 
Often 47 31.8 
Sometimes 63 42.6 
Rarely 31 20.9 
Never 3- M 
148 
1100.0 10 years. 
Always 5 3.4 
Often 61 41.2 
Sometimes 66 44.6 
Rarely 15 10.1 
Never 1 92 
148 1 
less than 10 years. 
Always 12 
Often 74 
Sometimes 54 
Rarely 7 
Never 1 
148 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank* Test Results 
20 years 2.31 Chi-square = 27.4054 
10 years 1.99 Significance < 0.0001 
less than 10 years 1.70 D. F. =2 
Number of cases= 148 
8.1 
50.0 
36.5 
4.7 
4.7 
100,0 
® 
* Mean Rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more independent the auditor is perceived to 
be. 
By reducing the audit firm's tenure to ten years and less than ten years, the number of 
respondents giving this response increased to approximately 45 per cent and 58 per cent 
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respectively. In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric 
tests-'O were performed on the questionnaire results. The results, which are shown in Table 
6.14, indicated a significant difference. Although this difference was significant, further 
analysis of the responses showed that a substantial number of respondents (n=66) held the 
same perceptions of auditor independence across the three time periods that the audit firm 
acted. 
The length of time that the same audit partner was in charge of the audit, as revealed by 
Table 6.15, influenced the frequency that the respondents considered the auditor to be 
independent. When the same audit partner had been in charge of the audit for twenty years, 
only 25 per cent of the respondents considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' 
independent. By reducing the partner's time in charge of the audit to seven years, and less 
than seven years, the percentage of respondents giving this response increased to 
approximately 44 per cent and 65 per cent respectively. 
In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were 
performed and showed a significant difference. Further analysis of the responses showed that, 
while this difference was significant, fifty-one respondents perceived the independence of the 
auditor to be same irrespective of the time period over which the audit partner acted. 
Similar frequencies were obtained, as presented in Table 6.16, when the length of time that 
the audit manager acted was varied. When the same audit manager had acted on the audit for 
twenty years, only 24 per cent of respondents considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' 
independent. By reducing the manager's time to seven years, and less than seven years, this 
response was obtained from approximately 42 per cent and 62 per cent respectively. In order 
to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were performed 
which showed a significant difference. Although this difference was significant, further 
"Non-parametric tests were. used because they do not require the restrictive 
assumptions associated with parametric tests. The tests of association were based on the 
Friedman two-way analysis of variance because there were three related conditions (tenure 
set at 20 years; 10 years and less than 10 years), at least ordinal measurement had been 
achieved and it is almost as powerful as the F test (Siegel, 1956: 172). 
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analysis of the responses indicated that fifty-four respondents did not perceive any difference 
in the level of auditor independence from changing the length of time that the audit manager 
remained on the audit. 
Table 6.15: Impact on Perceived Auditor Independence of Changing the Length of 
Time that the Same Audit Partner Acts on the Audit 
Auditor considered to be independent when the 
partner in charge of the company's audit has 
been in charge for: #% 
20 years. 
Always 6 4.1 
Often 31 20.9 
Sometimes 55 37.1 
Rarely 50 33.8 
Never 4.11 
148 1,0 
7 years. 
Always 8 5.4 
Often 57 38.5 
Sometimes 63 42.6 
Rarely 19 12.8 
Never 1 92 
148 1 
less than 7 years. 
Always 14 9.4 
Often 82 55.4 
Sometimes 42 28.4 
Rarely 10 6.8 
Never QM 
148 100 0 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank* Test Results 
20 years 2.46 Chi-square = 55.8345 
7 years 1.94 Significance < 0.0001 
less than 7 years 1.60 D. F. =2 
Number of cases= 148 
* Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more independent the auditor is perceived to 
be. 
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Table 6.16: Impact on Perceived Auditor Independence of Changing the Length of 
Time that the Same Audit Manager Acts on the Audit 
Auditor considered to be independent when the 
manager in charge of the company's audit has 
been in charge for: 
#% 
20 years. 
Always 7 4.7 
Often 28 18.9 
Sometimes 62 41.9 
Rarely 45 30.4 
Never fi 41 
148 100.0 
7 years. 
Always 9 6.1 
Often 53 35.7. 
Sometimes 67 45.3 
Rarely 18 12.2 
Never 1 22. 
1,48 1_ 
less than 7 years. 
Always 15 10.1 
Often 76 51.4 
Sometimes 48 32.4 
Rarely 8 5.4 
Never 1 0.7 
148 100 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank* Test Results 
20 years 2.44 Chi-square = 52.7939 
7 years 1.96 Significance < 0.0001 
less than 7 years 1.60 D. F. =2 
Number of cases = 148 
* Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more independent the auditor is perceived to 
be. 
In order to assess the impact on perceived auditor independence of the rotation of audit 
personnel, audit partner/audit manager, the results from Tables 6.15 and 6.16 are compared. 
For each of the three time periods, more respondents considered the auditor to be `always' 
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or `often' independent when the same audit partner had been in charge of the company's 
audit than when the same audit manager had acted on the audit. Non-parametric tests" were 
performed to determine whether these differences were significant but no significant 
differences were found (at the p=0.05 level). 
Finally a comparison of the results from Tables 6.14 to 6.16 shows that more respondents 
considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent when for twenty years, the audit 
had been performed by unspecified personnel within the same audit firm than by specified 
Table 6.17: Impact on Perceived Auditor Independence of having the Same Firm with 
Specified Versus Unspecified Personnel 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
Specified Personnel (Partner) Versus Unspecified Personnel (Firm) for 20 years: 
Mean Rank Cases 
20.92 6 -Ranks (Partner ranked more independent than firm) 
21.60 36 +Ranks (Partner ranked less independent than firm) 
106 Ties (Partner ranked equally with firm) 
148 
z=-4.0762; p<0.0001* 
Specified Personnel (Manager) Versus Unspecified Personnel (Firm) for 20 years: 
Mean Rank Cases 
26.92 13 -Ranks (Manager ranked more independent than firm) 
27.02 40 +Ranks (Manager ranked less independent than firm) 
25, Ties (Manager and firm ranked equally) 
148 
z=-3.2357; p=0.0012* 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
"As noted previously, non-parametric tests were used because they do not require the 
restrictive assumptions associated with parametric tests. The tests of association were based 
on the Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Signed-Ranks Test because each respondent was asked to 
respond to two conditions (Partner and Manager); at least ordinal measurement had been 
achieved; and this test has a power efficiency of 95% (Siegel, 1956: 83). 
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personnel (audit partner/manager) within the same audit firm. Once again non-parametric 
tests were performed to determine whether these differences were significant. The results, 
which are shown in Table 6.17, indicated significant differences in the perceived 
independence of the auditor. The auditor was perceived to be independent less frequently 
when personnel were specified to be the same than when they were not. Although these 
differences were significant, it can be seen from the number of `Ties' presented in Table 
6.17, that the majority of respondents held the same perceptions of auditor independence for 
both the partner versus firm (n=106) and the manager versus firm (n=95). 
6.6.5: Provision of NAS and Perceived Auditor Independence 
Table 6.18 shows that when the auditor provides NAS to an audit client, a greater number 
of respondents strongly agreed or agreed that the auditor was more likely to become closely 
connected with client management (n=100) than to succumb to management pressures in 
relation to the treatment of contentious issues (n=89) or to become dependent on the audit 
client (n=89). 
Table 6.18: Effects of the Provision of NAS on Independence Impairment 
When the auditor provides NAS to the audit 
client, the auditor is more likely to: #% 
become dependent on the audit client. 
Strongly agree/ agree 89 60.1 
Undecided 41 27.7 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 18 112 
become closely connected with client 
management. 
14488 100.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 100 67.5 
Undecided 38 25.7 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 10 6g 
succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Strongly agree/ agree 
Undecided 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 
148 1 
89 60.1 
45 30.4 
14 95 
14ý8 100 0 
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These results suggest that the provision of NAS by auditors affects the perceived 
independence of auditors. Once again, further analysis of the responses showed some 
consistency in responses across the three statements, with sixty-nine respondents agreeing that 
the provision of NAS could lead to all three behaviours, while twenty-three respondents 
remained undecided and only eight respondents disagreed with all three statements. 
Table 6.19 shows that over two-thirds of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the 
independence of the auditor is decreased if the same personnel provide both audit services 
and NAS (n=102). 
Table 6.19: The Provision of NAS and Perceived Auditor Independence 
The independence of the auditor, for the purposes of 
the audit, is decreased if NAS is: #{ % 
provided to audit clients by personnel involved 
in the audit. 
Strongly agree/ agree 102 68.9 
Undecided 36 24.3. 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 10 6$ 
provided to audit clients by a separate department 
within the audit firm. 
148 100.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 36 24.3 
Undecided 51 34.5 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 61 41.2 
148 100.0 
provided to non-audit clients only. 
Strongly agree/ agree 23 15.6 
Undecided 36 24.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree $2 60.1 
not provided at all. 
1,48 100.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 17 11.5 
Undecided 41 27.7 
Disagree/ strongly disagree an 60.8 
provided by the auditor to all clients but full disclosure 
is made in the client's financial statements. 
Strongly agree/ agree 
Undecided 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 
148 100.0 
24 16.2 
75 50.7 
42 33.1 
14ý8 100.0 
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When NAS is provided to audit clients by a separate department within the audit firm, less 
than 25 per cent of the respondents responded in this manner. Further decreases in the 
number of respondents giving this response resulted when the NAS was provided by the audit 
firm to non-audit clients only (n=23) and when the auditor did not provide NAS at all 
(n=17). Over half of the respondents remained undecided as to whether the independence 
of the auditor would decrease if the audit firm provided NAS to audit clients but full 
disclosure of this was made in the client's financial statements. 
In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were 
performed. The results from these tests, as shown in Table 6.20, indicated significant 
differences and suggest that the respondents perceived the provision of NAS to audit clients 
by personnel involved in the audit as the greatest threat to auditor independence'. This 
suggestion is supported by the results from the additional tests which compared this method 
of NAS provision with each of the other four methods of NAS provisions'. 
The results also indicated that when the audit firm did not provide NAS at all, the threat to 
auditor independence was perceived to be lowestS4. Further analysis of the results showed that 
although the threat to auditor independence was lower when NAS were not provided at all 
by the audit firm than when NAS were provided to non-audit clients only, this difference was 
not significant (at the p=0.05 level). In addition, no significant difference (at the p=0.05 
level), in terms of perceived auditor independence, was found when the method of providing 
NAS to all clients but fully disclosing this in the client's financial statements was compared 
with the method of providing NAS to audit clients by a separate department within the audit 
firm. 
52The mean rank based on the Friedman Two-Way Anova was lowest when NAS were 
provided to audit clients by personnel involved in the audit. 
"See the results of the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests in Table 6.20. 
54The mean rank based on the Friedman Two-Way Anova was highest when NAS 
were not provided at all by the audit firm. 
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Table 6.20: Impact of Changes in the Method of NAS Provision on Perceived Auditor 
Independence 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank The independence of the auditor, for the purposes of the 
audit, is decreased if NAS is: 
1.82 (a) provided to audit clients by personnel involved in the 
audit. 
3.01 (b) provided by the auditor to all clients but full disclosure 
is made in the client's financial statements. 
3.06 (c) provided to audit clients by a separate department within 
the audit firm. 
3.51 (d) provided to non-audit clients only. 
3.59 (e) not provided at all. 
Number of cases=148; Chi-square=119.3284; D. F. =4; Significance <0.0001 
The lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the above 
statements. 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
-Ranks 
MR (Cases) 
(b) & (a) 35.40 (10) 
(c) & (a) 35.00 (9) 
(d) & (a) 29.83 (15) 
(e) & (a) 22.94 (9) 
(d) & (b) 45.96 (27) 
(e) & (b) 41.06 (25) 
(c) & (d) 40.64 (56) 
(c) & (e) 42.72 (59) 
+Ranks Ties 
MR (Cases) (Cases) 
55.39 (96) (42) 
54.69 (96) (43) 
62.22 (100) (33) 
58.40 (101) (38) 
47.42 (66) (55) 
48.53 (67) (56) 
38.43 (23) (69) 
38.37 (23) (66) 
Test Results 
z=-7.8214; p <0.0001 * 
z=-7.8881; p<0.0001* 
z=-8.0583; p<0.0001* 
z=-8.4876; p<0.0001* 
z=-3.6189; p=0.0003* 
z=-4.3320; p<0.0001* 
z=-3.4014; p=0.0007* 
z=-3.7862; p=0.0002* 
* Two-Tailed Probability 
-Ranks Respondents agreed more that independence would be decreased if NAS is provided by the first rather than by the second method. 
+Ranks Respondents agreed less that independence would be decreased if NAS 
is provided by the first rather than by the second method. 
Comparison of (b) & (c), and (d) & (e) showed no significant differences (at the 
p=0.05 level). 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
Increases in the level of NAS provided by the auditor to audit clients resulted in over 60 per 
cent of the respondents, as shown in Table 6.21, disagreeing or strongly disagreeing that the 
auditor would have an increased ability to withstand client pressure (n=93). 
Table 6.21: Impact of Increases in the Level of NAS Provided to Audit Clients on the 
Perceived Behaviour of Auditors 
As the level of NAS provided by the auditor 
to an audit client increases, the auditor may: 
#% 
in effect become an employee of the 
company. 
Strongly agree/ agree 70 47.3 
Undecided 30 20.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 32.4 
148 1® 
have a financial interest in the success 
of the business. 
Strongly agree/ agree 84 56.8 
Undecided 33 22.3 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 31 2m 
hesitate qualifying the audit report in fear 
of losing the revenue generated by NAS. 
148 100.0 
Strongly agree/ agree 78 52.7 
Undecided 47 31.8 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 22 15.5 
be placed in a position of auditing his/her 
own decisions. 
Strongly agree/ agree 
Undecided 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 
have an increased ability to withstand 
client pressure. 
Strongly agree/ agree 
Undecided 
Disagree/ strongly disagree 
148 1® 
99 66.9 
33 22.3 
16 14. $ 
14ý8 100.0 
18 12.2 
37 25.0 
22 2$ 
14ý8 100.0 
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Over two thirds of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the auditor may be placed 
in a position of auditing his/her own decisions when the level of NAS provided to audit 
clients increased (n=99). Agreement was also reached by over half of the respondents that 
such increases in the provision of NAS may result in the auditor having a financial interest 
in the success of the business (n=84), or hesitating to qualify the audit report in fear of 
losing revenue generated from the provision of such services (n=78). Slightly less than half 
of the respondents agreed/strongly agreed that increases in the level of NAS provided may 
lead to the auditor becoming an employee of the audit client (n=70). 
These results suggest that an increase in the level of NAS provided to audit clients is most 
likely to result in the auditor being placed in a position of auditing his/her own decisions and 
least likely to result in the auditor having an increased ability to withstand client pressure. 
Although more than 20 per cent of the respondents remained undecided in respect of each 
of the potential effects from increasing the level of NAS provided, further analysis of the 
responses showed that only six respondents remained undecided for all five effects. 
6.6.6: Client Employment and Perceived Auditor Independence 
Table 6.22 presents the frequencies that the auditor was considered to be independent when 
an offer of employment was made to one of the audit staff members during the current audit. 
The more senior the audit staff member when the offer of employment was made, the greater 
the number of respondents who perceived the auditor to be `never' or `rarely' independent. 
When an offer of employment was made to the audit partner, approximately 44 per cent of 
the respondents (n=65) perceived the auditor to be `never' or `rarely' independent. This 
response was obtained from approximately 36 per cent of the respondents when an offer of 
employment was made to the audit manager (n=53) and from approximately 29 per cent of 
the respondents when an offer of employment was made to the audit senior (n=43). 
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Table 6.22: Impact of Employment Offer on Perceived Auditor Independence 
Auditor perceived to be independent when during 
the current audit, the company made an offer of 
employment to the: 
ý% 
audit partner. 
Always 7 4.7 
Often 29 19.6 
Sometimes 47 31.8 
Rarely 52 35.1 
Never 13 M 
148 1ö 
audit manager. 
Always 5 3.4 
Often 31 20.9 
Sometimes 59 39.9 
Rarely 45 30.4 
Never $ 5,4 
148 100 
audit senior. 
Always 9 6.1 
Often 44 29.7 
Sometimes 52 35.1 
Rarely 39 26.4 
Never 4 2.7 
148 100 0, 
Non-parametric tests were undertaken in order to determine whether these differences were 
significant. The results, as shown in Table 6.23, indicated significant differences when an 
offer of employment was made to the audit partner rather than to the audit manager (at the 
p <0.05 level), to the audit manager rather than to the audit senior (at the p=0.0001 level), 
and to the audit partner rather than to the audit senior (at the p <0.0001 level). 
However, while significant differences were obtained it is important to note that further 
analysis of the responses showed that the majority of respondents (n=98) ranked 
independence equally irrespective of the person to whom the offer of employment was made. 
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Table 6.23: Impact of Changes in Audit Personnel to Whom an Offer of Employment 
is Made on Perceived Auditor Independence 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
(i) Offer of Employment to Partner Versus Manager: 
Mean Rank* Cases 
17.67 6 -Ranks (Auditor perceived more independent if offer made to 
partner rather than to manager) 
13.64 22 +Ranks (Auditor perceived less independent if offer made to 
partner rather than to manager) 
120 Ties (Independence ranked equally whether offer made to 
partner or to manager) 
148 
ý 
z=-2.2088; 2-Tailed P=0.0272. 
(ii) Offer of Employment to Manager Versus Senior: 
Mean Rank* Cases 
18.03 31 -Ranks (Auditor perceived more independent if offer made to 
senior rather than to manager) 
17.75 4 +Ranks (Auditor perceived less independent if offer made to 
senior rather than to manager) 
113 Ties (Independence ranked equally whether offer made to 
senior or to manager) 
148 
z=-3.9965; 2-Tailed P=0.0001. 
(iii) Offer of Employment to Partner Versus Senior: 
Mean Rank* Cases 
24.92 40 -Ranks (Auditor perceived more independent if offer made to 
senior rather than to partner) 
18.71 7+ Ranks (Auditor perceived less independent if offer made to 
senior rather than to partner) 
101 Ties (Independence ranked equally whether offer made to 
senior or to partner) 
148 
z=-4.5821; 2-Tailed P<0.0001. 
* Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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Table 6.24 shows the frequencies that the auditor was perceived to be independent when s/he 
takes up a position with the audit client as financial controller, having acted as supervisor/ 
non-supervisor on the previous audit. When the company's financial controller had previously 
acted as supervisor on the audit which was conducted less than six months ago, 
approximately 35 per cent of the respondents considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' 
independent. This response was obtained from over half of the respondents when the financial 
controller had acted in a non-supervisory position during the same time frame (n=81). 
Table 6.24: Frequencies that Auditor is Perceived to be Independent when the 
Company's Financial Controller had Previously Acted on the Audit 
Auditor perceived to be independent when 
the company's financial controller had 
previously acted on the company's audit: Supervisory Non-Supervisory 
Position Position 
conducted less than 6 months ago. 
Always 8 5.4 13 8.8 
Often 44 29.7 68 45.9 
Sometimes 47 31.8 39 26.4 
Rarely 36 24.3 24 16.2 
Never 13 8.8 4 2.7 
conducted between 6 and 18 months ago. 
148 100.0 148 1000 
Always 12 8.1 15 10.2 
Often 50 33.8 78 52.7 
Sometimes 58 39.2 41 27.7 
Rarely 22 14.8 11 7.4 
Never 6 4.1 2 2Q 
148 LOO 
.O 148 1110® 
conducted over 18 months ago. 
Always 13 8.8 20 13.5 
Often 72 48.6 84 56.8 
Sometimes 46 31,1 34 23.0 
Rarely 14 9.5 7 4.7 
Never 2 ? t4 2 24 148 100.0 148 100,0 
In addition, Table 6.24 shows that when the time lapse between acting on the audit as either 
a. supervisor or non-supervisor and taking up employment with the client company increased, 
the percentage of respondents who considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' 
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independent also increased. Non-parametric tests were undertaken in order to determine 
whether these differences were significant, and the results from these tests, as shown in Table 
6.25, indicated significant differences. Although these differences were significant, further 
analysis of the responses showed that a substantial number of respondents held the same 
perceptions of auditor independence irrespective of the time lapse between acting on the audit 
and becoming the company's financial controller. 
Table 6.25: Impact of Time Lapse Between Acting on the Audit and Becoming the 
Company's Financial Controller on Perceived Auditor Independence 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank* Auditor perceived to be independent when the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a supervisory 
position on the company's audit which was conducted: 
2.30 less than 6 months ago. 
1.98 between 6 and 18 months ago. 
1.72 over 18 months ago. 
Number of cases=148; Chi-square=24.7601; D. F. =2; Significance <0.0001 
Mean Rank* 
, 
Auditor perceived to be independent when the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a non- 
supervisory position on the company's audit which was 
conducted: 
2.21 less than 6 months ago. 
1.98 between 6 and 18 months ago. 
1.81 over 18 months ago. 
Number of cases= 148; Chi-square= 12.0236; D. F. =2; Significance=0.0024 
* Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank the more independent the auditor is perceived to be. 
Further analysis of the responses showed that when the previous position was as audit 
supervisor, less than half of the respondents (n=63) held the same perceptions of auditor 
independence across the three time periods while almost three quarters of them (n= 109) held 
the same perceptions of auditor independence across the three time periods when the previous 
position was as non-supervisor. 
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For each time frame, however, more respondents perceived that the auditor was `always' or 
`often' independent when the financial controller had previously acted in a non-supervisory 
position on the audit than in a supervisory position. Once again, non-parametric tests were 
performed to determine whether these differences were significant. The results from these 
tests, as shown in Table 6.26, indicated significant differences. 
Table 6.26: Impact of Previous Position of Company's Financial Controller on 
Perceived Auditor Independence 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
1. Less than 6 months ago, the company's financial controller had acted on the 
audit as: 
-Ranks +Ranks Ties Test Results 
Mean Mean 
Rank (Cases) Rank (Cases) (Cases) 
SINS 26.50 (8) 33.91 (57) (83) z=-5.6233 
P<0.0001* 
2. Between 6 and 18 months ago, the company's financial controller had acted 
on the audit as: 
SINS 27.43 (7) 28.65 (49) (92) z=-4.9432 
P<0.0001* 
3. Over 18 months ago, the company's financial controller had acted on the 
audit as: 
SINS 22.81 (8) 23.04 (37) (103) z=-3.7813 
p =0.0002* 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
S =Supervisor; NS =Non-Supervisor 
-Ranks Auditor is perceived more independent when financial controller 
had acted as supervisor than as non-supervisor on the audit. 
+Ranks Auditor is perceived less independent when financial controller 
had acted as'supervisor than as non-supervisor on the audit. 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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While these differences were significant, the majority of respondents held the same 
perceptions, which are reflected by the number of `Ties' in Table 6.26, irrespective of the 
previous position of the company's financial controller. 
Table 6.27 presents the frequencies that the auditor was considered to be independent when 
s/he takes up a non-financial position with the audit client company, having acted as a 
supervisor/non-supervisor on the previous audit. 
Table 6.27: Frequencies that Auditor is Perceived to be Independent when One of the 
Company's Non-Financial Personnel had Previously Acted on the Audit 
Auditor perceived to be independent when one 
of the company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted on the company's audit which 
was conducted: 
Supervisory Non-Supervisory 
Position Position 
#% ý/ % 
less than 6 months ago. 
Always 25 16.9 37 25.0 
Often 72 48.6 75 50.7 
Sometimes 27 18.3 18 12.1 
Rarely 19 12.8 12 8.1 
Never 3,4 6 41 
148 100.0 148 100.0 
between 6 and 18 months ago. 
Always 26 17.6 40 27.0 
Often 74 50.0 72 48.6 
Sometimes 32 21.6 22 14.9 
Rarely 12 8.1 8 5.4 
Never 424 
148 10.0 
.0 148 100.0 
over 18 months ago. 
Always 26 17.6 40 27.0 
Often 81 54.7 73 49.3 
Sometimes 28 18.9 21 14.2 
Rarely 10 6.8 8 5.4 
Never 246 41 
148 100.0 148 100.0 
132 
It can be seen from Table 6.27 that when the time lapse between acting as supervisor on the 
company's audit and taking up a non-financial position with the company increased, the 
number of respondents who considered the auditor `always' or `often' independent also 
increased. In relation to the non-supervisory position, no change occurred in the number of 
respondents who considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent when the time 
lapse was increased from six months to between six and eighteen months. Only one 
additional respondent considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent when the 
time lapse was increased to over eighteen months. Once again, non-parametric tests were 
performed, but no significant differences were found (at the p<0.05 level). 
In addition, Table 6.27 shows that for each time frame, more respondents considered the 
auditor to be `always' or `often' independent when one of the client's non-financial personnel 
had previously acted in a non-supervisory capacity than in a supervisory capacity on the 
audit. The results from the non-parametric tests undertaken, as shown in Table 6.28, 
indicated significant differences. A significantly greater number of respondents perceived the 
auditor to be less independent when one of the company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted as supervisor rather than as non-supervisor on the audit. Although these 
differences were significant, further analysis of the responses showed that the majority of 
respondents perceived no change, as reflected by the number of `Ties' in Table 6.28, in the 
independence of the auditor as a result of the previous audit position that one of the 
company's non-financial personnel held. 
In order to assess the impact on perceived auditor independence of the new position (financial 
controller/ non-financial personnel) taken up by the auditor with the audit client company, 
the results from Tables 6.24 and 6.27 are compared. A greater number of respondents 
perceived the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent when the new position with the 
client company was as one of the company's non-financial personnel rather than as its 
financial controller. This was the case for each time period and for each of the previous 
positions (supervisory/ non-supervisory) of the auditor. Non-parametric tests were undertaken 
in order to determine whether these differences were significant and the results, as shown in 
Table 6.29, indicated significant differences. 
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Table 6.28: Impact of Previous Position of One of the Company's Non-Financial 
Personnel on Perceived Auditor Independence 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
1. Less than 6 months ago, one of the company's non-financial personnel had 
acted on the audit as: 
-Ranks +Ranks Ties Test Results 
MR (Cases) MR (Cases) (Cases) 
SINS 15.00 (6) 19.20 (30) (112) z=-3.8177 
P=0.0001* 
2. Between 6 and 18 months ago, one of the company's non-financial personnel 
had acted on the audit as: 
SINS 14.50 (6) 16.96 (26) (116) z=-3.3097 
p =0.0009* 
3. Over 18 months ago, one of the company's non-financial personnel had 
acted on the audit as: 
SINS 13.50 (7) 14.83 (21) (120) z=-2.4707 
p=0.0135* 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
S =Supervisor; NS =Non-Supervisor 
-Ranks Auditor perceived more independent when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel had acted as supervisor than as non- 
supervisor on the audit. 
+Ranks Auditor perceived less independent when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel had acted as supervisor than as non- 
supervisor on the audit. 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of 
cases. 
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Table 6.29: Impact of the Auditor's New Position on Perceived Auditor Independence 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
1. Supervisor on audit conducted less than 6 months ago is now acting as: 
-Ranks +Ranks Ties Test Results 
Mean Mean 
Rank (Cases) Rank (Cases) (Cases) 
NFP/FC 40.56 (68) 32.30 (10) (70) z=-6.0641; p<0.0001* 
2. Non-Supervisor on audit conducted less than 6 months ago is now acting as: 
NFP/FC 30.51 (51) 30.44 (9) (88) z=-4.7188; p<0.0001* 
3. Supervisor on audit conducted between 6 and 18 months ago is now acting 
as: 
NFP/FC 35.47 (59) 32.20 (10) (79) z=-5.2944; p<0.0001* 
4. Non-Supervisor on audit conducted between 6 and 18 months ago is now 
acting as: 
NFP/FC 25.98 (42) 28.70 (10) (96) z=-3.6610; p=0.0003* 
5. Supervisor on audit conducted over 18 months ago is now acting as: 
NFP/FC 28.30 (42) 24.71 (12) (94) z=-3.8402; p=0.0001* 
6. Non-Supervisor on audit conducted over 18 months ago is now acting as: 
NFP/FC 22.03 (31) 23.62 (13) (104) z=-2.1940; p=0.0282* 
NFP=Non-Financial Personnel; FC=Financial Controller 
-Ranks Auditor perceived more independent when the ex-auditor became 
one of the company's NFP than its FC. 
+Ranks Auditor perceived less independent when the ex-auditor became 
one of the company's NFP than its FC. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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It can be seen from Table 6.29 that the auditor was perceived to be independent more 
frequently when the position taken by the ex-auditor was as one of the company's non- 
financial personnel than as its financial controller. Although these differences were 
significant, the number of `Ties' reflected in Table 6.29, indicates that the majority of 
respondents held the same perceptions of auditor independence irrespective of the new 
employment position taken up by the auditor with the client company. 
6.7: Financial Statement Reliability 
In addition to assessing the impact of each of the six variables on perceived auditor 
independence, the questionnaire sought respondents' perceptions as to the effects of each of 
these six variables on the reliability of financial statements. Prior to looking at these effects, 
the impact of auditor independence on the reliability of financial statements is first 
considered. 
6.7.1: Impact of Auditor Independence on the Reliability of Financial Statements 
Table 6.30 shows that over 70 per cent of the respondents stated that they `always' or `often' 
consider the reliability of audited financial statements when using them for decision making 
purposes. When assessing the reliability of audited financial statements, only 49 per cent of 
the respondents stated that they `always' or `often' consider the independence of the auditor 
in this assessment while approximately 10 per cent of them stated that they `rarely' consider 
the independence of the auditor in this assessment. When auditors were perceived not to be 
independent, the majority of respondents (n=117) stated that this would decrease the 
reliability of financial statements `to some extent' or `significantly'. 
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Table 6.30: Assessment of the Reliability of Financial Statements 
Frequency that the reliability of 
financial statements is assessed: 
Always 72 49.3 
Often 34 23.3 
Sometimes 26 17.8 
Rarely 11 7.5 
Never a 2.1 
146* 10010 
Frequency that the independence of the 
auditor is considered when assessing the 
reliability of the financial statements: 
Always 32 24.2 
Often 33 25.0 
Sometimes 54 41.0 
Rarely 13 9.8 
Never Q Q, Q 
132" 10060- 
Impact on financial statement reliability 
when the auditor is perceived not to 
be independent: 
Reliability remain constant 2 1.7 
Reliability decreased to some extent 52 43.7 
Reliability decreased significantly A 1466 
10 100 
* Two respondents who `rarely' or `never' use financial statements (refer 
to Table 6.4) were not required to respond to this question. 
An additional 14 respondents who `rarely' or `never' assess the 
reliability of the financial statements (see above) were not required to 
respond to this question. 
# A further 13 respondents who `rarely' or `never' consider the 
independence of the auditor when assessing the reliability of the financial 
statements (see above) were not required to respond to this question. 
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6.7.2: Audit Firm Size and Financial Statement Reliability 
The majority of respondents, as shown in Table 6.31, perceived the financial statements to 
be `always' or `often' reliable whether they were audited by a Big Six or a non-Big Six audit 
firm. A higher number of respondents gave this response when the audit was performed by 
a Big Six audit firm (n=139) rather than by a non-Big Six audit firm (n=106). In order to 
determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were undertaken. 
The results showed a significant difference at the p<0.0001 level. 
Table 6.31: Impact of Audit Firm Size on the Perceived Reliability of Financial 
Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable 
when the audit is performed by a: 
#% 
Big Sir audit firm. 
Always 62 41.9 
Often 77 52.0 
Sometimes 7 4,7 
Rarely 2 1.4 
Never Q 0.0 
148 100 
Non-Big Sir audit firm. 
Always 12 8.1 
Often 94 63.5 
Sometimes 35 23.7 
Rarely 7 4.7 
Never Q QiQ 
148 1000.0 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
Mean Rank Cases 
36.00 3 -Ranks (Financial statements audited by non-Big Six ranked 
more reliable than those audited by Big Six) 
41.71 79 +Ranks (Financial statements audited by non-Big Six ranked less 
reliable than those audited by Big Six) 
66 Ties (Financial statements audited by non-Big Six and by Big 
148 
Six ranked equally in terms of reliability) 
z=-7.3666; 2-Tailed P<0.0001 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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While this difference was significant, it can be seen from Table 6.31 that sixty-six 
respondents held the same perceptions in terms of the reliability of financial statements 
irrespective of the size of the firm that performed the audit. 
6.7.3: Audit Market Competition and Financial Statement Reliability 
Table 6.32 shows that the majority of respondents perceived the financial statements to be 
`always' or `often' reliable regardless of the level of competition in the audit market. 
Table 6.32: Impact of Audit Market Competition on the Perceived Reliability of 
Financial Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable 
when the audit is undertaken in an audit 
environment which is considered to: % 
be highly competitive. 
Always 19 12.9 
Often 73 49.3 
Sometimes 52 35.1 
Rarely 3 2.0 
Never 1 0.7 
148 10000.0 
have low competition. 
Always 34 22.9 
Often 86 58.1 
Sometimes 18 12.2 
Rarely 9 6.1 
Never 1Q7 
14®, 
m8 
100 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
Mean Rank Cases 
35.97 57 -Ranks (Financial statements in low competition ranked more 
reliable than those in high competition) 
44.42 18 +Ranks (Financial statements in low competition ranked less 
reliable than those in high competition) 
73 Ties (In low and high competition, financial statements 
ranked equally in terms of reliability) 
148 
z=-3.3030; 2-Tailed P=0.0010 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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A higher percentage of respondents gave this response when the level of competition was 
low (81 per cent) than when it was high (62 per cent). The non-parametric test undertaken 
indicated a significant difference in the reliability of financial statements when audited in the 
two environments. Financial statements audited in a highly competitive environment were 
perceived to be significantly less reliable than those audited in an environment which has low 
competition. This result is consistent with the results reported in Table 6.9 where almost 60 
per cent of the respondents believed that the greater the level of competition in the audit 
market, the more likely it was that the auditor would be less independent and with the results 
reported in Table 6.30, where approximately 98 per cent of the respondents stated that the 
reliability of the financial statements would decrease `to some extent' or `significantly' if they 
perceived the auditor not to be independent. Although the results indicated a significant 
difference, it can be seen from Table 6.32 that almost half of the respondents (n=73) 
perceived no difference in terms of the reliability of financial statements whether competition 
in the audit market was high or low. 
6.7.4: Audit Committees and Financial Statement Reliability 
The existence of an audit committee in a company resulted in approximately 83 per cent of 
the respondents, as revealed in Table 6.33, perceiving the financial statements to be `always' 
or `often' reliable. When an audit committee did not exist, only half of the respondents gave 
this response. In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non- 
parametric tests were undertaken. The results indicated a significant difference at the 
p<0.0001 level. This result is consistent with previous results which showed that the 
majority of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the auditor was less likely to be 
independent when a company had an audit committee (refer to Table 6.11) and with the 
reduced reliability of financial statements when auditors are perceived not to be independent 
(refer to Table 6.30). 
The number of `Ties' reflected in Table 6.33 shows that although the majority of respondents 
perceived that the reliability of the financial statements was affected by the existence or non- 
existence of an audit committee, sixty-one of them did not perceive any difference. 
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Table 6.33: Impact of Audit Committees on the Perceived Reliability of Financial 
Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable 
when the company: 
has an audit committee. 
II % 
Always 43 29.0 
Often 80 54.0 
Sometimes 14 9.5 
Rarely 10 6.8 
Never 1 0.7 
148 1 00 
does not have an audit committee. 
Always 13 8.8 
Often 62 41.9 
Sometimes 56 37.8 
Rarely 16 10.8 
Never 1 0.7 
148 Mo 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
Mean Rank Cases 
72.08 6 -Ranks (When no audit committee exists, financial 
statements ranked more reliable than when one 
exists) 
41.92 81 +Ranks (When no audit committee exists, financial 
statements ranked less reliable than when one 
exists) 
61 Ties (Financial statements ranked of equal reliability 
whether an audit committee exists or not) 
148 
z=-6.2703; 2-Tailed P<0.0001 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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6.7.5: Audit Tenure and Financial Statement Reliability 
Table 6.34 shows the frequencies that the financial statements were perceived to be reliable 
when the length of time that an audit firm acts for the same company was varied. The 
perceived reliability of the financial statements was influenced in the same direction, although 
to a larger extent, to that reported in relation to auditor independence (refer to table 6.14). 
Table 6.34: Impact of Changing the Audit Firm on the Perceived Reliability of 
Financial Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when 
the company has had the same audit firm for: 
#% 
20 years. 
Always 11 7.4 
Often 73 49.3 
Sometimes 45 30.4 
Rarely 17 11.5 
Never 2 1.4 
L02 
148 100 
10 years. 
Always 19 12.8 
Often 84 56.7 
Sometimes 34 23.0 
Rarely 10 6.8 
Never 1 Q7 
less than 10 years. 
148 100ý. 0 
Always 30 20.3 
Often 91 61.4 
Sometimes 18 12.2 
Rarely 8 5.4 
Never 1 0.7 
148 10®0,0 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
20 years 
10 years 
Less than 10 years 
Mean Rank Test Results 
2.28 Chi-square = 23.0169 
1.99 Significance < 0.0001 
1.73 D. F =2 
N=148 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower 
the mean rank, the more reliable the financial statements are perceived to be. 
142 
When the company had the same audit firm for twenty years, approximately 57 per cent of 
the respondents perceived the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable. By 
reducing tenure to ten years and less than ten years, the percentage of respondents who 
responded in this manner increased to approximately 70 per cent and 82 per cent 
respectively. 
The results from the non-parametric tests undertaken indicated a significant difference in the 
perceived reliability of the financial statements by varying the audit firm's tenure. The 
financial statements were perceived to be significantly more reliable the less time the audit 
firm was associated with the audit client. Although this difference was significant, further 
analysis of the responses showed that over half of the respondents (n=80) perceived the 
financial statements to be of the same reliability irrespective of the length of time that the 
audit firm acted. 
Table 6.35 shows the frequencies that the respondents perceived the financial statements to 
be reliable when the period, that the audit partner has been in charge of the company's audit, 
was varied. When the audit partner was in charge of the company's audit for less than seven 
years, approximately 83 per cent of the respondents considered the financial statements to 
be `always' or `often' reliable. By increasing the partner's time in charge of the audit to 
seven and twenty years, the percentage of respondents giving this response reduced to 
approximately 68 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. 
This reduction in the perceived reliability of the financial statements was significant based 
on the results from the non-parametric test undertaken. These results are consistent with 
those presented in Table 6.15 which showed that the shorter the period that the same audit 
partner was in charge of the audit, the greater the number of respondents who considered the 
auditor to be `always' or `often' independent. 
Further analysis of the responses showed that while the perceptions of the majority of 
respondents were influenced by the length of time that the audit partner was allowed to act, 
a substantial number of them (n=70) were not influenced. 
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Table 6.35: Impact of Changing the Audit Partner on the Perceived Reliability of 
Financial Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when 
the partner in charge of the company's audit has 
been in charge for: % 
20 years. 
Always 11 7.4 
Often 63 42.6 
Sometimes 53 35.8 
Rarely 20 13.5 
Never 1M 
148 l0 0 
7 years. 
Always 17 11.5 
Often 84 56.7 
Sometimes 39 26.4 
Rarely 7 4.7 
Never 
_i 
u 
148 10Q. 0 
less than 7 years. 
Always 29 19.6 
Often 94 63.5 
Sometimes 17 11.5 
Rarely 7 4.7 
Never 1 0.7 
148 1® 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank Test Results 
20 years 2.36 Chi-square = 35.4020 
7 years 1.97 Significance < 0.0001 
Less than 7 years 1.67 D. F =2 
N= 148 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower 
the mean rank, the more reliable the financial statements are perceived to be. 
In the same way that the perceived independence of the auditor was influenced by the length 
of time that an audit manager acts on the company's audit, Table 6.36 shows that the 
perceived reliability of the financial statements was also influenced. Half of the respondents 
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considered the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable when the audit manager 
acted on the company's audit for twenty years. The percentage of respondents responding in 
this manner increased to approximately 63 per cent when the audit manager's tenure was 
reduced to seven years and to approximately 78 per cent when the audit manager's tenure 
was reduced to less than seven years. 
Table 6.36: Impact of Changing the Audit Manager on the Perceived Reliability of 
Financial Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when 
the manager in charge of the company's has been 
in charge for: 
20 years. 
Always 9 6.1 
Often 65 43.9 
Sometimes 51 34.4 
Rarely 21 14.2 
Never 2 1.4 
148 1® 
7 years. 
Always 18 12.1 
Often 75 50.7 
Sometimes 46 31.1 
Rarely 8 5.4 
Never IM 
less than 7 years. 
148 M, 0 
Always 30 20.2 
Often 86 58.1 
Sometimes 25 16.9 
Rarely 6 4.1 
Never 1 0.7 
148 1® 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
20 years 
7 years 
Less than 7 years 
Mean Rank Test Results 
2.34 Chi-square = 32.4865 
1.99 Significance < 0.0001 
1.68 D. F =2 
N= 148 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower 
the mean rank, the more reliable the financial statements are perceived to be. 
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Once again, non-parametric tests were undertaken in order to determine whether these 
differences were significant. The results from these tests indicated a significant difference at 
less than the 0.0001 level. In addition, further analysis of the responses showed that while 
the perceptions held by the majority of the respondents in respect of the reliability of the 
financial statements were influenced by the length of time that the audit manager acted, the 
perceptions held by a substantial number of the respondents (n=69) were not influenced. 
In order to assess the impact of the rotation of audit personnel (audit partner/ audit manager) 
on the reliability of the financial statements, the results from Tables 6.35 and 6.36 are 
compared. No change resulted in the total number of respondents who considered the 
financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable whether the person in charge of the 
audit for twenty years was the partner or the manager. For the two other periods, seven 
years/ less than seven years, more respondents considered the financial statements to be 
`always' or `often' reliable when the partner, rather than the manager, was the same. In 
order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were 
performed. No significant differences were found (at the p=0.05 level). 
Finally, a comparison of the results from Tables 6.34 to 6.36, shows that more respondents 
considered the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable when for twenty years, 
the company's audit was performed by unspecified personnel in the same audit firm rather 
than by specified personnel (audit partner/manager) in the same audit firm. 
Non-parametric tests were performed in order to determine whether these differences were 
significant. The results, which are shown in Table 6.37, indicated a significant difference in 
the perceived reliability of the financial statements. The financial statements were perceived 
to be less reliable when the manager was specified to be the same than when s/he was not. 
Although this difference was significant, it can be seen from Table 6.37 that the majority of 
the respondents (n=113) did not perceive any difference in terms of the reliability of 
financial statements whether the manager was specified or not. No significant difference was 
found in the perceived reliability of financial statements when the company's audit had been 
performed by an unspecified partner within the same audit firm rather than by a specified 
partner within the same audit firm (at the p=0.05 level). 
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Table 6.37: Impact on the Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements of having the 
Same Firm with Specified Versus Unspecified Personnel 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
Specified Personnel (Manager) versus Unspecified Personnel (Firm) for 20 years: 
Mean Rank Cases 
17.90 10 -Ranks (Financial statements ranked more reliable if the 
manager is specified than unspecified) 
18.04 25 +Ranks (Financial statements ranked less reliable if the 
manager is specified than unspecified) 
113 Ties (Financial statements ranked of equal reliability 
whether the manager is specified or not) 
148 
ý z=-2.2276; p=0.0259* 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
6.7.6: Provision of NAS and Financial Statement Reliability 
Table 6.38 reveals that less than half of the respondents perceived the company's financial 
statements 'always' or `often' reliable when NAS was provided to the company by personnel 
involved in the audit (n=66). 
By fully disclosing this fact in the company's financial statements, a higher percentage of 
respondents (approximately 60 per cent) gave this response. When NAS was provided to the 
company by a separate department within the audit firm, approximately 64 per cent of the 
respondents perceived the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable. This 
response was obtained from approximately 78 per cent of the respondents when NAS was 
provided by a firm not involved in the audit. 
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Table 6.38: Impact of the Provision of NAS on the Perceived Reliability of Financial 
Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when 
NAS has been provided to the company by: % 
personnel involved in the audit. 
Always 6 4.1 
Often 60 40.5 
Sometimes 55 37.1 
Rarely 25 16.9 
Never 2 LA 
148 100,0 
a separate department within the firm. 
Always 25 16.9 
Often 70 47.3 
Sometimes 37 25.0 
Rarely 14 9.4 
Never 2 1.. 4 
148 l® 
an audit firm not involved in the audit. 
Always 47 31.7 
Often 69 46.6 
Sometimes 22 14.9 
Rarely 9 6.1 
Never _1 
22 
148 M. 0 
the auditor to all clients but full disclosure is 
made in the client's financial statements. 
Always 29 19.6 
Often 59 39.9 
Sometimes 48 32.4 
Rarely 11 7.4 
Never 1 0.7 
148 100.0 
In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were 
undertaken. Table 6.39 shows that except for the comparison of (c) the provision of NAS by 
a separate department within the audit firm with (b) the provision of NAS by the audit firm 
to all clients but full disclosure is made in the client's financial statements, the results from 
these tests indicated significant differences (at the level <0.0001). It can be seen from Table 
6.39, that the reliability of the financial statements is most threatened when NAS is provided 
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by personnel involved in the audit". 
Table 6.39: Impact of Changes in the Method of NAS Provision on the Perceived 
Reliability of Financial Statements 
Friedman Two-Way Anova Test 
Mean Rank Financial statements perceived to be reliable when NAS has been 
provided to the company by: 
3.11 (a) personnel involved in the audit. 
2.46 (b) the auditor to all clients but full disclosure is made in the client's 
financial statements. 
2.45 (c) a separate department within the firm. 
1.98 (d) an audit firm not involved in the audit. 
Number of cases=148; Chi-square=58.2912; D. F. =3; Significance <0.0001 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
-Ranks + Ranks Ties Test Results 
MR (Cases) MR (Cases) (Cases) 
(b) & (a) 37.38 (64) 41.59 (11) (73) z=-5.1089; p<0.0001* 
(c) & (a) 39.71 (65) 38.46 (13) (70) z=-5.1825; p<0.0001* 
(d) & (a) 54.21 (91) 45.14 (14) (43) z=-6.8747; p<0.0001* 
(d) & (b) 33.75 (52) 30.00 (13) (83) z=-4.4601; p<0.0001* 
(c) & (d) 31.99 (50) 26.50 (11) (87) z=-4.6975; p<0.0001* 
-Ranks Financial statements perceived more reliable when NAS has been 
provided by the first rather than by the second method. 
+Ranks Financial statements perceived less reliable when NAS has been 
provided by the first rather than by the second method. 
Comparison of (b) and (c) showed no significant difference (at the p=0.05 
level). 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
"The mean rank based on the Friedman Two-Way Anova test was highest when NAS 
were provided by personnel involved in the audit. 
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This finding is consistent with the results presented in Table 6.20 when it was found that the 
provision of NAS by personnel involved in the audit was the greatest threat to auditor 
independence. Further analysis of the responses showed that the method of NAS provision 
affected the perceptions held by the majority of respondents (n=112) in respect of the 
reliability of the financial statements. In relation to the remaining respondents (n=36), there 
were no changes in their perceptions of the reliability of the financial statements. 
6.7.7: Client Employment and Financial Statement Reliability 
Table 6.40 presents the frequencies that the financial statements were perceived to be reliable 
when an offer of employment was made to an audit staff member during the current audit. 
Table 6.40: Impact of Employment Offer on the Perceived Reliability of Financial 
Statements 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when 
during the current audit, the company made an offer 
of employment to the: 
#% 
audit partner. 
Always 15 10.1 
Often 52 35.2 
Sometimes 48 32.4 
Rarely 29 19.6 
Never 4 2.2 
148 M00 
audit manager. 
Always 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
audit senior. 
Always 
Often 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
Never 
14 9.5 
59 39.9 
48 32.4 
24 16.2 
2m 
148 1®0 
17 11.5 
69 46.6 
40 27.0 
18 12.2 
4 2.7. 
148 100.0 
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The more senior the audit staff member, the fewer the number of respondents who 
considered the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable. Even when an offer of 
employment was made to the least senior audit member, the audit senior, approximately 15 
per cent of the respondents perceived the financial statements to be `rarely' or `never' 
reliable. A similar effect, as reported in Table 6.22, was experienced in relation to auditor 
independence. 
Table 6.41: Impact of Changes in Audit Personnel to Whom an Offer of Employment 
is Made on the Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank Financial statements perceived to be reliable when during the current 
audit, the company made an offer of employment to the: 
2.13 (a) audit partner 
2.03 (b) audit manager 
1.84 (c) audit senior 
Number of cases=148; Chi-square =6.2128; D. F. =2; Significance=0.0448 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Tests 
-Ranks +Ranks Tics Test Results 
MR (Cases) MR (Cases) (Cases) 
(a) & (c) 21.72 (34) 20.56 (8) (106) z=-3.5886; P=0.0003* 
(b) & (c) 14.12 (25) 20.50 (4) (119) z=-2.9299; p=0.0034* 
-Ranks Financial statements perceived more reliable when a job offer is made 
to the audit senior rather than to either the audit partner or audit 
manager. 
+Ranks Financial statements perceived less reliable when a job offer is made to 
the audit senior rather than to either the audit partner or audit manager. 
No significant difference in the perceived reliability of financial statements when a job 
offer is made to the audit partner rather than to the audit manager (at the p=0.05 
level). 
MR Mean Rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
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The results from the non-parametric tests, as shown in Table 6.41, indicated significant 
differences in the perceived reliability of the financial statements when an offer of 
employment was made by the company during the current audit to different audit staff 
members. When an offer of employment was made to the audit senior rather than to either 
the audit partner or the audit manager, the financial statements were perceived to be 
significantly more reliable. However, the difference in the perceived reliability of the 
financial statements was not significant when an offer was made to the audit partner rather 
than to the audit manager (at the p=0.05 level) 
Even in those instances of significant differences, it can be seen from Table 6.41 that the 
majority of respondents (reflected by the number of `Ties') perceived the financial statements 
to be of equal reliability irrespective of the person to whom an offer of employment was 
made. 
Table 6.42 shows the frequencies that the financial statements were perceived to be reliable 
when the auditor becomes the company's financial controller, having previously acted as 
supervisor/ non-supervisor on the company's audit. When the company's financial controller 
had less than six months ago supervised the audit, approximately 47 per cent of the 
respondents perceived the financial statements to be `always' or `often' reliable. This 
response was obtained from approximately 57 per cent of the respondents when the 
company's financial controller had previously acted in a non-supervisory position on the 
company's audit which was conducted during the same time frame. 
The nature of the financial controller's previous position (supervisor/ non-supervisor) also 
influenced the perceptions held by the respondents in each of the other two time frames. In 
both cases, fewer respondents perceived the financial statements to be `always' or `often' 
reliable when the company's financial controller had previously acted on the audit in a 
supervisory rather than in a non-supervisory capacity. The effects of the previous position 
of the company's financial controller on the perceived reliability of the financial statements 
are similar to those reported in relation to perceived auditor independence (refer to Table 
6.24). 
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Table 6.42: Frequencies that Financial Statements are Perceived to be Reliable when 
the Company's Financial Controller had Previously Acted on the Audit 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable 
when the company's financial controller had 
previously acted on the audit: 
Supervisory Non-Supervisory 
Position Position 
#%#% 
conducted less than 6 months ago. 
Always 13 8.8 19 12.8 
Often 57 38.5 66 44.6 
Sometimes 52 35.1 44 29.7 
Rarely 20 13.5 17 11.5 
L. 4 Never 4.1 
149 1 00.0 148 100.0 
conducted between 6 and 18 months ago. 
Always 15 10.1 21 14.2 
Often 62 41.9 72 48.6 
Sometimes 52 35.1 40 27.0 
Rarely 17 11.5 14 9.5 
Never 2 1.4 1 22 
148 100.0 148 100.0 
conducted over 18 months ago. 
Always 17 11.5 23 15.5 
Often 74 50.0 75 50.7 
Sometimes 38 25.6 36 24.3 
Rarely 17 11.5 13 8.8 
Never 2 IA 1 0.7 
148 100.0 148 100.0 
In order to determine whether these differences were significant, non-parametric tests were 
performed. The results, as presented in Table 6.43, indicated significant differences in each 
of the three time periods. However, although these differences were significant, it can be 
seen from Table 6.43 by the number of `Ties' presented, that the majority of respondents 
perceived the financial statements to be of equal reliability irrespective of the previous 
position of the company's financial controller. 
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Table 6.43: Impact of the Previous Position of the Company's Financial Controller on 
the Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
(I) Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the company's financial 
controller was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which was conducted 
less than 6 months ago. 
Mean Rank Cases 
23.43 7 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
22.32 37 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
14,4 Ties '(The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
148 
18.64 7 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
19.08 30 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
111 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
(ii) Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the company's financial 
controller was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which was conducted 
between 6 and 18 months ago. 
148 
(iii) 
z=-3.8628; 2-Tailed P=0.0001 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
z=-3.3341; 2-Tailed P=0.0009 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the company's financial 
controller was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which was conducted 
over 18 months ago. 
13.60 5 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
13.48 21 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
122 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
148 
ý 
z=-2.7303; 2-Tailed P=0.0063 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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When the time lapse between either acting as audit supervisor or in a non-supervisory 
capacity and taking up the position as the company's financial controller increased, the 
number of respondents who perceived the financial statements to be `always' or `often' 
reliable also increased. Non-parametric tests were performed in order to determine whether 
these differences were significant. No significant differences (at the p =0.05 level) were 
found when the auditor's previous position was as non-supervisor. 
However, the results from the non-parametric tests shown in Table 6.44 indicated significant 
differences when the auditor's previous position was as audit supervisor. 
Table 6.44: Impact of Time Lapse Between Acting on the Audit and Becoming the 
Company's Financial Controller on Financial Statement Reliability 
Friedman Two-Way Anova 
Mean Rank Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the company's 
financial controller had previously acted as supervisor on the audit 
which was conducted: 
2.17 (a) less than 6 months ago. 
1.99 (b) between 6 and 18 months ago. 
1.84 (c) over 18 months ago. 
Number of cases= 148; Chi-square=8.1216; D. F. =2; Significance=0.0172 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks-Tests 
-Ranks +Ranks Tics Test Results 
MR (Cases) MR (Cases) (Cases) 
(a) & (b) 17.00 (8) 17.65 (26) (114) z=-2.7611; p=0.0058* 
(c) & (b) 15.83 (24) 18.50 (8) (116) z=-2.1691; p=0.0301* 
-Ranks Financial statements ranked more reliable for the first rather than 
the second time period. 
+ Ranks Financial statements ranked less reliable for the first rather than 
the second time period. 
MR Mean Rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
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The financial statements were perceived to be significantly more reliable the longer the time 
lapse between acting as audit supervisor and taking a position as the company's financial 
controller. Although these differences were significant it should be observed from Table 6.44 
that the majority of respondents perceived the financial statements to be of equal reliability 
irrespective of the time lapse between acting on the audit as supervisor and becoming the 
company's financial controller. 
Table 6.45 presents the frequencies that the respondents perceived the financial statements 
to be reliable when one of the company's non-financial personnel had previously acted as a 
supervisor or non-supervisor on the company's audit. The longer the time lapse between 
Table 6.45: Frequencies that Financial Statements are Perceived to be Reliable when 
One of the Company's Non-Financial Personnel had Acted on the Audit 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable 
when one of the company's non-financial 
personnel had previously acted on the audit: 
conducted less than 6 months ago. 
Always 23 
Often 67 
Sometimes 33 
Rarely 23 
Never 2 
148 
conducted between 6 and 18 months ago. 
Always 26 
Often 65 
Sometimes 38 
Rarely 17 
Never 2 
148 
conducted over 18 months ago. 
Always 26 
Often 70 
Sometimes 34 
Rarely 16 
Never 2 
148 
Supervisory Non-Supervisory 
Position Position 
15.5 31 20.9 
45.3 71 48.0 
22.3 28 18.9 
15.5 16 10.8 
1.4 2 1.4 
100 L8 l® 
17.6 
43.9 
25.6 
11.5 
. 
L4 
100.0 
ý 
32 21.6 
71 48.0 
27 18.2 
16 10.8 
2 L4 
148 140 0 
17.6 
47.3 
22.9 
10.8 
1.4 
10®0.0 
33 22.3 
73 49.3 
25 16.9 
14 9.5 
am 1., 48 1000 
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acting on the company's audit and taking up a position with the company as one of its non- 
financial personnel, the greater the number of respondents who perceived the financial 
statements to be `always' or `often' reliable. In order to determine whether these differences 
were significant, non-parametric tests were performed but the differences were not found to 
be significant (at the p=0.05 level). 
For each time period more respondents perceived the financial statements to be 'always' or 
'often' reliable when the previous position was non-supervisory than supervisory in nature. 
Similar effects were reported in relation to auditor independence (refer to Table 6.27). Once 
again, non-parametric tests were undertaken in order to determine whether these differences 
were significant. The results, as reported in Table 6.46, indicated significant differences for 
each of the three times periods. Although these differences were significant, it should be 
observed from the number of 'Ties' reflected in Table 6.46, that the majority of respondents 
perceived no difference in the reliability of the financial statements whether the previous 
position of the one of the company's non-financial personnel was as audit supervisor or as 
non-supervisor. 
In order to assess the impact on respondents' perceptions of financial statement reliability of 
the nature of the new employment position taken up by the auditor with the client company, 
financial controller/ non-financial position, the frequencies presented in Tables 6.42 and 6.45 
are compared. When the auditor became the company's financial controller, irrespective of 
his/her previous audit position or the time lapse, fewer respondents considered the financial 
statements to be `always' or `often' reliable than when the auditor became one of the 
company's non-financial personnel. 
Non-parametric tests were performed in order to determine whether these differences were 
significant, the results of which are presented in Table 6.47. When the auditor had previously 
acted as supervisor on the audit, the new position (financial controller/ non-financial 
personnel) showed significant differences for the first two time periods (less than six months 
and between six and eighteen months) but the difference was found not to be significant (at 
the p=0.05 level) in respect of the third period (over eighteen months). When the auditor 
had previously acted as non-supervisor on the audit, the new position (financial controller/ 
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Table 6.46: Impact of the Previous Position of One of the Company's Non-Financial 
Personnel on the Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
(i) 
(ii) 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which 
was conducted less than 6 months ago. 
Mean Rank Cases 
12.00 2 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
14.16 25 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
121 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
148 
z=-3.9641; 2-Tailed P=0.0001 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which 
was conducted between 6 and 18 months ago. 
12.00 3 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
12.57 21 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
124 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
148 
(iii) 
z=-3.2571; 2-Tailed P=0.0011 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel was supervisor/ non-supervisor on the audit which 
was conducted over 18 months ago. 
11.00 2 -Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
11.00 19 +Ranks (If supervisor, financial statements ranked less 
reliable than if non-supervisor) 
127 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether supervisor or non-supervisor) 
148 
z=-3.2498; 2-Tailed P=0.0012 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
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Table 6.47: Impact of the Auditor's New Position on the Perceived Reliability of 
Financial Statements 
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Tests 
(I) Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the supervisor on the 
audit conducted less than 6 months ago, has now become the company's 
FC/NFP. 
Mean Rank Cases 
32.01 50 -Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if FC) 
39.85 17 +Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked less reliable 
than if FC) 
81 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether FC or NFP) 
148 
(ii) 
z=-2.8828; 2-Tailed P=0.0039 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the supervisor on the 
audit conducted between 6 and 18 months ago, has now become the 
company's FC/NFP. 
25.73 39 -Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if FC) 
32.10 15 +Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked less reliable 
than if FC) 
94 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether FC or NFP) 
148 
(iii) 
z=-2.2473; 2-Tailed P=0.0246 
Financial statements perceived to be reliable when the non-supervisor on the 
audit conducted less than 6 months ago, has now become the company's 
FC/NFP. 
25.77 39 -Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked more 
reliable than if FC) 
26.75 12 +Ranks (If NFP, financial statements ranked less reliable 
than if FC) 
97 Ties (The reliability of financial statements ranked 
equally whether FC or NFP) 
148 
z=-3.2057; 2-Tailed P=0.0013 
FC=Financial Controller NFP=Non-Financial Personnel 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
159 
non-financial personnel) was only significant for the first period (less than six months) but 
not for the latter two periods (between six and eighteen months and over eighteen months). 
Although the difference was significant for the first period, it can be seen from Table 6.47, 
that the majority of the respondents (n=97) did not perceive any difference in the reliability 
of the financial statements whether the auditor who had previously acted in a non-supervisory 
capacity on the audit became the company's financial controller or one of its non-financial 
personnel. 
6.8: Economic Impact of a Perceived Lack of Auditor Independence 
This section addresses the economic impact of a perceived lack of auditor independence in 
terms of its effects on respondents' investment and lending decisions and on their use of 
alternative sources of information about the company. 
6.8.1 Impact of Perceived Auditor Independence on Investment/ Lending Decisions 
Table 6.48 shows the frequencies that the independence of the auditor is considered when 
making an investment/ lending decision. There was a relatively even spread of responses 
across the three categories: always to often (n=43); sometimes (n=50); and rarely to never 
(n=53). 
When auditors were perceived not to be independent, ten respondents stated that this would 
have no effect on the amount that they would invest in, or lend to, a company. Over half of 
the respondents stated that they would invest/ lend less and a further 24 per cent stated that 
they would not invest/ lend at all if they perceived the auditor not to be independent. An 
additional category of response ('undecided'), as shown in Table 6.48, arose from further 
analysis of questionnaire responses. A total of fourteen lenders were undecided as to how 
their lending decisions would be affected if they perceived the auditor not to be independent. 
They argued that other factors, in addition to a perceived lack of auditor independence, 
would have to be taken into account when making this decision. Some of these factors 
included: 
"(Impact on decision is) situation specific - would seek further information or take 
overall factors into consideration. " 
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"You would have to verify the loan by other means. " 
"(The decision) would depend on other factors, i. e., quality of management, our own 
internal assessment of company, industry, etc. " 
"(It is a) question of degree - the degree that perceived independence is lacking, 
nature of loan term (secured/unsecured), nature of business, alternative information 
sources. " 
"It would have an impact on credit assessment but other factors such as predictability 
of future cashflows and repayment capacity would be more critical. " 
"(Lack of independence) cannot be looked at in isolation. Other factors such as 
security would determine answer. " 
Table 6.48: Impact of Perceived Auditor Independence on Investment and Lending 
Decisions 
Frequency that auditor independence is considered 
when making an investment/ lending decision: #% 
Always 21 14.4 
Often 22 15.1 
Sometimes 50 34.2 
Rarely 44 30.1 
Never 2 6.2 
146* 100.0 
Impact on investment/ lending decision when the 
auditor is perceived not to be independent: 
No effect 10 10.8 
Invest/ lend less 47 50.5 
Would not invest at all 22 23.7 
Undecided 14 15.0 
100.0 
* Two respondents who `rarely' or `never' use financial statements (refer to Table 
6.4) were not required to respond to this question. 
An additional 53 respondents who `rarely' or `never' consider the independence 
of the auditor when making an investment/ lending decision (see above) were 
not required to respond to this question. 
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6.8.2: Impact of Perceived Auditor Independence on the Use of Alternative Sources of 
Information about the Company 
Table 6.49 shows that over 30 per cent of the respondents stated that they `rarely' or `never' 
specifically consider the independence of the auditor when deciding on the use of alternative 
sources of information about the company. Of those who did consider the independence of 
the auditor, all but one respondent stated that they would increase their use of alternative 
sources of information if they perceived the auditor not to be independent. This need for 
additional information is consistent with the reasons provided by the fourteen lenders who 
were undecided as to how their loan decision would be affected if they perceived the auditor 
not to be independent. 
Table 6.49: Impact of Perceived Auditor Independence on the Use of Alternative 
Sources of Information about the Company 
Frequency that auditor independence is considered 
when deciding on the use of alternative sources of 
information about the company: 
#% 
Always 15 
Often 24 
Sometimes 61 
Rarely 36 
Never 10 
146* 
10.3 
16.4 
41.8 
24.7 
6.8 
1® 
Impact on the use of alternative sources of information 
when the auditor is perceived not to be independent: 
Increase significantly 59 59.0 
Increase to some extent 40 40.0 
Decrease to some extent 1 1.0 
100^ 100,0 
* Two respondents who `rarely' or `never' use financial statements (refer 
to Table 6.4) were not required to respond to this question. 
A An additional 46 respondents who `rarely' or `never' consider the 
independence of the auditor when deciding upon the use of alternative 
sources of information about the company (see above) were not required 
to respond to this question. 
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6.9: Other Effects 
The responses to the one hundred and two statements on the questionnaire were tested 
throughout for any potential effects that could have been caused by the respondents' gender, 
group, age, work experience, accounting knowledge, chartered accounting training, and 
previous suspicions of a lack of auditor independence ". Only those effects, which were 
significant, are reported (at the 0.05 level). 
6.9.1: Gender 
The gender of the respondents was available from sources outside of the mail questionnaire. 
Only one response, as shown in Table 6.50, was affected by the gender of the respondents. 
Table 6.50: Significant Effects of Respondents' Gender on Responses 
Mann Whitney U Test 
Independence is decreased if NAS is provided to audit clients by a separate 
department within the audit firm. 
Mean Rank Cases Gender Test Results 
71.96 130 Male z=-2.0646" 
92.83 18 Female p=0.0390* 
148 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower 
the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the above statement. 
Corrected for ties 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
It can be seen from Table 6.50 that males were more concerned than females as to the effect 
that the provision of NAS by a separate department within the audit firm would have on 
56As noted previously, non-parametric tests were used because they do not require the 
restrictive assumptions associated with parametric tests. The tests of association were based 
on the Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova (for k independent samples) and the Mann-Whitney U 
test (for 2 independent samples) because at least ordinal measurement of the data had been 
achieved, and both tests have a power efficiency close to 95 % (Siegel, 1956: 126/193). 
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auditor independence. 
6.9.2: Group 
The group (corporate lender, investment manager, and analyst) that respondents came from 
was also available from sources outside of the questionnaire. Only four responses, as shown 
in Table 6.51, were significantly affected by the group that the respondents came from. 
Table 6.51: Significant Effects of Respondents' Group on Responses 
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova 
Corporate Investment Analyst 
Lender Manner 
MR MR MR 
1. Importance of financial statements 69.43 92.89 87.00 
Chi-square= 8.5629Significance =0.0138"* 
2. Non-Big Six are more likely to 
become closely connected with 
client management. 72.03 92.98 62.33 
Chi-square=6.2482"; Significance=0.0440' * 
3. Independence is decreased if NAS is 
provided to audit clients by a separate 
department within the audit firm. 80.42 52.17 61.54 
Chi-square=10.7936"; Significance=0.0045"* 
4. Auditor perceived independent when 
the manager in charge of the audit 
has been in charge for 20 years. 79.23 58.61 60.42 
Chi-square=6.5416 Significance =0.0380^* 
A Corrected for ties * D. F. =2 
MR The mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
For statement 1, the lower the mean rank, the more importance that 
respondents attached to financial statements. For statements 2 and 3, the 
lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the 
statements. For statement 4, the lower the mean rank, the more 
independent the auditor was perceived to be. 
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It can be seen from Table 6.51, that corporate lenders attached a significantly greater 
importance to financial statements than either investment managers or analysts. The results 
also show that analysts were more concerned than corporate lenders or investment managers 
about the performance of audits by non-Big Six audit firms and perceived that they were 
more likely to become closely connected with client management. Investment managers, 
however, were more concerned by the provision of NAS and less concerned by audit tenure 
than analysts or corporate lenders. 
6.9.3: Age 
Table 6.52 shows that the age of respondents influenced their responses to six questions 
which dealt with competition, audit firm size and audit tenure. Younger respondents were 
less concerned than older respondents by a highly competitive audit market. In such a 
market, the latter respondents perceived that the auditor was more likely to become closely 
connected with client management, dependent on the audit client and rely on management 
representations. Although in two cases, respondents between the age of thirty and forty years 
were more concerned than those over forty years by a highly competitive audit market, the 
differences were not significant (at the p=0.05 level). 
In addition, the older the respondent the more likely s/he was to perceive that long audit 
tenure would increase the audit client's dependence on the auditor. Respondents under thirty 
years were also less concerned than older respondents by non-Big Six audit firms and 
perceived that they were less likely to become closely connected with client management and 
to succumb to management pressures in relation to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Although respondents over forty years were less concerned than respondents between thirty 
and forty years that non-Big Six firms would succumb to management pressures, the 
difference was not significant (at the p=0.05 level). 
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Table 6.52: Significant Effects of Respondents' Age on Responses 
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova 
Under 30 Between 30 Over 40 
years & 40 years years 
(n=25) (n=88) (n=35) 
In a highly competitive market, 
the auditor is more likely to: 
a) become closely connected 
with client management. 
b) become dependent on the 
audit client. 
c) rely on management 
representations 
MR MR MR 
93.70 70.97 69.66 
Chi-square=6.8889 Significance =0.0319^* 
99.22 69.06 70.53 
Chi-square=12.0688 Significance=0.0024"* 
93.32 69.55 73.51 
Chi-square=7.2897"; Significance=0.0261A* 
Non-Big Six audit firms are more 
likely to: 
a) become closely connected with 98.12 73.27 60.73 
client management. Chi-square=12.5462"; Significance=0.0019"* 
b) succumb to management pressures 
in relation to the treatment of 96.96 63.68 73.86 
contentious issues. Chi-square=9.4317 Significance =0.0090^* 
When an auditor continues in 
office for the same client over 
a prolonged period of time, the 
client's dependence on the 
auditor will increase. 97.86 72.67 62.41 
Chi-square=13.8697"; Significance =0.0010^* 
A Corrected for ties 
* D. F. =2 
MR The mean rank is sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the above 
statements. 
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6.9.4: Nature of Work Experience 
Table 6.53, shows the significant influence of the nature of the respondents' work experience 
on their responses. This experience influenced their responses to three statements which dealt 
with audit tenure, the provision of NAS, and audit firm size. 
Table 6.53: Significant Effects of the Nature of Respondents' Work Experience on 
Responses 
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova 
Sanctioning Preliminary Combination 
Responsibility Review Both 
(n=42) (ii=82) (n=24) 
MR MR mit 
1. Auditor perceived to be 
independent when the 63.94 81.70 68.38 
company has had the same 
audit firm for 10 years. Chi-square=6.3699"; Significance=0.0414"* 
2. Auditor independence is 
decreased if NAS is not 
provided at all. 
3. Non-Big Six audit firms 
when compared to Big 
Six audit firms are less 
independent. 
A Corrected for ties 
* D. F=2 
67.45 82.62 5 9.10 
Chi-square=8.2410"; Significance=0.0162"* 
89.19 69.45 66.04 
Chi-square=7.7857"; Significance =0.0204^* 
MR The mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
In respect of statement 1, the lower the mean rank the more independent 
the auditor is perceived to be. For statements 2 and 3, the lower the 
mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the statements. 
Respondents with the most experiences' were less concerned about long audit tenure than 
"Respondents were deemed to have the most experience when they were responsible 
for sanctioning investment/ lending proposals. 
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those respondents with less experience. Respondents who were responsible for sanctioning 
proposals perceived the auditor to be independent more frequently when the company had 
the same audit firm for ten years than those with limited or no such responsibility. 
When respondents had the least experienceSB they were less convinced that any benefit might 
accrue in terms of auditor independence from the provision of NAS by audit firms. Although 
respondents who were responsible for sanctioning proposals were less convinced than those 
who had limited responsibility that any benefits would accrue in terms of auditor 
independence from the provision of NAS by audit firms, this difference was not significant 
(at the p=0.05 level). Finally, respondents who were responsible for sanctioning proposals 
were more confident in the independence of non-Big Six audit firms than those with limited 
or no such responsibility. 
6.9.5: Length of Work Experience 
Table 6.54 shows that the length of respondents' work experience influenced their responses 
to four statements which dealt with audit market competition and audit committees. 
Respondents with more than five years' work experience were more concerned than those 
with less than five years' work experience by a highly competitive audit market and 
perceived that such a competitive market would result in the auditor becoming dependent on 
the audit client, relying on management representations and in the financial statements being 
less reliable. 
Although those respondents with more than ten years' experience were less concerned than 
those with between five and ten years' experience, that a highly competitive audit market 
would result in the auditor relying on management representations and had less concern as 
to the reliability of financial statements in such circumstances, these differences were not 
significant (at the p=0.05 level). 
"Respondents were deemed to have the least experience when they were responsible 
for reviewing investment/ lending proposals and referred the final decision to a higher 
authority for approval. 
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Table 6.54: Significant Effects of the Length of Respondents' Work Experience on 
Responses 
Kruskal-Wallis 1-Way Anova 
Under 5 Between 5 Over 10 
Years & 10 Years Years 
(n=34) (n=63) (11=51) 
1. In a highly competitive audit market, 
the: 
a) auditor is more likely to become 
dependent on the audit client. 
b) auditor is more likely to rely on 
management representations. 
MR MR MR 
86.76 76.75 63.54 
Chi-square=7.5685"; Significance =0.0227^* 
87.56 66.67 75.47 
Chi-square=6.4076"; Significance =0.0406^* 
c) financial statements are perceived 
to be reliable. 63.46 84.01 70.12 
Chi-square=7.0564 Significance =0.0294^* 
2. When an audit committee does not 
exist, the auditor is more likely to 
succumb to management pressures 
in relation to the treatment of 
contentious issues. 85.66 80.23 59.98 
Chi-square= 10.8047Significance =0.0045^* 
A Corrected for ties 
* D. F. =2 
MR The mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. 
In respect of statement I (c), the lower the mean rank, the more reliable 
the financial statements are perceived to be. For all other statements, the 
lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the 
statements. 
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The length of work experience also influenced perceptions of the effects of an audit 
committee on the likelihood of the auditor succumbing to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. Respondents with more than ten years' experience 
were more concerned than those with less experience, that the auditor may succumb to 
management pressures when no audit committee exists. 
6.9.6: Accounting Knowledge 
Table 6.55 shows that accounting knowledge had significant effects on responses to three 
statements which dealt with audit firm size and audit tenure. 
Table 6.55: Significant Effects of Respondents' Accounting Knowledge on Responses 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
No Some 
Accounting Accounting 
(n=23) (n=125) 
MR MR 
1. Non-Big Six audit firms when 
compared with Big Six audit 
firms are less independent. 
2. Financial statements perceived to be 
reliable when the audit is performed 
by a Big Six audit firm. 
3. Financial statements perceived to be 
reliable when the company has had 
the same audit firm for 10 years. 
A 
MR 
Corrected for ties * 
54.63 78.16 
z=-2.5502"; p=0.0108* 
57.50 77.63 
z=-2.3349"; p=0.0196* 
59.61 77.24 
z=-2.0234"; p=0.0430* 
2-Tailed Probability 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. In 
respect of statement 1, the lower the mean rank the more that 
respondents agreed with the statement. For statements 2 and 3, the lower 
the mean rank, the more reliable the financial statements are perceived 
to be. 
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Respondents with no accounting knowledge had less confidence, than respondents with some 
accounting knowledge, in the independence of the non-Big Six versus the Big Six audit firms. 
In addition, those respondents who had no accounting knowledge attached a significantly 
greater reliability to the financial statements audited by Big Six audit firms than respondents 
with some accounting knowledge. When the company had had the same audit firm for ten 
years, respondents with no accounting knowledge perceived that the financial statements were 
reliable more frequently, than those with some accounting knowledge. 
6.9.7: Training of Chartered AccountantsS9 
The significant effects of chartered accounting training on the responses are shown in Table 
6.56. As could be expected, respondents who had trained with a Big Six audit firm were less 
confident in the independence of non-Big Six audit firms than respondents who had trained 
with such firms. 
However, respondents who had trained with a non-Big Six firm were more concerned, than 
those who had trained with a Big Six firm, that short audit tenure would lead to less reliable 
financial statements. The former respondents perceived that the financial statements were 
reliable less frequently than the latter respondents, when either the audit partner or the audit 
manager were involved in the same audit for less than seven years. In addition, respondents 
who had trained with a non-Big Six audit firm were more concerned, than those who had 
trained with a Big Six audit firm, that a close connection with client management would lead 
to an impairment of auditor independence. 
"As noted in Table 6.3, the term `chartered accountant' is used to represent those 
individuals who obtained their accounting qualification from the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland. 
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Table 6.56: Significant Effects of the Training of Chartered Accountants on Responses 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Big ix Non-Big Six 
(n=16) (n=3) 
MR MR 
1. Non-Big Six audit firms when 
compared with Big Six audit 
firms are less independent. 
2. Financial statements perceived to be 
reliable when the same: 
(a) audit partner has been in charge of 
the audit for less than 7 years. 
(b) audit manager has been in charge of 
the audit for less than 7 years. 
3. An auditor's independence is likely to be 
impaired if the auditor becomes closely 
connected with client management. 
A Corrected for ties 
8.91 15.83 
z=-2.1422"; p=0.0322* 
8.88 16.00 
z=-2.3529"; p=0.0186* 
8.88 16.00 
z=-2.3529"; p=0.0186* 
11.13 4.00 
z=-2.3117"; p=0.0208* 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. In 
respect of statements 2(a) and 2(b), the lower the mean rank, the more 
reliable the financial statements are perceived to be. For statements 1 and 
3, the lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the 
statements. 
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6.9.8: Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor Independence 
Respondents' previous suspicions of a lack of auditor independence was the variable which 
affected the most responses. A total of thirty-nine statements, covering all aspects of the 
study, were significantly affected by this variable. 
In relation to their general perceptions of auditor independence, Table 6.57 shows that 
respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more 
concerned, than those who had not, that independence would be impaired if the auditor 
became closely connected with client management, dependent on the audit client, or 
succumbed to management pressures in relation to the treatment of contentious issues. 
Table 6.57: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to General Perceptions 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Did Did not 
Suspect Suspect 
(n=79) (n=69) 
MR MR 
1. Independence is impaired if the auditor: 
(a) becomes closely connected with client 
management. 
(b) becomes dependent on the client. 
(c) succumbs to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
MR 
A 
64.60 85.83 
z=-3.3577"; p=0.0008* 
64.46 85.99 
z=-3.4352"; p=0.0006* 
65.67 84.61 
z=-3.1016"; p=0.0019* 
Corrected for ties 
Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the above 
statements. 
173 
Responses to statements dealing with audit firm size and audit market competition were also 
significantly affected, as shown in Table 6.58, by whether respondents had previously 
suspected a lack of auditor independence or not. 
Table 6.58: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to Audit Firm Size and Competition 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Did Did not 
Suspect Suspect 
(n=79) (n=69) 
MR MR 
1. 
2. 
Financial statements perceived to be 
reliable when the audit is performed 
by a Big Six audit firm. 
In a highly competitive audit market, 
the auditor may: 
(a) be less independent. 
(b) be replaced by a less rigorous auditor. 
(c) become closely connected 
with client management. 
(d) become dependent on the audit client. 
(e) succumb to management pressures in 
relation to the treatment of contentious 
issues. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
A 
82.25 65.62 
z=-2.6563"; p=0.0079* 
65.42 84.90 
z=-2.9991^; p=0.0027* 
66.26 83.93 
z=-2.6806"; p=0.0073* 
67.31 82.73 
z=-2.3282"; p=0.0199* 
65.87 84.38 
z=-2.8752"; p=0.0040* 
65.76 84.51 
z=-2.9842"; p=0.0028* 
Corrected for ties 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. In 
respect of statement 1, the lower the mean rank the more reliable the 
financial statements were perceived to be. For statements 2 (a) to 2 (e), 
the lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the 
statements. 
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Respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more 
concerned, than those who had not, about the reliability of financial statements when audited 
by Big Six firms. In addition, the former respondents were more concerned, than the latter 
respondents, by a highly competitive audit market. They perceived that it may result in the 
auditor being less independent, being replaced by a less rigorous auditor, becoming closely 
connected with client management, more dependent on the audit client and succumbing to 
management pressures. 
Table 6.59 shows that respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence were more concerned, than those who had not, by a lack of an audit committee 
perceiving that it may result in the auditor becoming dependent on the audit client or 
succumbing to management pressures. 
Table 6.59: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to Audit Committees 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Did Did not 
Suspect Suspect 
(n=79) (n=G9) 
MR MR 
1. When no audit committee exists, the auditor may: 
(a) become dependent on the audit client. 
(b) succumb to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues. 
z. 
(a) 
Independence enhanced if the audit committee 
is responsible for the: 
dismissal of the auditor. 
67.35 82.69 
z=-2.2875"; p=0.0222* 
66.03 84.20 
z=-2.7745"; p=0.0055* 
66.53 83.62. 
z=-2.6437"; p=0.0082* 
(b) selection of the auditor. 
A 
67.88 82.08 
z=-2.2663"; p=0.0234* 
Corrected for ties * 2-Tailed Probability 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. For 
each of the above statements, the lower the mean rank the more that 
respondents agreed with the statements. 
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In addition, the former respondents appreciated the benefits of an audit committee more than 
the latter respondents, arguing that auditor independence would be enhanced if the audit 
committee was responsible for the selection and the dismissal of the auditor. 
Table 6.60 shows that respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence were more concerned, than those who had not, by long audit tenure. The 
former respondents perceived that the longer an audit firm was associated with the same 
client, the more likely it was that the auditor would succumb to management pressures in 
relation to the treatment of contentious issues and that the auditor would be less independent. 
The former respondents perceived that the auditor was less likely to be independent if the 
company had the same audit firm for less than 10 years or the same audit manager for less 
than seven years. For each of three time periods that the audit partner was allowed to act on 
the audit, respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence perceived 
that the auditor was less independent than those who had not previously suspected a lack of 
auditor independence. In addition, the former group of respondents perceived that the 
financial statements were reliable less frequently than the latter group when the partner or 
manager had been the same for seven or less than seven years, or when the audit firm had 
been the same for ten or less than ten years. 
Responses relating to the provision of NAS were also significantly affected, as shown in 
Table 6.61, by whether respondents had or had not previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence. Those who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more 
concerned, than those who had not, about the potential effects that the provision of NAS 
could have on auditor independence. In particular, they were more concerned that the 
provision of NAS may result in the auditor becoming closely connected with client 
management, becoming dependent on the audit client or succumbing to management pressures 
in relation to the treatment of contentious issues. In addition, they perceived more strongly 
that increases in the provision of NAS to audit clients may result in the auditor becoming an 
employee of the company, having a financial interest in the success of the audit client's 
business, hesitating to qualify the audit report in fear of losing revenue generated by NAS 
or being replaced in a position of auditing his/her own decisions. 
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Table 6.60: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to Audit Tenure 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Did Did not 
Suspect Suspect 
(n=79) (n=69) 
MR MR Test Results"* 
Long audit tenure may result 
in the auditor: 
succumbing to management pressures in 68.55 
relation to the treatment of contentious issues. 
being less independent. 
Auditor independent when the: 
company has had the same audit 
firm for less than 10 years. 
manager has been the same for 
less than 7 years. 
Auditor independent when the 
partner has been the same for. 
20 years. 
7 years. 
less than 7 years. 
81.31 z=-1.9689; p=0.0490 
64.47 85.98 z=-3.1908; p=0.0014 
83.87 63.77 z=-3.1321; p=0.0017 
81.83 66.11 z=-2.4439; p=0.0145 
82.18 65.70 z=-2.4582; p=0.0140 
80.65 67.46 z=-2.0103; p=0.044,4 
80.56 67.56 z=-2.0509; p=0.0403 
Financial statements reliable when the 
audit firm has been the same for: 
10 years. 83.69 
less than 10 years. 82.42 
Financial statements reliable when the 
audit partner has been the same for: 
7 years. 80.68 
less than 7 years. 80.06 
Financial statements reliable when the 
audit manager has been the same for: 
7 years. 81.37 
less than 7 years. 81.23 
63.98 z=-3.1148; p=0.0018 
65.43 z=-2.7628; p=0.0057 
67.43 z=-2.1007; p=0.0357 
68.13 z=-1.9709; p=0.0487 
66.64 z=-2.2780; p=0.0227 
66.79 z=-2.2998; p=0.0215 
* 2-Tailed Probability A Corrected for ties 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower the 
mean rank the more independent the auditor, the more reliable the financial 
statements, or the more that respondents agreed with the statements. 
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Table 6.61 also shows that respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence were more concerned than those who had not by the provision of NAS by audit 
personnel to audit clients. 
Table 6.61: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to the Provision of NAS 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Did Did not 
nS CC Suspect 
(n=79) (n=69) 
MR 
The provision of NAS by the audit 
firm may result in the auditor: 
(a) becoming closely connected 
with client management. 63.63 
(b) becoming dependent on the 
audit client. 
(c) succumbing to management 
pressures in relation to the 
64.62 
treatment of contentious issues. 64.15 
Increases in the level of NAS 
provided by the auditor to the 
company may result in the auditor: 
(a) becoming and employee of the 
company. 
(b) having a financial interest in the 
63.30 
success of the company. 66.83 
(c) hesitating to qualify the audit report 
in fear of losing NAS revenue. 60.75 
(d) being placed in a position of auditing 
his/her own decisions. 62.73 
Independence decreased if NAS is 
provided to: 
(a) audit clients by audit personnel. 62.94 
(b) non-audit clients only. 81.51 
* 2-Tailed Probability A 
MR Test Results^* 
86.94 z=-3.6268; p=0.0003 
85.81 z=-3 . 225 6; p= 0.0013 
86.35 z= -3.4083; p=0.0007 
87.32 z=-3.6229; p= 0.0003 
83.28 z=-2.5480; p=0.0108 
90.25 z=-4.4747; p<0.0001 
87.98 z=-4.0552; p=0.0001 
87.73 z=-3.8789; p=0.0001 
66.47 z=-2.2697; p=0.0232 
Corrected for ties 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The 
lower the mean rank, the more that respondents agreed with the above 
statements. 
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In such instances, those respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence perceived that the independence of the auditor would decrease. However, these 
respondents were less concerned than those who had not previously suspected a lack of 
auditor independence by the provision of NAS to non-audit clients only. 
Table 6.62 shows that responses relating to client employment were also significantly affected 
by whether or not respondents had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence. 
Table 6.62: Significant Effects of Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Responses relating to Client Employment 
Mann-Whitney U Tests 
Auditor perceived independent when one of the 
company's non- financial personnel had previously 
acted as non-supervisor on the audit which was 
conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago. 
(b) between 6& 18 months ago. 
(c) over 18 months ago. 
Auditor perceived independent when one of the 
company's non- financial personnel had over 18 
months ago acted as audit supervisor. 
* 2-Tailed Probability 
A 
Did Did not 
Suspect Suspect 
(n=79) (n=69) 
MR MR 
80.82 67.26 
z=-2.0802^; p=0.0375* 
80.74 67.36 
z=-2.0416"; p=0.0412* 
81.05 67.00 
z=-2.1484"; p=0.0317* 
80.39 67.75 
z=-1.9716"; p=0.0487* 
Corrected for ties 
MR Mean rank is the sum of the ranks divided by the number of cases. The lower the 
mean rank, the more independent the auditor was perceived to be. 
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Respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more 
concerned than those who had not that independence would be impaired if one of the 
company's non-financial personnel had previously acted as a non-supervisor on the, audit. 
This was the case for each of the three time periods. In addition, when one of the company's 
non-financial personnel had over eighteen months ago previously acted as supervisor on the 
audit, respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence perceived 
the auditor to be independent less frequently than those who had not previously suspected a 
lack of auditor independence. 
6.10: Summary 
The results from the mail questionnaire were presented in this chapter. The respondents were 
predominantly male lenders whose main responsibility included the review of loan proposals, 
having had at least five years experience in this role. The majority of respondents stated that 
they used financial statements, and considered them to be important, for decision making 
purposes. 
When asked whether they had ever previously suspected a lack of auditor independence, 
more than half of the respondents replied in the affirmative. The most frequent circumstances 
associated with these suspicions were the provision of NAS to audit clients and the 
performance of the audit by a non-Big Six firm. 
The size of the audit firm influenced respondents' perceptions of auditor independence and 
the reliability of financial statements, with a greater number of respondents having more 
confidence in both when the audit was performed by a Big Six rather than by a non-Big Six 
audit firm. The level of competition in the audit market also influenced their perceptions. The 
lower the level of competition, the greater the number of respondents who perceived the 
auditor to be independent and the financial statements to be reliable. The majority of 
respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed that the existence of an audit committee would 
result in the auditor being less independent. When an audit committee did not exist, a 
significantly lower number of respondents considered the financial statements to be reliable 
than when a company had an audit committee. 
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The length of time that an audit firm acts for the same client influenced respondents' 
perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability that they attached to financial 
statements. The shorter the audit firm's tenure, the greater the number of respondents who 
considered the auditor to be `always' or `often' independent and the financial statements to 
be `always' or `often' reliable. Both the perceived independence of the auditor and the 
reliability of the financial statements were affected in a similar way when the partner's and 
manager's time on the audit was reduced. Although the effect appeared greater when the 
manager's time, rather than the partner's time on the audit, was reduced, the difference was 
not significant. However, the differences were significant when a comparison was made of 
perceptions held when the same firm acted on, rather than the same personnel were involved 
in, the audit for twenty years. Respondents perceived the auditor to be independent and the 
financial statements to be reliable more frequently when the audit firm, rather than the audit 
personnel, were the same for twenty years. 
A significantly greater number of respondents perceived that the independence of the auditor 
would decrease if NAS was provided to audit clients by personnel involved in the audit rather 
than by either a separate department within the audit firm or to non-audit clients only. The 
company's financial statements were perceived to be reliable more frequently when NAS was 
provided by a firm not involved in the audit than by either a separate department within the 
audit firm or by personnel involved in the audit. 
An offer of employment made by the audit client company to audit staff during the current 
audit influenced both the perceived independence of the auditor and the reliability of the 
financial statements. A significantly greater number of respondents perceived the auditor to 
be independent and the financial statements to be reliable when an offer of employment was 
made to less, rather than more, senior audit staff members. The perceived independence of 
the auditor and the reliability of the financial statements was also negatively affected when 
either the company's financial controller or one of its non-financial personnel had previously 
acted on the company's audit in either a supervisory or non-supervisory capacity. The effect 
was significantly greater when (i) the position taken with the client was as its financial 
controller rather than as one of its non-financial personnel; (ii) the time lapse between acting 
on the audit and being employed by the client was shorter rather than longer; and (iii) the 
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previous position on the audit was as a supervisor rather than a non-supervisor. 
The majority of the respondents did consider the independence of the auditor when making 
an investment/ lending decision. In relation to those who did, the majority stated that if they 
perceived the auditor not to be independent, they would invest/ lend less, or not at all. In 
addition, the majority of the respondents did consider the independence of the auditor when 
deciding on their use of alternative sources of information about the company and of those 
who did, all but one of them stated that they would increase their use of alternative sources 
of information if they perceived the auditor not to independent. 
The final issue addressed in this chapter was the potential effects on responses of 
respondents' profile and their previous suspicions of a lack of auditor independence. The 
latter variable affected responses to all aspects of the study. Those respondents who had 
previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more concerned by the issues 
addressed in the study than those who had not. Responses relating to the independence of 
non-Big Six audit firms and the effects of audit tenure were influenced by all variables except 
respondents' gender and the length of their work experience. The age of the respondents and 
the length of their work experience influenced their responses to questions dealing with a 
highly competitive audit market. The length of their work experience also influenced their 
responses to questions which dealt with a lack of an audit committee. Responses relating to 
the provision of NAS were influenced by the group that respondents came from, their 
gender, and the nature of their work experience while responses relating to client 
employment were not influenced by any variable except their previous suspicions of a lack 
of auditor independence. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
7.1: Introduction 
The results from the in-depth interviews conducted are presented in this chapter. The sample 
for this part of the study, as discussed in Chapter 5, included fifteen corporate lenders, ten 
investment managers and ten analysts. Participation was obtained from each of the corporate 
lenders and from eight investment managers and seven analysts. The results, which are 
presented using the structure outlined in the interview guide (appendix F), were analyzed 
using the cross-interview approach suggested by Patton (1990). This involved grouping 
together answers from the different interview transcripts by topic per the interview guide and 
allowing the guide to act as a descriptive framework for analysis. Once answers had been 
grouped by topic, they were analyzed using content analysis which according to Patton 
(1990) is the "process of identifying, coding and categorizing the primary patterns in the 
data" (p. 381). The primary patterns identified from this process were used to develop 
matrices. Interviewee responses to the questions in each topic were then entered onto these 
matrices (appendix G). 
This chapter, which is structured as follows, includes a profile of the interviewees and an 
identification of their use of, and the importance that they attach to, financial statements. It 
reports on the specific instances in which interviewees suspected a lack of auditor 
independence. The main part of the chapter reports on the effects of each of the six factors, 
identified in Chapter 3, on perceived auditor independence which are then tied into 
perceptions of financial statement reliability. In an attempt to understand more fully the 
context in which these perceptions were held, characteristics specific to the Irish market 
which led to these perceptions are discussed. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the 
effects of interviewees' profile and their previous suspicions of a lack of auditor 
independence on the perceptions held. 
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7.2: Profile of Interviewees 
As shown in Table 7.1, the majority of interviewees were male (90 per cent) and were aged 
Table 7.1: Demographics relating to Interviewees 
ý/ % 
Gender: 
Male 27 90.0 
Female I 
, 
-0 
LO 
Age: 
Under 30 years 3 10.0 
Between 30 and 40 years 18 60.0 
Over 40 years 2 am 
30 1100, 
between 30 and 40 years (60 per cent). This profile was similar to the profile of the mail 
questionnaire respondents, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Both lenders and investment managers had, on average, nine years' experience in their 
current role and analysts had an average of five years' experience. Table 7.2 shows that the 
Table 7.2: Interviewees' Work Experience 
ý% 
Nature of Work Experience: 
Authority to sanction proposals (i) 9 30.0 
Review proposals but final decision 
is referred to a higher authority (ii) 14 46.7 
Combination of (i) and (ii) 7 212 
LO 10®0.0 
responsibility that interviewees had varied from complete sanctioning authority to limited or 
no sanctioning authority. 
For those with no sanctioning authority, all decisions were referred to an investment/ credit 
committee. Limited sanctioning authority meant that interviewees sanctioned proposals up to 
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a pre-specified amount and referred all those proposals beyond this amount to an investment/ 
credit committee. 
As is clear from Table 7.3, with the exception of one analyst all interviewees had some 
Table 7.3: Accounting Knowledge of Interviewees 
#% 
Accounting Knowledge: 
None 1 3.3 
Accounting course at college 13 43.4 
Qualified accountant 10 33.3 
Banking examinations 2M 
L 1® 
accounting knowledge. For some, their formal training was limited to a course taken at 
college whereas others were fully qualified accountants. Of the ten qualified, six had obtained 
a chartered qualification and had trained with a Big Six audit firm. 
7.3: Use and Importance of Financial Statements 
The frequency that financial statements were used for decision making purposes was 
consistent across the three groups with each of the interviewees stating that they always used 
financial statements when making decisions. The importance of financial statements as a 
decision making tool varied across the three groups (appendix G, matrices I and 16). 
Corporate lenders attached significant importance to financial statements. 
"We wouldn't lend without them really. " (L6)60; 
"They are crucial for our lending decisions. We don't have an awful lot else to go 
on. " (L7); 
60L6 refers to corporate lender, number six. Fifteen corporate lenders were 
interviewed and will be referred to as L1, L2,... L15. 
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"The audited accounts are absolutely critical. " (L10). 
Although financial statements were critical to corporate lenders for lending decisions, they 
were not used alone but were used in conjunction with other information. 
"They are not the only criterion for making a decision but we would not make any 
lending decision without seeing the financial statements. " (L1); 
"Just because I would see a signed set of accounts, I wouldn't necessarily make my 
decision solely on that. " (L8); 
"Yes, we would use them but they would have to be used in conjunction with 
information which pertains to the present and future. " (L13). 
Investment managers were more critical than corporate lenders of financial statements and 
relied more on research undertaken by brokerage firms and on management information than 
on information provided by financial statements. 
"The company accounts would be the most frequent thing that we would look at, 
apart from investment analyst research. " (IMI)ß1; 
"What is in actual published financial statements is of very little value. To get real 
information, you need to look at management accounts. " (IM3); 
"We would rely more heavily on broker's research than on the financial statements. " 
(IM4). 
Analysts proved to be equally critical of the information provided by financial statements and 
only used financial statements to confirm what they already knew about the company. 
61IM1 refers to investment manager, number one. Eight investment managers were 
interviewed and will be referred to as IM1, IM2.... IM8. 
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"I would be quite sceptical of them (financial statements). " (A3)62; 
"When they report their accounts you are pretty familiar with what the composition 
of them should be. " (Al); 
"You would look at the accounts in terms of seeing what is actually happening and 
compare them with what you already know from the industry and your expectations. " 
(A4); 
"When the audited statements come out, an analyst would read down through them 
to see if there is any extra information but there is usually very little extra 
information. " (A5). 
While expecting that investment managers and analysts would be more dependent on financial 
statements, and therefore, less critical of them, because of the lack of security that is 
available to them for, their investments compared to that available to corporate lenders, they 
proved to be more critical of information provided by financial statements. However, 
although investment managers and analysts were more critical than corporate lenders of the 
information provided by financial statements, no group was willing to rely on them as the 
sole provider of the necessary information for decision making purposes. Each group used 
financial statements in conjunction with other information. 
7.4: Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor Independence 
When asked whether they had ever previously suspected a lack of auditor independence, 
fourteen interviewees (seven corporate lenders; three investment managers; and four analysts) 
replied in the negative. The responses of the sixteen interviewees who had on occasion 
suspected a lack of auditor independence exhibited a degree of consistency in that suspicions 
of a lack of auditor independence focused on circumstances in which the audit was performed 
62A3 refers to analyst number three. Seven analysts were interviewed and will be 
referred to as Al, A2,.. A7. 
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by a non-Big Six audit firm (appendix G, matrix 2). This finding is consistent with the mail 
questionnaire results which showed the performance of an audit by a non-Big Six firm, as 
the second most frequent reason which respondents gave for their suspicions. 
"Statements audited by very small firms of accountants, like most bankers, we would 
throw a healthy scepticism, on the basis that small firms' income from any one 
company might constitute a significant proportion of their total fees and as such their 
independence might be compromised a little. " (L1); 
"I would not trust an audit performed by a non-Big Six firm. When an audit practice 
is small, and they are making a lot of money from one client, a blind eye may be 
turned because they are more dependent on that client. " (L7); 
"More suspicious of the smaller firms who have fewer clients and maybe one or two 
larger clients. Obviously they are important to them so they have to keep them sweet, 
i. e., go to the limit with certain things. " (A2). 
In the cases noted above, these suspicions related to the smaller firms' dependency on clients 
for fee income. Disproportionate audit fee income was also noted by respondents to the mail 
questionnaire as a reason for suspecting a lack of auditor independence. Two interviewees 
noted fee dependency as a reason for suspecting a lack of auditor independence but they did 
not identify the size of the audit firm as a cause of this dependency. 
"The bigger the fee, the greater the risk of a lack of objectivity. " (L5); 
"The potential loss of fee must be a part of it (loss of independence). " (IM7). 
Fee dependency was noted by three other interviewees indirectly, when they identified the 
size of the company, as a reason for suspecting a lack of auditor independence. 
"In one case, I would have felt that, because of the importance of the client to the 
firm and the size 'of the audit, the accountancy firm might have been able to have its 
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arm twisted on an interpretation of an accounting policy. " (L13); 
"I would think that it is easier for an auditor to make a stand of principle for a small 
client than for a bigger client. Certainly it is bad news for an auditor to lose a large 
client. " (IM3); 
"Larger companies would exercise more control over their auditors than smaller 
companies. I would say that for any large auditing firm, a large plc is a large account 
and if they can avoid it and have the choice, they are not going to do something that 
would put the company in a bad light. " (IM4). 
Recent highly publicised failures63 of companies audited by Big Six firms caused two 
interviewees to be suspicious of the independence of the Big Six audit firms. 
"In relation to the Big Six firms, well some of the scandals that have happened over 
the last few years, have happened in these firms. So I would think that they also try 
and keep their clients sweet. " (A2); 
"I wouldn't trust the Big Six auditors at all. All of the scandals in recent years have 
been with the Big Six auditors, so they mustn't be independent. " (A7). 
Two interviewees, while being suspicious of the non-Big Six audit firms in terms of their 
independence, highlighted that the performance of an audit by a Big Six firm gave them 
comfort. 
"In terms of the larger ones, the Big Six, I would not have had any suspicions at any 
stage in terms of their independence. " (L3); 
"I would assume that a Big Six audit is okay, I would take that for granted. " (L7). 
63The failures referred to by interviewees in which the Big Six firms were the auditors 
of the failed entities included Maxwell, 1991 (Coopers, Lybrand, Deloitte were auditors), 
and BCCI, 1991 (Price Waterhouse were auditors). 
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The power that directors of companies were perceived to exert over their auditors was noted 
as another reason for suspecting a lack of auditor independence. This was not separately 
identified in the mail questionnaire but was implicit in other questions which dealt with audit 
committees. 
"Auditors have to be under pressure to perform in a way that is conducive to the 
interests of the directors. For example, if their opinion is going to result in the 
directors incurring more taxes, or showing a loss when they want to show a profit, 
or a weaker balance sheet when they want a stronger one, at the end of the day, they 
are paying their fees so there is a natural pressure which I don't think anyone can 
deny. " (L6); 
"I would believe that as long as companies (the directors) pay the auditors and hire 
and fire them, then there is no genuine independence. " (IM5); 
"In public companies where the directors would be very powerful, in society as well 
as in their own organisations, it is quite difficult for the auditors to produce a very 
strong line and to get what they might believe to be best practice. " (IM7). 
Finally, although the provision of nonaudit services by auditors to their audit clients was the 
most frequent reason given by respondents to the mail questionnaire for suspecting a lack of 
auditor independence, only two interviewees noted this as the cause of their suspicions. 
"I suppose you just suspect where other services are also being provided by the audit 
firm. So you would be suspicious in relation to their independence in respect of the 
audit. " (IM6); 
"I wouldn't trust the Big Six auditors at all because they are all providing nonaudit 
services. The audit is the loss leader, it is the way that they get in and then they hold 
on to the client. They are dependent on their clients for such services. " (A7). 
Hence, it would appear that interviewees were more suspicious of a lack of auditor 
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independence when the audit was performed by a non-Big Six audit firm than by a Big Six 
audit firm, although two were suspicious in the latter case. The size of the audit fee as a 
percentage of the audit firm's income resulted in a number of interviewees being suspicious 
because they felt that it would result in the auditor becoming dependent on the audit client 
and, therefore, becoming less objective. Directors were also seen to be powerful individuals 
and in a position to influence auditors which would lead to the suggestion that audit 
committees have a role to play here. This will be discussed later in the chapter. Finally, 
contrary to expectations generated by the results from the mail questionnaire, the provision 
of NAS by audit firms to their audit clients was seen by only two interviewees as a reason 
for suspecting a lack of auditor independence. 
7.5: Audit Firm Size and Perceived Auditor Independence 
It was expected, based on the results obtained from the mail questionnaire and reported in 
Chapter 6, that the majority of interviewees would perceive non-Big Six audit firms to be less 
independent than Big Six audit firms. This was the case with twenty three interviewees 
stating that they would have more confidence in the independence of the Big Six than in the 
non-Big Six audit firms (appendix G, matrix 3). One analyst noted that he did not perceive 
Big Six audit firms to be independent because they were dependent on clients for NAS. The 
remaining six interviewees stated that the size of the audit firm did not influence their 
perceptions of auditor independence. 
The lack of confidence expressed by the majority of interviewees in relation to the 
independence of non-Big Six audit firms can be classified as follows: their dependency on 
clients for fee income (n= 11); the lack of structures in smaller audit practices (n=6); and 
their personalised approach to audits (n=4). 
De en ndency on clients for fee income: 
"In the bigger audit firms you would see a huge diversity of clients whereas in the 
smaller audit firms, you may find that they make most of their income from one 
company. In those circumstances, where they are more dependent on one client for 
fee income, it is more difficult to be objective. " (L9); 
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"If it is a Big Six firm, I would have more confidence. There is a greater spread of 
expertise, less likely to have an independence problem whereas with a smaller audit 
firm, they may be more dependent on one audit. " (IM8); 
"The non-Big Six are more prone to fee driven income and are more sensitive to 
this. " (A3). 
Lack of structures in smaller audit firms: 
"There is a greater opportunity to influence a smaller practice than a larger practice 
because the latter is very well organised, has its own structures in place. A small firm 
won't have the same resources and will depend on individuals within the practice to 
try and bring the same checks and balances which a large firm, by having the 
structures in place, can automatically impose. " (L10); 
"I wouldn't necessarily be comfortable that the smaller audit firms would have the 
procedures or methodologies that the Big Six would have. " (IM3); 
"The Big Six are part of international groups which are obliged to satisfy international 
standards. The smaller firms don't have such ties, reporting structures or quality 
standards. " (A3). 
Personalised approach to audits: 
"The Big Six are less likely to give a personalised approach to their clients. " (L4); 
"In the bigger audit firms you would find a huge diversity of clients whereas in the 
smaller audit firms, you may find that the auditor is a close friend of the company. " 
(L9). 
In addition, interviewees had a greater confidence in the independence of Big Six firms 
because of the perceived importance of reputation to the Big Six firms (n=7) and the higher 
profile companies which were audited by the Big Six firms than by non-Big Six firms (n=7). 
192 
"The major Pics are audited by the Big Six which gives us comfort. " (L8); 
"I have the confidence, as a banker, that bigger audit firms have their reputations to 
consider and they can't be seen to be doing something that might damage this. " 
(L12); 
"I would have more confidence in the Big Six in that their professional reputation and 
the spread of partners would make it less likely for independence clashes to occur. " 
(IM2); 
"I would think that for the Big Six firms their reputation is their biggest regulator. " 
(A4); 
"The Pics use international audit firms and I would have more confidence in their 
financial statements because of this. " (A6). 
Although the majority of interviewees perceived Big Six audit firms to be more independent 
than non-Big Six audit firms, in three cases this confidence was extended to the medium 
sized firms within the non-Big Six category. 
"We would have more confidence in the Big Six and the medium sized firms, but in 
terms of the smaller one/two partner firms, we would have less confidence. " (L9); 
"I would extend my confidence to wider than just the Big Six. There would be a 
reasonable number of medium sized firms in Ireland and although they do not form 
part of the Big Six, you would still attach a greater credibility to them than the 
smaller firms. " (IM4). 
7.6: Audit Market Competition and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When questioned on the effects of a highly competitive audit market on the perceived 
independence of the auditor, three corporate lenders believed that although the price of the 
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audit might suffer, neither the quality of the audit nor the professionalism of the auditor, 
should suffer (appendix G, matrix 4). 
"What I would expect is the sacrifice would only be with the fee income, but not in 
terms of their professionalism. " (Li); 
"I would expect that when they get the audit as a result of this tendering process, they 
would go about the audit as they would normally do. I don't think that the level of 
effort that goes into an audit would be affected as a result of the fee. " (L9); 
"I think that in a competitive market your price is affected but I think that what 
differentiates you from your competitors is the level of service that you offer. " (L14). 
Five interviewees noted that, although competition encouraged audit firms to tender low bids 
for the audit, standards should not be reduced because the loss in audit income would be 
compensated for by way of income from NAS. These interviewees argued that auditors are 
willing to sustain a loss on the audit and maintain audit quality because they will recoup these 
losses by means of NAS income. 
"In putting in a low tender for an audit fee, you may well be cutting the income from 
that source but I believe that by maintaining your presence in that company allows 
you to get more value added in terms of the other nonaudit services. " (L3); 
"If they have reduced their audit fee to get the audit, they are obviously picking it up 
some place else. So that looking at everything overall, they would probably not have 
any great incentive to cut back on the audit work just because the audit fee is 
smaller. " (IM4); 
"Any losses made on the audit side are more than compensated for on the consultancy 
side. " (IM8). 
In addition, a number of interviewees highlighted that the importance that audit firms attach 
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to their reputation (n=8) and the risk of litigation (n=5) ensured that audit standards were 
not compromised as a result of competitive tendering. 
"I think that their international reputation is far more important than the fee that they 
might earn on one audit. " (L8); 
"Audit quality should not suffer because I think that auditors are conscious of 
litigation. For the bigger firms their reputation is vital because they have a greater 
potential of adding value by providing a good service or by having a breadth of 
clients which the smaller firm is not going to have. " (IM3); 
"They would still have to do the same standard of work. At the end of the day they 
have to cover themselves against potential litigation. " (A2). 
Although the majority of interviewees believed that the standard of audit work would not be 
reduced as a result of competitive tendering (n=18), a significant minority of them held 
opposing views (n=12). 
"If they are undercutting their fees, they may end up taking short corners. " (L2); 
"I find it very difficult to envisage a situation where you can cut the price of the 
audit, maintain your cost bases and maintain the same quality on an on-going basis. 
If you are big and you have deep pockets, you can do that for a period of time. But 
if you don't have deep pockets, well the pressure is going to come from some place 
else. I have no doubt that, in those circumstances, the practice is more susceptible to 
being influenced than it would be in a more stable reasonable market place. " (LIO); 
"Where an audit firm bids aggressively for an audit and is successful, to make that 
audit profitable, they might not put as much effort into the audit or go into as much 
depth as they should do. " (IM2); 
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"I think the extent to which competition is being taken at the moment would suggest 
that the tenders that are coming in, are not being placed at a level to give the audit 
firms profits. Hence they must be doing something else to ensure their own viability, 
and maybe they are compromising the standards being applied to the audit. " (IM7); 
"In the past, they have cut corners, most definitely" (A3); 
"Competitive tendering has resulted already in the Big Six sending out more junior 
staff. " (A7). 
7.7: Audit Committees and Perceived Auditor Independence 
To introduce this part of the discussion, interviewees were asked who they believed was 
responsible for the appointment of auditors. In all cases, they saw the management of the 
company as making this decision, which was ratified by the shareholders (appendix G, matrix 
5). This responsibility was viewed negatively by interviewees because they believed that it 
placed management in a powerful position and led to auditors considering management, 
rather than the shareholders, as their clients. Shareholders were seen as not having much 
power because their interests were so diverse and they were not sufficiently organised to vote 
against an auditor. 
It was expected, based on these findings, that interviewees would support the introduction 
of audit committees in companies and that they would view the establishment of an audit 
committee as a means of enhancing the independence of auditors by firstly, reducing the 
power of management and secondly, as a means of encouraging auditors to see the 
shareholders, and not management, as their clients and in that way strengthen their 
independence of management. 
Although more than half of the interviewees perceived that the existence of an audit 
committee would enhance the independence of the auditor (n=16), a number of the 
interviewees argued that, the role played by (n=7) and/or the independence of the non- 
executive directors (n=3), were critical factors if the audit committee was to achieve this 
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objective (appendix G, matrix 6). 
"I think it depends on what audit committees do. If they only meet once a year to 
effectively approve the accounts, probably not. However, if they are more involved, 
for example, with internal control issues and with half yearly reports, they may 
enhance auditor independence. " (L2); 
"It would depend on how influential the non-executive director is and what his 
function is" (LS); 
"Audit committees should enhance auditor independence but it all leads to the 
question of the strengths of the boards of Plc's. Some of them have obviously very 
strong boards where the non-executive directors have the applicable knowledge. 
However, some of them don't and some of the non-executive directors are basically 
puppets. " (IM5); 
"Yes, audit committees should enhance auditor independence if it acts as a mediator 
between the auditor and the management of a company. " (A2); 
"I suppose it (audit committee) should but it depends on the quality of the non- 
executive directors and who is paying their fees. At the end of the day, you have to 
ask the question what are the non-executive directors working towards, what is in 
their interest and what is not. " (A3). 
The arguments made by those interviewees who believed that the audit committee would 
enhance the independence of the auditor fell into the following three categories: the belief 
that non-executive directors were independent (n=7); that the audit committee provided the 
auditor with an additional channel of communication (n=14); and that the audit committee 
would be responsible for both the selection and remuneration of the auditor (n=13). 
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Independent non-executive directors: 
"The audit committee is good to have there because the non-executive directors will 
have their own interests elsewhere and they will act as guardians of the company and 
will make sure that the management of the company don't drive the company in a 
direction that the shareholders wouldn't want it driven. The non-executive directors 
have no real axe to grind. " (L12); 
"I would think that it (audit committee) would have a positive impact. Obviously, the 
non-executive directors would generally have experience elsewhere with other 
companies and by their nature, will be a little bit more independent than the executive 
directors. " (L14); 
"The non-executive directors are well known to the business community and would 
have no function, whatsoever, in the day-to-day running of the company. " (1M8). 
Additional 
communication channel: 
"It (audit committee) gives another channel for communication, for example, say the 
auditor had a suspicion and he may worry about losing that part of his business, it 
provides him with a valuable method of resolving that issue and in a way which 
minimises losing the account. " (L3); 
"It (audit committee) would act as an independent body which the auditor could go 
to with any queries. " (L11); 
"Independence is enhanced because it (audit committee) gives the auditor the 
opportunity to talk to non-executive directors who are going to be equally keen not 
to be swayed by the prevailing management. " (IM3). 
Selection and remuneration of auditors: 
"Because the non-executive directors are individuals not involved in the business of 
the company and having them set remunerations, which is the key to all relationships, 
would enhance the independence of the auditor. " (L11); 
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"Audit committees should enhance the independence of the auditor because the people 
who are in executive roles within the firm aren't making decisions as to who the 
auditor is. So auditors don't have that fear, say that something happens in a particular 
area in the business, that this person will remove him. It reduces the threat of being 
replaced. " (L6); 
"The more that the audit committee is involved in deciding whether the audit firm 
should be changed to another firm and decides on fees, the better it will be in relation 
to the independence of the auditor. " (1M4); 
"I think it is essential for auditor independence that this body (audit committee) 
selects the auditor. " (IM8). 
Five interviewees acknowledged that while the role of the audit committee is good in theory, 
their experience of such committees has led them to conclude that they are ineffective. This 
experience has shown them that non-executive directors were of poor calibre and lacked 
independence. Although this experience may be deemed limited, in that audit committees are 
a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland, it is still worthy of comment in so far as it has made 
interviewees view non-executive directors negatively. 
"I think in theory it (audit committee) should enhance auditor independence, but in 
practice, I wonder if it makes a lot of difference. If I take a cross-section of the 
public companies that we would deal with, I wouldn't have thought, with a couple of 
exceptions, that the calibre of non-executive directors would be sufficiently high to 
have a major say in changing what the chief financial officer might do. I think that 
it is only in unusual circumstances that the non-executive directors would overrule the 
executives. " (L8); 
"In theory it (audit committee) should but I think that it depends on who constitutes 
the audit committee and to what extent influences from the outside, and by that I 
mean the Board, may prevail. I feel that it could be influenced. " (L13); 
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"I think that the problem with non-executive directors is that they don't have the time 
to spend on assessing how true the set of accounts are, or don't find the time to talk 
to the directors, the accounting staff, and the auditors. " (IM6); 
"Are the non-executive directors independent, I would have questions with that. It's 
not down to one specific thing, there would be a whole array of things where we 
would have potential difficulties with non-executive directors, in terms of their real 
independence. It would vary from close connections with the company and working 
with connected companies, to being paid by the company and their pay being a 
substantial element of their income, to the work that they could provide that company 
given all their responsibilities that we would know that they have, and given their 
general status and experience as we would perceive it to be. " (IM7); 
"From my experience of audit committees, I don't believe that their non-executive 
directors are independent. In Ireland, the non-executive directors are too cosy with 
the executive directors and normally they are appointed based on recommendations 
made by the executive directors. " (A7). 
In that audit committees are a relatively new phenomenon in Ireland it would not have been 
surprising if their role and relevance had not been fully understood by the participants, but 
it was not expected for certain participants that their limited experience of audit committees 
would have led to negative feelings as to the independence of non-executive directors and/ 
or to the value of the audit committee in enhancing auditor independence. 
7.8: Audit Tenure and Perceived Auditor Independence 
As discussed in Chapter 6, less than half of the respondents to the mail questionnaire 
perceived the auditor to be less independent when s/he continued in office with the same 
client over a prolonged period of time. Similarly more than half of the interviewees preferred 
to see the auditor in place for a long period of time because it ensured that they had a good 
knowledge of the business (appendix G, matrix 7). 
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"I think that there is an actual benefit from long tenure. The practice has built up 
knowledge about the company itself, the management, its style. If somebody wants 
to fool the auditor, I would have thought that this is possible where somebody knows 
very little about the company. " (LIO); 
"Long-standing relationships often mean that the understanding of the business is far 
greater and, therefore, a better audit can be done. " (IM1); 
"It (long audit tenure) can be beneficial in so far as the auditor really understands 
how the business works and can do a more thorough audit, taking into account the 
cyclical nature of the business. " (Al). 
Six interviewees who did not favour any reduction in audit tenure, argued that the manner 
in which auditing was regulated would ensure that audit standards were not compromised. 
"I think that the constant changing and upgrading of standards by the auditing bodies 
gives me a lot more comfort that auditors are not becoming complacent. " (L8); 
"There is a process which the audit firm goes through on a regular basis to ensure 
that the audit firm maintains its standards and keeps up to date. " (1M7); 
"You would presume that they have checks on each other, say somebody reviewing 
the work of others, checking that the worked signed off is actually done and checking 
that accounts are signed off correctly. " (A4). 
Although interviewees recognised the benefits of audit experience over time, they were also 
aware of attendant problems. Interviewees perceived that an extended auditor-client 
relationship could result in the auditors becoming cosy in their relationships with clients 
which may cause them to become complacent in their audit work (n=12) or may result in 
a staleness in the audit approach (n=4). 
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"Long tenure would impact on independence, more from the point of view of the cosy 
relationship, people get complacent. " (L6); 
"Long tenure would result in the auditor beginning to think in the same way about the 
business. So there would be a lack of independence in thought which would build up 
from people developing similar ways of thinking about things. " (IM3); 
"I would think that the auditors would become very cosy in such relationships and too 
trusting of management. " (A7). 
Because of the problems associated with long tenure, interviewees were asked for their views 
on the rotation of audit firms or audit personnel after a certain period of time. The majority 
of interviewees were not in favour of rotating audit firms (n=24), some arguing that there 
was no evidence to suggest that this was necessary while others used the benefits of 
knowledge argument associated with long audit tenure, which was discussed previously. The 
majority of interviewees perceived that the rotation of audit personnel enhanced auditor 
independence because it ensured that auditors did not become cosy in their relationships 
(n= 12) and it brought a freshness to the audit (n= 13). Some interviewees argued that the 
rotation of audit personnel was a more practical option than, and would achieve the same 
effects as, the rotation of audit firms. This finding is consistent with the mail questionnaire 
results, reported in Chapter 6, which showed that more respondents perceived the auditor to 
be independent when the audit was performed by the same audit firm than by the same audit 
personnel. 
It is interesting to note that five interviewees believed that if the independence of the auditor 
was at issue then the rotation of audit personnel was not the solution. In such instances, the 
rotation of audit firms was recommended. 
"If independence is at issue, then I don't think rotation of audit personnel is going to 
increase that independence. - If the senior partner is exhibiting some form of 
favouritism or non-independence, well he is the one who cracks the whip, so no 
matter who you rotate within the firm, that will still be exhibited. " (L3); 
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"Rotating audit personnel will not solve the (independence) issue. One guy passes it 
on to the next and there will always be some continuity between a certain number of 
people on the audit, even if a certain proportion of them are moving on from year to 
year. " (IM4); 
"I don't think that rotating audit staff would necessarily improve independence. I 
would prefer rotation of audit firms. " (Al). 
7.9: Provision of NAS and Perceived Auditor Independence 
When interviewees were asked what effects the provision of NAS by audit firms to their 
audit clients would have on their perceptions of auditor independence, only four of them 
perceived a reduction in auditor independence which they argued was caused by the firm's 
dependency on such services for fee income (appendix G, matrix 8). 
"If the audit is going to be the loss leader to get them in the door, well there will 
have to be some incentive for them to go along with management wishes. Where they 
are more dependent on these other services for fee income, I can see where it may 
affect the audit. " (L11); 
"The Big Six firms are the ones that are likely to be offering all sorts of services. The 
smaller firms, because they are not providing such services, they may be more 
independent. " (IM6); 
"The provision of NAS has to have some impact on auditor independence because the 
audit would be the loss leader and they do it because they know that they are going 
to get these additional services. " (A2); 
"I would see the firms as being very dependent on such services for fee income. They 
can not be independent where they are providing such services and are so dependent 
on them for fee income. " (A7). 
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To solve this perceived independence threat, three of them favoured prohibiting audit firms 
from providing such services and one argued for both services to be provided by separate 
personnel. 
The majority of interviewees did not perceive any reduction in the independence of the 
auditor where NAS was provided (n=26). In four cases, interviewees noted that they would 
have recommended to their clients using their audit firms for such services, arguing that the 
audit firm's experience and knowledge of their businesses would result in better advice being 
obtained. Other interviewees argued that they would prefer to see audit firms provide NAS 
to their clients because it would ensure that the standard applied to the audit would be higher 
and that a better audit opinion would result (n=3). 
"In certain cases, we would have recommended our clients go to their auditors for 
additional services. I think that accountants are the people to provide NAS because 
they have the knowledge of that particular company. " (LA); 
"I think that the more you know about your client, the better the audit opinion that 
you can give. Because you are getting a better understanding of the business, it will 
mean that you can give a better audit opinion. " (L6); 
"The provision of NAS could ensure that the audit is of a higher standard because if 
they don't impress their clients with that, well they won't get the other services. " 
(L10); 
"They are the people with experience of the company, through the audit, and are in 
a strong position to give that type of advice. They know the company, thegroup, the 
systems. They are the people that the company would turn to for such advice rather 
than to a different firm because there is a certain learning curve for the new firm who 
doesn't have the overall view that the auditors have. " (IM8); 
"The auditor is in a unique position of understanding the client's financial operations 
and its business better than anybody else. I don't have any evidence that would lead 
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me to be concerned that the audit is compromised. " (A5). 
Because the majority of interviewees had a positive attitude towards the provision of NAS 
by audit firms, it led to a discussion on the manner in which they perceived that such 
services were provided by audit firms. In all cases, they had assumed that both roles were 
performed by separate personnel/ departments. A number of them stressed the importance 
of such separation as a means of ensuring that the independence of the auditor was not 
compromised. 
"What would cause me concern is w'iere the same department is giving tax advice, 
or other NAS and performing the audit. I would imagine that such services are 
performed by separate departments. " (L9); 
"I would see the separation of functions as very important and not prejudicing their 
independence. " (IM7); 
"You would assume that the audit firm is very rigorous in the separation of the two 
roles. You would have to have an independent person performing the audit, one 
separate from the person who recommended the system. " (Al). 
Nine interviewees noted that because it was not possible to have separation of these roles in 
the non-Big Six firms, this resulted in them having less confidence in their independence. 
"The Big Six have a clear distinction between their audit side and their consulting 
side. That clear distinction leads me to believe that the audit side would not be 
affected by the other work that is provided. That line or that distinction is less clear 
in firms that are not so big. In the smaller firms, you would find that the auditor has 
a more integrated role or is more involved with the company directly. Where the 
auditor is more closely connected with the company, you might question that at 
times. " (L13); 
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"In the smaller firms, separation can not happen and the auditor is less reliable as a 
consequence. " (IM3); 
"In the larger firms, they are more specialised but in the smaller firms, you have the 
auditors providing a lot of tax expertise and then that is audited by them. I think that 
is where you have the least independence. " (IM5). 
Finally, when interviewees were asked whether they believed that the provision of NAS 
would result in the audit firm hesitating to qualify the audit report or succumbing to 
management pressures in fear of losing this income, the majority believed that such practices 
would not occur (n=26). Their reasons included: there was no evidence to suggest that they 
were doing this (n= 10); audit firms have sufficient checks to ensure that audit standards are 
not being compromised (n=3); audit firms are more professional than to allow themselves 
to be influenced by the provision of NAS (n=8) and their reputation is too important to them 
to behave in such manners (n=5). 
7.10: Client Employment and Perceived Auditor Independence 
A review of the literature, which was reported in Chapter 3, showed that it is quite common 
for an auditor to take up a position with a client on whose audit s/he was involved. The 
majority of interviewees were aware that this happened (n= 17) and believed that it was the 
career path for many trainee auditors to join an audit firm with the objective of moving on 
to industry or commerce (appendix G, matrix 9). Thirteen interviewees noted that the 
employment of trainee auditors by clients should not lead to an impairment of auditor 
independence because such individuals would not have been in a senior position on the audit 
and would only have been with the audit firm for a short period. 
"You have a team of auditors. You don't have any one person. He is important to the 
overall effort but he is not, as one person, in a position to influence or compromise 
things. " (L1); 
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"A lot of these people are only in the firm for a short period so it probably would not 
have a significant impact on auditor independence. " (L2); 
"I don't think that one individual has the capability to compromise the audit in any 
way. " (A5). 
Ten interviewees perceived that there was a potential threat to auditor independence when 
the person taking up the position with the client had previously acted in a more senior 
capacity on the audit. This is consistent with the mail questionnaire results which were 
discussed in Chapter 6. In such instances, interviewees perceived that power could be exerted 
by the ex-auditor to influence auditor-client relationships. 
"It (client employment) would probably be more serious if the person was more 
senior and became the financial director because he would have a closer relationship 
at the partner level. " (L2); 
"Most of the people that you are talking about are probably not so senior, they may 
be at supervisory level but not at partner level, so it (client employment) may not 
have an impact on independence. " (L3); 
"I don't think that there would be a significant effect on auditor independence unless 
it was a senior partner who left the firm to join a client. Then the independence 
would be quite low. " (L5); 
"I would doubt that independence is affected except where it (client employment) was 
at a very senior level. Say a partner left to become the finance director of quite a big 
company, this could have an impact on independence because of the relationship that 
he would have with the audit firm. " (IM3); 
"I have certainly heard of well known examples of people who have left the 
partner/director level of accountancy firms and have gone off to become one of the 
company's senior board members. I think that this is definitely much more 
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controversial and I am sure that there are difficulties then in the company's 
relationship with the auditor. " (IM4). 
The knowledge that ex-auditors have of the auditing firm's techniques was used by seven 
interviewees to explain why they perceived independence to be impaired when an auditor 
takes up an employment position with a former client. They believed that this familiarity with 
auditing techniques could allow the ex-auditor to hide something from the current auditor if 
s/he so wished. 
"I suppose it (client employment) can (impair auditor independence) to some extent, 
in that you would know what the auditors are looking for. " (L2); 
"You could say that the guy coming in has done the audit and he knows the audit 
files, he knows the type of questions that they are going to ask, he knows the people 
from last year. So if he has something that he doesn't want to show or to show in a 
different way, he has scope to do this and fill in the gaps. " (L6); 
"They (ex-auditors) can present the information in such a way that they (current 
auditors) wouldn't question it. " (L12). 
Those agreeing with this were in the minority, with the majority of interviewees arguing 
either that auditing techniques were not unique to a firm and would be known to most 
individuals without having worked in the firm (n= 11) or that this knowledge should lead to 
an improved audit (n=10). 
"I am not sure that auditing techniques are that unique from firm to firm. If you know 
the auditing techniques of one firm, then you would be familiar with the techniques 
used by other firms. " (L3); 
"I would think that most companies who are audited would know their auditors' 
techniques, what they look for, etc. This isn't unique to the individual who has 
changed from poacher to gamekeeper. " (LA); 
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"I think that it (client employment) should help the audit by speeding things up 
without impairing independence. Very often the company needs someone who 
is 
familiar with their systems and this could enhance the quality of the audit. " (L7); 
"I think that any chartered accountant, whether he has been in that audit firm or 
another, will know the way that audit firms look at issues. " (IM8); 
"They would probably know how to lay out the papers which makes the auditor's job 
easier. Hence the fee may be reduced. " (A2). 
The results from the mail questionnaire, as discussed in Chapter 6, showed that the longer 
the time lapse between acting on the audit and being employed by the client, the greater the 
number of respondents who perceived the auditor to be independent. This came through in 
the interviews with eight interviewees arguing that as the years progressed, independence 
would be less threatened because of any old relationships. In time, new people would become 
involved in the audit and they would not have had any previous relationships with the ex- 
auditor. 
"Independence may be a problem the following year but as there is turnover within 
the firm,. there is more likely to be fresh people coming in, it should wash through. " 
(L3); 
"I think that in the short-term independence is more likely to be a problem. " (LA); 
"When you change jobs, you forget very quickly how well you got on with other 
people. Within a certain number of years, you will have new people involved in the 
audit anyway so I don't see it (client employment) as a huge problem. " (IM2); 
"People within the audit firm are going to turnover very quickly anyway, so they (ex- 
auditors) are going to end up dealing with new people quite soon. " (IM4); 
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"There is such turnover of staff within the audit firm that the chances of the ex- 
auditor knowing somebody well, is reduced. Perhaps in the first years, but after that 
it is highly unlikely. " (IM8). 
Finally, when interviewees were asked for their views as to what an auditor should do if a 
job offer was made by the client while undertaking the audit, all of them agreed that the 
auditor should withdraw from the audit immediately because this represented a serious 
conflict of interest and may lead to the auditor being viewed as an employee of the company. 
7.11: Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements 
When interviewees were asked whether they consider audited financial statements, to be 
reliable, a clear distinction was made between financial statements from publicly quoted 
companies and those from smaller companies (appendix G, matrix 10). Eight interviewees 
perceived the financial statements from the former companies to be reliable because the 
requirements of the Stock Exchange ensured that financial statements of such companies were 
more transparent and reliable. Nine interviewees perceived that financial statements from 
smaller companies were unreliable because such companies prepared their financial 
statements for taxation purposes and on that basis, their results were understated. 
"Take Plc's, all of the financial information that you get in relation to Plc's would 
be above board and clean and everything would be there because it is regulated by 
the Stock Exchange. We believe that accounts prepared by small or medium sized 
companies are not a true reflection of their position. These accounts are prepared for 
tax purposes, i. e., keep profits low. " (IS); 
"With quoted Plc's and the bigger companies, you would take it that the financial 
statements are very reliable. You would be a lot more careful with the smaller 
companies as regards their accounting policies. " (IM2); 
"In relation to the smaller family-run businesses, I would consider their accounts to 
be very unreliable. However, in relation to the companies that I would deal with, the 
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Plc's, their accounts are much more accurate. They have to be transparent because 
of the Stock Exchange requirements. " (A7). 
A number of interviewees, although in the minority, did not draw this distinction and 
assumed that all financial statements were reliable because they were audited (n=8). 
"If they (financial statements) are audited, I would assume that they are reliable. " 
(L7); 
"The natural assumption, when you get accounts, is that they are one hundred percent 
accurate. " (IM1); 
"I assume they (financial statements) are reliable because they are audited. " (Al). 
Six interviewees noted that rather than trying to assess the reliability of financial statements 
directly, they assessed management instead and used this as a proxy for the reliability of the 
financial statements while four interviewees stated that if the information in the financial 
statements coincided with their expectations, they would assume then that they were reliable. 
In summary, except for one investment manager who was quite critical of financial 
statements stating that she would never assume financial statements to be reliable based on 
her past experience, the majority of interviewees assumed that financial statements were 
reliable, and in particular, those from publicly quoted companies. 
7.12: Effects of a Perceived Lack of Auditor Independence on the Reliability of 
Financial Statements and on Decision Making 
When interviewees were asked what effect a lack of auditor independence would have on 
their assessment of the reliability of financial statements, the majority stated that they would 
consider the financial statements to be less reliable (n=21; appendix G, matrix 11). This is 
consistent with the mail questionnaire results reported in Chapter 6. The effects of a lack of 
auditor independence on their investment/ lending decisions was less clear. 
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To deal firstly with the effects on the reliability of financial statements: six interviewees 
stated that they did not consider the independence of the auditor when assessing the reliability 
of financial statements, one stated that it would have no effect because it was more his view 
of the management, than of the auditor, which was important in this assessment; two noted 
that an effect may occur but was dependent on the degree that independence was lacking; and 
the remainder (n=21) stated that it would decrease the amount of reliance that they would 
place on the financial statements (appendix G, matrix 11). These results are consistent with 
those from the mail questionnaire where the majority of respondents stated that a lack of 
auditor independence would decrease the reliability of financial statements 'to some extent' 
or `significantly'. 
As noted previously, no clear pattern existed as to the effect of a lack of auditor 
independence on interviewees' investment/ lending decisions (appendix G, matrix 12). 
Twelve interviewees stated that in such a situation they would not invest in or lend to a 
company, six stated that the effect on their decision was dependent on the degree that 
independence was lacking, a further five interviewees noted that in such circumstances they 
would seek additional information prior to making this decision and the remaining 
interviewees stated that it was either unusual for them to worry about the independence of 
the auditor (n=3) or that the independence of the auditor was not important for lending/ 
investment decisions (n=4). The responses to this question in the mail questionnaire 
demonstrated an equally unclear pattern suggesting that decision making is a complex activity 
requiring more information than that which is provided by the financial statements alone, and 
that the perceived independence or otherwise of the auditor of the financial statements is just 
one part of the necessary information set. 
7.13: Characteristics of the Irish Market 
In an attempt to understand more fully the context in which these perceptions were held, 
further questions were asked about whether there were any characteristics specific to the Irish 
market which led to their perceptions of auditor independence. Their opinions on the 
following three specific issues were sought: (i) the size of the Irish market; (ii) fear of 
litigation in an auditor context; and (iii) the nature of regulation in the auditing environment. 
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7.13.1: Size of Irish Market 
The Irish market place was considered to be small by all interviewees asked (n=23) and was 
viewed to have both positive and negative effects on auditor behaviour (appendix G, matrix 
13). On the positive side, it was argued by the majority of interviewees that because the 
market place in Ireland was small, auditors were encouraged to behave more independently 
in order to maintain their reputation (n=15). They maintained that in such a small market, 
where everybody tends to know everybody, misbehaviour by auditors would become known 
quite quickly in the market place and their reputation would suffer as a result. In addition, 
seven interviewees noted that in a market this small, where there is a limited number of 
clients for auditors, auditors may behave more independently and perform better audits in 
order not to lose clients. 
"Ireland is a small market and Dublin is the main part of it. I think that in accounting 
because there is a requirement to be seen to be honest and independent and given the 
scale of the market, if your reputation is tarred, it would be very difficult to set up 
here again. So I would think that this would impact on their behaviour. " (L9); 
"One of the advantages of a small market place is that you know what is happening 
in it and you will find out very quickly, either officially or through the grapevine, 
what someone's reputation is. If someone has a bad reputation, this will become 
known very quickly. " (L10); 
"There is a limited number of accounts available to them (auditors) so they are not 
going to risk one account as this could have a domino effect on all their other 
accounts. Their ability to grow their market share is fairly limited so they have to 
ensure that what they are doing, they are doing well - otherwise somebody else will 
come and take their account. So in a small market, they have to perform even better. " 
(IM1); 
"In a small market where industry is so concentrated, if they don't keep things 
properly, well they won't get another chance. " (A4); 
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"Because the market is so small, if you do something wrong, it is known very quickly 
and very widely. So I think that this is an extra guard, in terms of, the quality of 
work done. " (A5). 
Although the majority of interviewees believed that a market this small encouraged 
independent auditor behaviour, one interviewee argued that it may encourage auditors to 
behave less independently, in that, they may be more lenient with their clients in relation to 
contentious issues, so as not to lose their accounts. It was also believed by two interviewees 
that because the relationships that existed between auditors and their clients were much closer 
in a smaller market place, the auditors may be less independent. 
"Being a smaller country, everyone tends to be closer and it is more difficult to say 
no than in bigger countries. This could lead to less independence rather than more. " 
(L2); 
"I think that auditors, particularly in a market like Ireland which is small and there 
are only so many clients out there, would be less inclined to raise the flag on smaller 
issues than they would be in a bigger economy where there was a lot more potential 
clients. Where you have a concentration of large clients, you wouldn't want to do 
anything that might put that relationship at risk. " (IM2); 
"Because everyone knows everyone, it may seem a bit cosy. " (Al). 
Finally, two interviewees noted that they had confidence in the independence of auditors 
because of the lack of evidence in Ireland which suggested that auditors were not behaving 
independently. 
"There hasn't been any bad experiences, particularly with companies going 
unexpectedly under, other than in the way which could be easily construed from the 
financial statements. If there were four cases in a year, well then you might have 
significant question marks as to whether auditors are credible or not. That's really 
when credibility comes into play, when somebody goes bust. " (IM3); 
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"You have to ask yourself has there been problems, in terms of the public domain, 
in relation to their independence, say not portraying the true picture of what is going 
on in companies. In Ireland, there has been very few instances where you would say 
that this has occurred. If you had the Polly Pecks of this world, you would worry 
more about standards. " (IM6). 
In order to determine whether auditors were more accessible to users of audited financial 
statements in a market like Ireland, interviewees were asked if they had ever sought direct 
communication with the auditor when they had queries in relation to the financial statements. 
Corporate lenders communicated frequently with auditors in relation to accounting issues but 
investment managers and analysts did not, believing that auditors would not talk to them. If 
the latter groups had queries in relation to the financial statements, they would talk directly 
with the management of the company. 
7.13.2: Fear of Litigation 
Nineteen interviewees were asked whether they believed that auditors' fear of litigation 
encouraged them to behave independently. While the majority replied that auditors were 
beginning to fear litigation in Ireland (n=16), only nine of them believed that this fear would 
encourage them to behave more independently (appendix G, matrix 14). 
"I think yes they are beginning to fear litigation much more and it should influence 
their behaviour. " (L13); 
"I think that they are very conscious of litigation. That is a fairly recent advent in the 
Irish market. They are going to be more careful to ensure that they are not liable or 
off-side in any way. " (L15); 
"I think that they are becoming more conscious of it (litigation). In every area where 
professional advice is given, there is more litigation and therefore, people have to 
become more aware. " (IM4); 
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"Given the level of insurance that they have to carry and the way that premiums have 
gone up, and given that premiums are related to claims, that would be something that 
they would consider. " (IM7); 
"I think that they do fear litigation and I don't think that auditors would risk being 
slack with their work because they think that there are few consequences. I would be 
amazed if auditors weren't permanently aware of the implications of what they are 
doing. " (A5). 
Two interviewees argued that although auditors may fear litigation, it may not necessarily 
encourage them to behave more independently. 
"Litigation is there to a certain extent but I don't think that it is the driving force 
behind auditor independence. Loss of reputation is the bigger issue. " (Li l); 
"They do fear litigation but I am not sure that it will encourage them to behave 
independently. " (IM5). 
7.13.3 Audit Regulation 
In order to assess whether the manner in which auditing profession is regulated in Ireland had 
any influence on interviewees' perceptions of auditor independence, twenty-three interviewees 
were asked for their viewpoints on self-regulation (appendix G, matrix 15). The majority of 
interviewees (n= 19) believed that the profession should be self-regulated and their arguments 
included: the profession's past record at regulation shows it to be successful (n=15); there 
is a lack of evidence to suggest that independent regulation is required (n=8); and 
accountants are the ones with the knowledge to implement reasonable rules for their industry 
(n=7). 
Pas record shows them to be successful: 
"I think that the Institute does a very good job. They are so long in existence and 
their rules have been developed over this time span as well. I am happy with their 
performance. " (L7); 
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"I think that experience has shown us that the present system has worked, so why 
change it. " (L15); 
"I think that the accountants have demonstrated that they are fairly effective in what 
they are doing and they have moved with the times. " (IM7). 
ck of evidence to su 9 °a est that independent regulation i ir 
"I don't think that there have been many cases recently which would have brought the 
profession into disrepute. So I don't think that there is any justification for an 
independent regulatory body at the moment. " (L6); 
"While there has been a few notable cases about auditors in Ireland, I don't think that 
there is sufficient evidence to suggest that they can't keep their own house in order. " 
(IM2). 
Kn_ ledge to implement reasonable rules: 
"I think that those in the industry know what rules to put in place that make sense. 
The danger of an independent body making rules for auditors is that the rules may not 
make sense and may not be workable. " (L9). 
Some interviewees, although in the minority, did not favour self-regulation. They argued that 
the penalties, a self-regulatory body would impose on its members for misbehaviour, would 
be more lenient than those imposed by an independent body (n=3), they believed that 
independent regulation would be healthier (n=4) and would result in higher standards for the 
profession (n=2). 
"Self-regulation is a recipe for disaster or for loopholes. You won't find any self- 
regulatory body imposing undue pressures on themselves because the members would 
object. It would be much healthier if outside committees were checking the standards 
of such organisations. Higher standards would result. " (LS); 
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"It (regulation) will always work better if they are answerable to an outside body. 
When you are self-regulated you are going to make things more comfortable for 
yourself. " (L11); 
"I think that a watchdog sort of figure would ensure that they are complying with the 
standards. " (L12); 
"I would favour some sort of government intervention because I feel that the auditing 
profession has had a poor history of regulating themselves. I think that their penalties 
for bad behaviour are too small and should be increased. " (A7). 
7.14: Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor 
Independence on Perceptions Held 
An analysis was undertaken of the interviewees' responses based on the group that they came 
from, their age, the nature of their work experience and previous suspicions of a lack of 
auditor independence. Their gender and their accounting knowledge were excluded for this 
analysis because of the small number of interviewees who were female (n=3) and who had 
no accounting knowledge (n= 1). 
It has already been noted that corporate lenders attached greater importance to financial 
statements than either investment managers or analysts". This is consistent with the results 
from the mail questionnaire which were reported in Chapter 6. A higher percentage of 
lenders stated that financial statements were crucial to their decisions and that they would not 
make a lending decision without first seeing the financial statements while a higher 
percentage of analysts stated that they only used the financial statements to confirm what they 
already knew about the company (appendix G, matrix 16). 
It was expected based on the results from the mail questionnaire and reported in Chapter 6, 
that analysts would be more critical 'than corporate lenders or investment managers of the 
14See Section 7.3 on p. 185 above. 
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independence of non-Big Six audit firms. However, an analysis of the interview results 
showed that out of the three groups, analysts had the least confidence in the independence 
of Big Six firms and for them the size of the audit firm did not influence their perceptions 
of auditor independence (appendix G, matrix 17). Confidence was expressed in the 
independence of Big Six firms by more younger than older interviewees and by more 
interviewees with no or limited sanctioning authority than those with such authority. These 
findings are consistent with the mail questionnaire results reported in Chapter 6. Finally, 
those interviewees who had not previously suspected a lack of auditor independence had more 
confidence, than those who had, in the independence of the Big Six audit firms, an 
independence which they saw as linked to the importance of reputation to such firms and the 
high profile of the companies audited by these firms. This finding is also consistent with the 
results reported in Chapter 6 which showed that respondents who had previously suspected 
a lack of auditor independence were more critical, than those who had not, of the reliability 
of financial statements audited by Big Six firms. 
The confidence expressed by corporate lenders and investment managers in the independence 
of Big Six audit firms held over into their discussion of the impact of audit market 
competition. Corporate lenders perceived that high levels of competition in the audit market 
would not result in the Big Six firms cutting back of the amount of audit work that they 
performed because they were more professional than that, while investment managers 
perceived that reputation was too important to Big Six firms to behave in such a manner 
(appendix G, matrix 18). In addition, corporate lenders and investment managers were less 
concerned than analysts as to the effect highly competitive audit market conditions would 
have on auditor independence. They believed that such a market may result in a reduction 
in audit price, but that audit quality would not suffer, furthermore any cut in audit price 
would be more than compensated for by the income that the firms derived from NAS. 
However, analysts perceived that such market conditions might encourage cutbacks in the 
amount of audit work performed. It was expected based on the mail questionnaire results that 
younger interviewees would be more concerned than older interviewees as to the impact of 
a highly competitive audit market. This was indeed found to be the case. Interestingly, the 
more authority that interviewees had, the more likely they were to perceive that high 
competition resulted in the auditor cutting back on the amount of audit work performed. 
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Again, interviewees who had not previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were 
confident that Big Six audit firms would not cut back on the amount of audit work undertaken 
because of their fear of losing their reputation. 
The benefits of audit committees (enhancement of auditor independence and provision of an 
additional communication channel) were recognised more frequently by investment managers 
than by analysts or corporate lenders (appendix G, matrix 19). In addition, investment 
managers were more likely to suggest that the audit committee should be responsible for 
auditor appointment and remuneration than members of either the analyst or corporate lender 
groups. Similarly, the desirability of the audit committee having this responsibility was 
recognised more frequently by younger interviewees than by older interviewees. In addition, 
the provision by the audit committee of an additional auditor communication channel was 
recognised more by younger than by older interviewees and by interviewees with limited 
sanctioning authority than by other interviewees. Finally, interviewees who had not 
previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were more inclined to perceive the audit 
committee as enhancing auditor independence but were less concerned to require the audit 
committee to be responsible for auditor appointment and remuneration. 
The majority of interviewees did not favour the rotation of audit firms and in particular those 
interviewees who were investment managers, young, had. limited sanctioning authority and 
had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence (appendix G, matrix 20). In 
addition, a lower percentage of interviewees in the above categories perceived long audit 
tenure to be beneficial in that it would result in the auditor having a good knowledge of the 
company's business. A higher percentage of corporate lenders compared to investment 
managers or analysts recognised that long audit tenure may result in the auditor becoming 
cosy in his/ her relationship with management, a higher percentage of corporate lenders also 
recommended that audit personnel be rotated to combat this problem. Investment managers, 
on the other hand, favoured the rotation of audit personnel in order that a freshness be 
brought to the audit approach. Younger interviewees were more concerned by long audit 
tenure than older interviewees perceiving that it may result in the development of an overly 
comfortable relationship between the auditor and company management. Similarly, those 
interviewees with no sanctioning authority were more concerned, than those with total or 
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limited sanctioning authority, that long audit tenure may result in the development of 
inappropriate auditor-client relationships. Finally, interviewees with limited sanctioning 
authority were more in favour, than other interviewees, of rotating audit personnel arguing 
that it would bring a freshness to the audit approach. 
The lack of confidence expressed by corporate lenders and investment managers in the 
independence of non-Big Six audit firms again came to the fore in their discussion of the 
provision of NAS (appendix G, matrix 21). Many of them took the view that because non- 
Big Six firms did not separate the audit function from NAS, confidence in their independence 
was diminished. Similarly, this lack of separation of functions in the non-Big Six audit firms 
gave rise to greater concerns among older rather than younger interviewees, those without 
rather than with sanctioning authority, and those who had previously suspected a lack of 
auditor independence compared to those who had not. While the overall majority of 
interviewees did not perceive any impairment in auditor independence from the provision of 
NAS and were therefore not in favour of prohibiting audit firms from providing such 
services, this viewpoint was more prevalent among corporate lenders and investment 
managers than analysts, among older rather than younger interviewees, among interviewees 
with complete or limited sanctioning authority as compared with those with no such 
authority, and among interviewees who had not previously suspected a lack of auditor 
independence as compared with those who-had. 
Those interviewees who were analysts, under forty years of age, and who had not previously 
suspected a lack of auditor independence proved to be less concerned by the potential effects 
that client employment could have on auditor independence believing that individuals leaving 
the audit firm to take up employment with a company did not have sufficient power to 
influence auditor independence (appendix G, matrix 22). Similarly, those interviewees with 
limited sanctioning authority were less concerned by the potential effects of client 
employment than other interviewees, arguing that audit techniques were not unique to a firm 
and, therefore, knowledge of them would not influence auditor independence. While 
investment managers were less concerned than corporate lenders about the potential effects 
of client employment on auditor independence, they did recognise that if the person leaving 
the audit firm had acted in a senior capacity, independence may become impaired. 
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7.15: Summary 
The results from the in-depth interviews were presented in this chapter. Interviewees were 
of a similar profile, in terms of age, sex and work experience, as respondents to the mail 
questionnaire. The use of financial statements was consistent across groups with each of the 
interviewees stating that financial statements were always used for decision making purposes. 
flowever, weight attached to financial statements in the decision making process did vary 
across groups with investment managers and analysts perceiving them to be of less value than 
corporate lenders. The majority of interviewees assumed that financial statements were 
reliable, in particular, financial statements from publicly quoted companies. 
Over half of the interviewees had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence. The 
reasons they gave for their suspicions being aroused included the performance of the audit 
by a non-Big Six audit firm, the audit firm's dependency on audit fee income, the power that 
directors were perceived to exert over auditors and finally the provision of NAS by audit 
firms. While the power that directors were perceived to exert over auditors was not 
separately identified in the mail questionnaire, it was implicit in other questions which dealt 
with audit committees. 
Similar to the mail questionnaire respondents, the majority of interviewees had more 
confidence in the independence of the Big Six audit firms because the non-Big Six firms were 
seen as being more dependent on clients for fee income and as providing a more personalised 
audit service to their clients. A further reason given was the lack in non-Big Six firms of 
those structures and systems which the Big Six firms had in place to ensure quality audits. 
The importance that Big Six firms attached to their reputations was also perceived by 
interviewees as an encouragement to Big Six firms to behave more independently than non- 
Big Six firms. 
While the majority of interviewees perceived that a highly competitive audit market would 
have an impact on the price, but not the quality, of the audit, a significant minority of them 
were concerned about the effects of such a market on audit quality. Although interviewees 
recognised that low-balling occurred, they believed that it should not impair auditor 
independence on the basis that the income generated from NAS would more than compensate 
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the audit firms for any loss sustained on the audit. 
The majority of interviewees considered that audit committees enhanced auditor independence 
by their being involved in the selection of the auditor and thereby reducing the power exerted 
by the management over the auditor and by providing the auditor with an additional 
communication channel. A number of them stressed that the non-executive directors had to 
be independent if the audit committee was to achieve its objectives. The lack of a sufficient 
number of high calibre, independent non-executive directors available to serve on audit 
committees resulted in five interviewees considering audit committees to be ineffective. 
Although on balance more than half of the interviewees favoured long audit tenure because 
of its benefit in ensuring that the audit firm had a good knowledge of the business, many 
interviewees recognised that length of tenure might cause independence problems with more 
than half expressing concern at the possibility of the development of complacency and an 
overly comfortable relationship with the client. The overall preference for longer rather than 
shorter tenure was reflected in the majority being against compulsory rotation of audit firms 
the perception being that the benefits associated with long tenure outweighed the related 
costs. However, the majority of interviewees did favour rotating audit personnel believing 
that such a policy would enhance auditor independence by ensuring that the auditor-client 
relationships did not become too close and by engendering a freshness in the audit approach. 
Some argued that this policy was more practical than, and would achieve the same effects 
as, the rotation of audit firms. 
The majority of interviewees did not perceive any reduction in the independence of auditors 
where NAS was provided to audit clients. This confidence resulted from their assumptions 
that these roles were performed by separate personnel within the audit firm. Where roles 
were not kept separate which was seen as being the situation in the non-Big Six firms there 
was less confidence in the ability of the auditor to remain independent. A number of 
interviewees considered that allowing an audit firm to provide NAS was beneficial to both 
the audit client and to the standard of audit work undertaken. 
The majority of interviewees were aware that auditors frequently took up employment 
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positions with their audit clients and believed that, unless the auditor had acted in a senior 
capacity on the audit, such employment of auditors would not impact negatively on auditor 
independence. Where the auditor had acted in a senior capacity on the audit, interviewees 
perceived that power could be exerted by the ex-auditor to influence auditor-client 
relationships. The majority of interviewees did not perceive any threat to auditor 
independence from the knowledge that ex-auditors had of the audit firm's techniques because 
such techniques were not unique to a firm and would be known to most individuals without 
having worked in the firm. They argued, instead, that knowledge of techniques should lead 
to an improved audit. Finally, the time lapse between acting on the audit and being employed 
by the client was deemed important by the majority of interviewees who maintained that as 
the years progressed, independence would be less threatened because of past relationships. 
In time, new people would become involved in the audit and they would not have had any 
previous contact with or knowledge of the ex-auditor. 
The majority of interviewees perceived a clear link between diminished auditor independence 
and reduced confidence in the reliability of financial statements, a reduced confidence which 
in turn would require them to seek additional information from sources other than the 
financial statements. However, the manner in which perceptions translated into changes in 
investment/lending decisions was less clear with some interviewees noting that it would result 
in them lending/investing less, others stating that it would have no, or an insignificant, effect 
on their lending/investing decisions and the remainder remaining undecided as to its effects. 
These findings and the mail questionnaire results suggest that decision making is a complex 
activity requiring more information than that which is provided by the financial statements 
alone and that the perceived independence or otherwise of the auditor of financial statements 
is just one part of the necessary information set. 
In order to understand more fully the context in which these perceptions were held, 
interviewees were asked whether there were any characteristics specific to Ireland which had 
contributed to these perceptions of auditor independence. In the majority of cases, 
interviewees considered that because the Irish market was small, auditors were encouraged 
to behave more independently in fear of losing their reputation. In addition, the majority of 
interviewees believed that auditors in Ireland were beginning to become more aware of the 
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possibility of litigation directed toward them and that this awareness encouraged them to 
behave more independently. Finally, the majority of interviewees were in favour of the 
auditing profession being self-regulated because of its success rate to date, the lack of 
evidence to suggest that independent regulation was required and their belief that the 
profession had the appropriate knowledge to implement reasonable rules. Some interviewees, 
although in the minority, argued against self-regulation. They believed that the penalties for 
misbehaviour imposed by a self-regulatory body would be smaller than those imposed by an 
independent body and that higher standards would result if the profession was regulated 
independently. 
The final issue addressed was the potential effects of interviewees' characteristics and their 
previous suspicions of a lack of auditor independence on perceptions held. Interviewees who 
were young, had no, or limited, sanctioning authority, had not previously suspected a lack 
of auditor independence or were corporate lenders had a greater confidence in the 
independence of Big Six firms than other interviewees. With the exception of younger 
interviewees, the above categories of interviewees were also less concerned about a highly 
competitive audit market. Interviewees who were young, with limited sanctioning authority, 
had not previously suspected a lack of auditor independence or were investment managers 
recognised the benefits of audit committees (independence enhancement and provision of an 
additional communication channel) more frequently than other interviewees. While the 
majority of interviewees did not favour the rotation of audit firms, this was favoured less 
frequently by interviewees who were investment managers, young, had limited sanctioning 
authority or had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence. Instead, these 
categories of interviewees were more in favour of the rotation of audit personnel. The lack 
of separation of the audit function from NAS caused interviewees who were older, had 
limited sanctioning authority, had previously suspected a lack of auditor independence or 
were corporate lenders to fear a reduction in auditor independence more than other 
interviewees. The potential impairment of auditor independence from client employment was 
perceived to be less by those interviewees who were analysts, young, with limited sanctioning 
authority or had not previously suspected a lack of auditor independence than by other 
interviewees. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1: Introduction 
The focus of this research has been on perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability 
of financial statements as held within the commercial environment in Ireland. Corporate 
lenders, investment managers and analysts were selected as representatives of this 
commercial environment. For the purposes of this study, auditor independence was defined 
as the auditor's ability to be, and to be seen to be, objective and impartial, that is, free from 
any bias towards any of the parties in relation to whom he or she is acting (ICAI, 1995). 
Information was deemed to have the quality of reliability when it is free from material error 
and bias and can be depended upon by users to represent faithfully in terms of valid 
description that which it either purports to represent or could be reasonably be expected to 
represent (ASB, 1991). Six variables, audit firm size, audit market competition, audit 
committees, audit tenure, provision of NAS and client employment, were selected for 
investigation. Data was collected using a mail questionnaire and in-depth interviews. 
The remainder of this chapter includes a summary of the main findings from the study. 
Implications of the findings are discussed and recommendations for further research are 
proposed. 
8.2: Previous Suspicions of a Lack of Auditor Independence 
In Chapter 2, evidence was adduced as to instances in which auditor independence was 
impaired with detrimental effects on the quality of the audit. Here a consistent feature was 
the power that directors were perceived to exert over auditors and the provision of NAS by 
audit firms to their audit clients. In this study, the existence of concern as to the 
independence of auditors was highlighted by the fact that more than half of the questionnaire 
respondents stated that there were specific instances in the past in which suspicions of a lack 
of auditor independence had been aroused. The factors most frequently associated with these 
suspicions were the provision of NAS to audit clients and the performance of the audit by 
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a non-Big Six firm. In addition, the perceptions held by those respondents who had 
previously suspected a lack of auditor independence were significantly different to those held 
by respondents who had not previously suspected a lack of auditor independence. In 
particular, the former respondents perceived that financial statements audited by Big Six 
firms were reliable less frequently than the latter respondents. They were also more 
concerned about the effects that a highly competitive audit market, a lack of an audit 
committee, long audit tenure, the provision of NAS, and client employment would have on 
auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements. 
The interviewees too identified the performance of an audit by a non-Big Six firm as a reason 
for suspecting a lack of auditor independence. They believed that such firms were more 
dependent on audit clients for fee income and that the threat to their independence was 
greater than for the Big Six audit firms. The power that directors were perceived to exert 
over auditors was noted by interviewees as another reason for suspecting a lack of auditor 
independence. Directors of companies were perceived to be very powerful individuals and 
in a position to influence auditors. While this was not separately identified in the mail 
questionnaire, it was implicit in other questions which dealt with audit committees and 
explains why respondents who had previously suspected a lack of auditor ipdependence were 
significantly more concerned, than those who had not, by a lack of an audit committee. 
8.3: Audit Firm Size 
The size of the audit firm has been recognised in the literature as an important variable that 
may affect perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements. The 
empirical studies undertaken to date have shown that larger audit firms are perceived to be 
more independent than smaller audit firms" and that the financial statements audited by them 
are perceived to be more reliable than those audited by smaller audit firms". However, none 
"Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Shockley, 1981; 
Pearson and Ryans, 1981/82; McKinley et al., 1985; Jackson-Heard, 1987; Gul, 1989; and 
Gul, 1991. 
66Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the study undertaken by McKinley et at. 
(1985). 
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of these studies have provided evidence as to why such perceptions were held. 
In this study, half of the questionnaire respondents perceived that non-Big Six audit firms 
were less independent than Big Six audit firms. One of the reasons, suggested by the 
interviewees for this lack of confidence in the independence of non-Big Six audit firms, was 
that they were perceived to provide a more personalised audit service to their clients than Big 
Six audit firms. Both Shockley (1982) and Gul (1991) identified this personalised mode of 
client service as having potential to weaken independence. In addition, interviewees perceived 
that non-Big Six audit firms were more dependent on clients for fee income. This perception 
supports the argument made by Mautz and Sharaf (1961) when they asserted that a large 
audit firm was less dependent on a particular client than a smaller firm because the client's 
fees were usually a smaller proportion of the larger firm's total income and therefore, the 
impact of losing a client was not as great for the larger firm. 
The perceived importance of reputation to the Big Six audit firms provided interviewees with 
a greater confidence that such firms would behave more independently. The importance of 
reputation to the Big Six audit firms has been previously identified in the literature, for 
example, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) recognised the importance of reputation to audit 
firms as an incentive for them to maintain their independence. One further reason identified 
by the interviewees for perceiving Big Six audit firms to be more independent than non-Big 
Six audit firms was that the former firms were part of international groups which they 
believed would impose standards and structures on them to deal with independence issues. 
It could be argued that if the independence of non-Big Six firms is not to be undermined, 
then the auditing profession should consider performing more regular reviews of smaller 
audit practices and reporting on such reviews externally in order that users can have the 
confidence that their independence is being monitored. Although such reviews are currently 
performed by the Joint Monitoring Unit, it does not report externally on the outcome of these 
reviews. An alternative to more intensive monitoring on a general basis might be to restrict 
the audits of certain types of companies to audit firms which were prepared to undergo 
regular monitoring and review in a manner analogous to that used in North America. 
The results from this study, which are consistent with those obtained by McKinley et al. 
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(1985), indicated a significant difference between the perceived reliability of financial 
statements audited by Big Six, rather than by non-Big Six, firms. Financial statements audited 
by the latter firms were perceived to be reliable less frequently than those audited by the 
former firms. Interviewees noted that they had more confidence in the financial statements 
of Plc's because they were audited by the Big Six firms. This supports the assertion made 
by Goldman and Barley (1974) that one of the reasons that companies use larger audit firms 
when they seek a stock exchange listing is because users of financial statements place greater 
confidence in the reports produced by large auditing firms. 
The study also found a significant difference in the perceptions held by respondents with 
some accounting knowledge as compared with those without any such knowledge. Those who 
did not possess any accounting skills or training had less confidence in the independence of 
non-Big Six audit firms and more confidence in the reliability of financial statements audited 
by Big Six audit firms than those with accounting skills and training. Furthermore, 
respondents who had trained with Big Six audit firms perceived non-Big Six auditors to be 
less independent than those respondents who had trained with non-Big Six audit firms. 
Finally, the nature of the work that respondents were engaged in, their age, and the nature 
of their work experience were all associated with significantly different perceptions of the 
independence of non-Big Six audit firms. Analysts were more critical than corporate lenders 
or investment managers and older respondents were more critical than younger respondents 
of the independence of non-Big Six audit firms, arguing that such firms were more likely to 
become closely connected with client management. However, the more responsibility that 
respondents had, the less likely that they were to agree that non-Big Six audit firms were less 
independent than Big Six audit firms67. 
8.4: Audit Market Competition 
In this study, perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability of financial statements 
were also influenced by the level of competition in the audit market. The lower the level of 
67Respondents were deemed to have greater responsibility if they had the authority to 
sanction, rather than to undertake the preliminary review of investment/ lending proposals. 
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competition, the greater the number of questionnaire respondents who perceived the auditor 
to be independent and the financial statements to be reliable. While the impact of audit 
market competition on perceptions of the reliability of financial statements has not been 
previously investigated, the effects of audit market competition on perceptions of auditor 
independence are consistent with those found in the study undertaken by Shockley (1981). 
When interviewees were questioned on the reasons for these perceptions, a significant 
minority of them stated that they were concerned about the impact that a highly competitive 
market would have on audit quality. They perceived that such a market would encourage 
auditors to cut back on the amount of audit work performed or send out more junior audit 
staff to perform the audit. Similar concerns were raised by Carey (1946), the Cohen 
Commission (1978), the Adams Committee (1978), and by Pearson (1980b) when they 
argued that a highly competitive audit market placed time and budget pressures on auditors 
to the extent that auditors were being tempted to omit audit procedures that should be 
performed and that instead of basing their opinions on independent evidence, auditors were 
subjectively relying on management representations. 
Although a significant minority of the interviewees perceived that a highly competitive audit 
market would have an adverse impact on audit quality, the majority did not. Instead, they 
perceived that only the price of the audit would be affected by competition. A number of 
interviewees highlighted the importance that audit firms attach to their reputation as a factor 
that would ensure that audit standards would not be compromised as a result of competition. 
They argued that because the Irish market was small, misbehaviour by auditors would 
become known more quickly in the market place and their reputation would suffer as a result. 
Hence, in such a small market auditors were encouraged to behave independently in order 
to maintain their reputation. In addition, the threat of litigation against auditors and the 
growing awareness of the possibility of such litigation in Ireland provided interviewees with 
confidence that audit standards would not be compromised. 
Other interviewees maintained that although competition encouraged audit firms to tender low 
bids for the audit, standards should not be reduced because the loss in audit income would 
be compensated by way of income from NAS. These interviewees argued that auditors were 
willing to sustain a loss on the audit and maintain audit quality because they would recoup 
230 
these losses by means of NAS income. The implication here is that a poor quality audit will 
result in the loss of both the audit engagement and the lucrative non-audit services. Others 
would argue that in some circumstances management might use the NAS income as a lever 
to obtain a more compliant auditor. 
In addition, the results of the study showed that younger and less experienced respondents 
were less concerned as to the effect of a highly competitive audit market on auditor 
independence than older and more experienced respondents68. The latter respondents 
perceived that in such a market the auditor was more likely to become dependent on the audit 
client and rely on management representations. Finally, the confidence expressed by 
corporate lenders and investment managers in the independence of Big Six audit firms was 
again shown in their discussion of audit market competition. They perceived that a highly 
competitive audit market would not result in the Big Six firms cutting back on the amount 
of audit work that they performed because they believed that such firms were either too 
professional or that their reputation was too important to them to behave in such a manner. 
8.5: Audit Committees 
The results from this study showed that the existence of an audit committee was perceived 
to enhance auditor independence. Interviewees argued that by being involved in the selection, 
remuneration and dismissal of the auditor, the audit committee strengthened auditor 
independence by reducing the power that management could exert over the auditor. This 
benefit of an audit committee has been previously recognised by Goldman and Barley (1974), 
among other writers, and is supported by previous empirical studies69. The interviewees in 
this study believed that company management normally made such auditor-related decisions, 
which were ratified by the shareholders. They viewed this responsibility negatively because 
they perceived that it placed management in a powerful position and led to auditors 
considering management, rather than the shareholders, as their clients. Two interviewees 
"Experience is based on the length of time that respondents have worked. 
"Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Pearson and Ryans, 
1981/82; Schleifer and Shockley, 1990; and Collier, 1992. 
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noted that the relationship which existed between the auditor and the company's directors was 
much closer in a market as small as that which existed in Ireland. The majority of 
interviewees saw the shareholders as being relatively powerless because their interests were 
so diverse and because of the difficulties in organising shareholders to oppose the 
recommendations of management. These viewpoints had been previously expressed by 
Mitchell et al. (1993) when they argued that: 
"Auditors rely upon the management for their appointment ... . Individual 
shareholders have little time to become involved in selection of auditors. Through 
secrecy, influence, apathy and lack of time/interest, the shareholders are asked to 
rubber stamp the directors' choices. Any dissenters are easily defeated by the large 
number of proxy votes exercised by the directors. Not surprisingly, it is the directors 
who are regarded as `clients' by auditors rather than shareholders or stakeholders. " 
(Mitchell et al., 1993, p. 15). 
Interviewees argued that an audit committee enhanced the independence of the auditor by 
providing him/her with an additional communication channel. These findings support the 
arguments of the Cadbury Committee (1992) which maintained that an audit committee had 
the potential to strengthen the position of the auditor, by providing a channel and forum for 
issues of concern to be discussed and by providing a framework within which the auditor can 
assert his/her independence in the event of a dispute with management. In light of these 
perceived benefits of audit committees, perhaps it is time for the auditing profession in 
Ireland to strengthen further their present recommendation that companies establish audit 
committees. 
Although half of the interviewees perceived that the existence of an audit committee would 
enhance the independence of the auditor, a number of interviewees agreed with Lam (1975) 
and AISG (1977) that the independence of the non-executive directors was a critical factor 
if the audit committee was to fulfil its role. It was the experience of five interviewees that 
non-executive directors were not independent. Because audit committees are a relatively new 
phenomenon in Ireland, it was not surprising that their role and relevance had not been fully 
understood by the participants but it was not expected that for certain participants that their 
experience of audit committees would have led to negative feelings as to the independence 
of non-executive directors or to the value of audit committees in enhancing auditor 
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independence. Hence, it could be argued that Irish companies should consider whether the 
cost of what is seen by some users at least as little more than an exercise in public relations, 
is worthwhile. 
The study also showed that the more experienced the respondents, the more concerned they 
were that the lack of an audit committee would result in the auditor succumbing to 
management pressures. In addition, the results from the mail questionnaire indicated a 
significant difference in the perceived reliability of financial statements when an audit 
committee existed than when it did not, with financial statements being perceived as more 
reliable in the former, than in the latter, case. These results are consistent with those 
obtained in the study undertaken by Lam (1976). 
8.6: Audit Tenure 
The length of time that an audit firm is associated with the same client significantly affected 
the perceptions of auditor independence held by respondents in this study. The results showed 
that the longer an audit firm acted for the same client the less independent the auditor and 
the less reliable the financial statements were perceived to be. While these results conflict 
with those obtained in other studies which investigated the effects of audit tenure on 
perceptions of auditor independence, the results are not directly comparable because these 
studies investigated different time periods70. This lack of confidence in auditor independence 
as a result of long audit tenure was explained by the interviewees as being caused by the 
perception that the auditors would become cosy in their relationships with clients and, in that 
way, would become complacent in their audit work. Similar arguments were made by Mautz 
and Sharaf (1961) and Shockley (1982). 
"Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Shockley (1981) and 
Jackson-Heard (1987) which investigated the effects of two tenure periods (5 years and less 
than 5 years), by Pearson and Ryans (1981/82) where the tenure period was not specified, 
and by Schleifer and Shockley (1990) where the tenure period was set at 3 to 5 years. In this 
study the tenure periods were set at 20 years, 10 years and less than 10 years for audit firm 
tenure and at 20 years, 7 years, and less than 7 years for the involvement of individual audit 
personnel. 
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In addition, the results from this study indicated that the length of time that the same audit 
personnel were involved in the audit significantly influenced perceptions held. The longer 
that the same personnel were involved in the audit the less independent the auditor and the 
less reliable the financial statements were perceived to be. While these results which relate 
to perceptions of auditor independence are consistent with those obtained by Pearson and 
Ryans (1981/82) and Schleifer and Shockley (1990), they are not directly comparable because 
neither of these two studies specified the period that the same audit personnel acted on the 
audit. 
In order to determine whether perceptions were more influenced by having the same audit 
firm rather than the same audit personnel involved in the audit, a comparison was made of 
perceptions held under both scenarios. The results indicated that auditors were perceived to 
be more independent and the financial statements more reliable when the same audit firm, 
rather than the same personnel, were involved in the audit for twenty years. This finding can 
be explained by the fact that although interviewees were aware of the problems associated 
with long audit tenure, the majority of them did not favour the rotation of audit firms. They 
argued that the benefit of knowledge associated with long audit tenure outweighed the costs 
(potential loss of independence). This argument has been previously used by the Adams 
Committee (1978) against audit firm rotation. Similar to the Cohen Commission (1978), 
interviewees believed that the rotation of audit personnel was a more practical option than, 
and would achieve the same benefits as, the rotation of audit firms. Currently, CAJEC 
(1995) recommends the regular rotation of audit partners and senior audit personnel for firms 
auditing listed companies. Perhaps, this should now be extended to non-listed companies as 
well as listed companies. In addition, the findings from this study indicated a significant 
enhancement in the perceived independence of the auditor and the perceived reliability of 
financial statements when the length of time that the audit manager acts on the audit is 
limited. It is unclear whether the senior personnel noted in CAJEC's (1995) recommendation 
includes audit managers and some clarification may prove beneficial here. 
The effects of audit tenure on perceptions of auditor independence also varied with 
respondents' age and the nature of their work experience. The older and the more 
responsibility that respondents had, the less concerned they were about long audit tenure. In 
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addition, when the same audit firm was involved in the audit for twenty years, investment 
managers perceived the auditor to be independent more frequently than either analysts or 
corporate lenders. Finally, when the audit was performed by the same audit firm for ten 
years, financial statements were perceived to be reliable more frequently by those 
respondents with some, rather than no, accounting knowledge. When the same personnel had 
been involved in the audit for less than seven years, those respondents who had trained with 
a Big Six firm perceived the financial statements to be reliable more frequently than those 
who had trained with a non-Big Six firm. 
8.7: Provision of NAS 
The majority of questionnaire respondents perceived a reduction in auditor independence 
when NAS were provided to audit clients by audit personnel. Interviewees associated their 
lack of confidence in auditor independence with the audit firm's dependency on such services 
for fee income. This increased fee dependency was one of the reasons given by the 
participants in the studies undertaken by Schulte (1965) and Dermer et al. (1971) to explain 
their lack of confidence in auditor independence when NAS were provided to audit clients 
and has been raised many times subsequently, e. g. Mitchell et al. (1993). The threat to 
auditor independence was significantly less when NAS were provided by a separate 
department within the audit firm or to non-audit clients only. These results are consistent 
with previous empirical studies which have shown that the risk of impairment to auditor 
independence is decreased where personnel providing NAS and audit services are kept 
separate". 
In addition, interviewees noted that one of the reasons that they did not perceive any threat 
to auditor independence from the provision of NAS was because they had assumed that both 
audit and NAS functions were performed by separate personnel. They stressed the importance 
of such separation as a means of ensuring that the independence of the auditor was not 
compromised. Separation of personnel was one of the alternatives to a total ban on the joint 
"Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Schulte, 1965; 
Dermer et al., 1971; Titard, 1971; and Pany and Reckers, 1984. 
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provision of audit and NAS identified by Hillison and Kennelley (1988). A' number of 
interviewees noted that because it was not possible to have separation of these roles- in the 
non-Big Six firms, this resulted in them having less confidence in their independence. This 
lack of separation was the reason that the size of the audit firm was recognised by the 
participants in the studies undertaken by Schulte (1965) and Dermer et al. (1971) as an 
important factor in judging the compatibility of NAS and auditor independence. At present, 
CAJEC (1995) recommends that: 
"if the firm has designed or recommended any part of the system of internal controls 
on which the audit relies, it may be advisable, perhaps in the case of larger 
companies, to arrange little or no common membership between the systems work 
and the audit team. " (CAJEC, 1995: 18 emphasis added) 
It can be observed from the above extract that CAJEC remains rather ambivalent in its 
recommendation. It is unwilling to recommend separation of personnel in all instances and 
only considers the provision of internal control advice as a potential threat to auditor 
independence and only then when it is provided to large companies. Even in these instances, 
complete separation is not recommended by CAJEC. Based on the findings from this study, 
maybe it is time for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) to consider 
revising its ethical guide in respect of the provision of NAS such that audit firms which are 
involved in the provision of NAS, provide such services by a department separate to that of 
the audit department. 
While the majority of respondents in this study favoured the provision of, NAS by a separate 
department in order to maintain auditor independence, this preference was more common 
among corporate lenders than among investment managers or analysts, and among female as 
compared to male respondents. Similar to the results obtained by Pany and Reckers (1983), 
the study found no relationship between respondents' knowledge of the audit function and 
their concern for independence when audit firms provided NAS to audit clients'. 
72No relationship was found when "respondents' knowledge of the audit function" was 
measured in terms of their accounting knowledge or the nature or length of their work 
experience. 
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Although it was recommended by Mitchell et al. (1993) that audit firms be prohibited from 
providing NAS to audit clients as a means of maintaining auditor independence, interviewees 
in this study were not in favour of such a proposal. They believed that the audit firm's 
experience and knowledge would result in the provision of better advice and would ensure, 
through the added information that the auditor would acquire from the provision of NAS, a 
higher standard being applied to the audit and a better audit opinion. A similar argument was 
expressed by the Council of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(1987). 
In addition, the results from this study showed that the method of NAS provision 
significantly affected the perceived reliability of financial statements. Financial statements 
were perceived to be significantly more reliable when NAS was provided by a separate 
department within the audit firm or by an audit firm not involved in the audit than by 
personnel involved in the audit. While previous studies have investigated the impact of NAS 
provision on the perceived reliability of financial statements, the results are not directly 
comparable with those obtained in this study because they were concerned with the effects 
of the size of NAS revenue rather than the method of NAS provision on perceptions of 
financial statement reliability73. 
8.8: Client Employment 
The results of this study showed that perceptions of auditor independence and the reliability 
of financial statements were affected when audit personnel took up positions with audit 
clients. The potential threats to both were greater the more senior the capacity in which the 
person taking up the position with the client had previously on the audit74. Interviewees 
perceived that, in such instances, power could be exerted by the ex-auditor to influence 
auditor-client relationships. This was one of the reasons suggested by Koh and Mahathevan 
(1993) to explain why independence was questioned more when the ex-auditor had previously 
73Refer to Chapter 3, for a discussion of the studies undertaken by McKinley et al. 
(1985) and Pany and Reckers (1988). 
74Seniority being differentiated in terms of audit partner, audit manager and audit 
senior. 
237 
acted in a supervisory rather than in a non-supervisory position on the client's audit. The 
employment of trainee auditors, on the other hand, was not perceived by interviewees to 
impair auditor independence because such individuals would not have been in a senior 
position on the audit and would only have been with the audit firm for a short period of time. 
In addition, the previous and new position of the ex-auditor and the time lapse between acting 
on the audit and taking up the position with the client influenced perceptions of both auditor 
independence and the reliability of the financial statements. The effect was significantly 
greater when (i) the new position was as financial controller rather than as one of the client's 
non-financial personnel; (ii) the time lapse was shorter rather than longer; and (iii) the 
previous audit position had been in a supervisory rather than in a non-supervisory capacity. 
These results, in relation to perceptions of auditor independence, are consistent with those 
obtained in previous studies". While the power argument, as previously discussed, can 
explain why the previous audit position influenced perceptions of auditor independence, it 
does not explain why the new position and the time lapse influenced perceptions. To explain 
the influence of time lapse, interviewees argued that as the years progressed, independence 
would be less threatened by old connections and relationships. In time, new people would 
become involved in the audit and they would not have had any previous connection or 
relationship with the ex-auditors. 
The knowledge that ex-auditors have of the audit firm's techniques has been used by both 
Firth (1981) and Koh and Mahathevan (1993) to explain why respondents in their studies 
perceived independence to be impaired when an auditor takes up an employment position 
with a former client. In this study, the majority of interviewees did not agree with this 
explanation and argued instead either that auditing techniques were not unique to a firm and 
would be known to most individuals without having worked with the firm, or that this 
knowledge could lead to an improved audit. However, some interviewees believed that this 
familiarity with auditing techniques could allow the ex-auditor to hide something from the 
current auditor if s/he so wished. This explains, in part, why the threat to auditor 
"Refer to Chapter 3 for a discussion of the studies undertaken by Warren, 1976; 
Imhoff, 1978; and Koh and Mahathevan, 1993. 
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independence was perceived to be greater when the position taken with the audit client was 
as its financial controller rather than as one of its non-financial personnel. 
The potential threat to auditor independence from a person participating in the conduct of an 
audit in the knowledge that s/he is to join the client was recognised by the participants in this 
study. When asked for their views as to what the auditor should do if a job offer was made 
by the client while undertaking the audit, all interviewees agreed with the recommendation 
made by CAJEC (1995), that s/he should withdraw from the audit immediately in order that 
independence is maintained. 
8.9: Summary 
This study sought to ascertain the perceptions of certain categories of users of audited 
financial statements in Ireland as to the impact of a number of auditor-client relationships on 
auditor independence. The research methodology employed was a mix of mail questionnaire 
and in-depth interviews. The results from the study showed that there was some overall 
concern as to the independence issues addressed among both questionnaire respondents and 
interviewees and they were generally in line with previous empirical research. However, 
these concerns were rarely overwhelming in strength, and notably not so in respect to the 
provision of NAS. Not surprisingly, these concerns were stronger among-those respondents 
who had had specific occasion to doubt auditor independence. The study highlighted the need 
for the ICAI to revise its ethical guidelines which dealt with audit tenure and the provision 
of NAS and to issue stronger recommendations for the establishment of audit committees. 
Participants in the study made a clear distinction between Big Six and non-Big Six audit firms 
and perceived non-Big Six audit firms as being less independent than Big Six audit firms and 
the financial statements audited by the former firms as being less reliable than those audited 
by the latter firms. It may be possible to alter these perceptions of the independence of the 
smaller firms by more proactive monitoring and control by the ICAI. However, whether the 
smaller audit firms would welcome such a move by the ICAI is not clear since there would 
be costs attached to this monitoring and these costs would have to be borne by the smaller 
firms. 
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This study raised a number of important issues which should be considered by the auditing 
profession if it wishes to continue to be self-regulated. For the profession to maintain self- 
regulation, it must instil in users a confidence that high standards are being maintained. 
Implicit in the maintenance of such standards is the notion that auditors are not only 
independent but that they are seen by users of audited financial statements to be independent. 
Hence, the profession must continue to research and redefine independence. 
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Appendix A 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Member 
AIB Group 
ABN AMRO Bank NV Dublin Branch 
Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc 
Ansbacher Bankers Ltd 
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association 
Bank of Ireland 
Banque Nationale de Paris Dublin Branch 
Barclays Bank 
Citibank, NA 
Equity Bank Ltd 
Guinness & Mahon Ltd 
Hill Samuel Bank Ltd 
ICC Bank Plc 
Irish Intercontinental Bank Ltd 
National Irish Bank Ltd 
Scotiabank - The Bank of Nova Scotia 
Smurfit Paribas Bank 
TSB Bank 
Ulster Bank Ltd 
Westdeutsche Landesbank (Irl) Ltd 
Woodchester Investments Bank Plc 
Members of the Irish Bankers Federation 1993/94 
No. of Names 
Provided 
47 
3 
8 
U 
0* 
15 
2 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
* 
A 
ý 
Unwilling to participate. 
1 
3 
3 
2 
0ý 
14 
3 
20 
5 
3 
2 
5 
1 
4 
141 
On 13th March 1996, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc announced that they had 
completed the acquisition of Ansbacher Bankers Ltd (Anglo Irish Bankcorp, 1996: 2). 
In February 1995, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Plc completed the acquisition of the 
loan book of Hill Samuel Ireland (Anglo Irish Bankcorp, 1995: 5). 
252 
Appendix B 
Members of the Irish Association of Investment Managers at 3 October 1995 
Member No. of Names 
Provided 
1. AIB Investment Managers Ltd 
2. Bank of Ireland Asset Management 
3. Eagle Star 
4. ESB Fund Managers Ltd 
5. Friends Provident 
6. GRE 
7. Guinness Mahon Ltd 
8. Hibernian Investment Managers Ltd 
9. Irish Life Assurance Ltd 
10. Irish Progressive Life Assurance 
11. Montgomery Govett 
12. New Ireland Investment Managers Ltd 
13. Norwich Union Finance (Ireland) Ltd 
14. Scottish Provident 
15. Standard Life Assurance 
16. Sun Life of Canada 
17. Ulster Bank Investment Managers Ltd 
* Unwilling to participate. 
1 
5 
I 
o* 
1 
1 
3 
3 
11 
1 
0 * 
2 
1 
1 
1 
I 
I 
34 
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Appendix C 
Four Largest Irish Stockbroking Firms 
Stockbroking Firm No. of Names 
Provided 
Size* 
1995 1996 
%% 
1. Davy Stockbrokers 8 30.9 33.7 
2. NCB Corporate Finance 4 22.7 24.4 
3. Goodbody Stockbrokers 4 24.8 22.1 
4. Riada Stockbrokers = JAI 
2122 946 
* Size is based on their dealings in Irish equity market shares. (Finance Stockbroking 
Survey, 1996). 
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iY WW 
DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
Scoil Ghnö Ollscoil Chathair Bhaile Atha Cliath 
Corporate Lender's Name 
Address 
27th October 1995 
Dear Corporate Lender (Name) 
DUBLIN 9. IRELAND 
Re: Perceptions of Auditor Independence and the effects on the Perceived Reliability 
of Financial Statements in Ireland 
I am a lecturer at Dublin City University Business School and I am writing to you in 
connection with my doctoral research. I am conducting an empirical study relating to the 
perceived independence of external auditors and the impact of independence on the perceived 
reliability of financial statements. The views of corporate lenders are an important part of 
this study and you have been selected as part of a random sample from this profession. 
Independence is defined, for the purposes of this study, as the auditor's ability to be, and be 
seen to be, objective and impartial. The auditor's effectiveness and the perceived reliability 
of the financial statements on which an opinion is expressed is likely to be impaired by any 
belief on the part of a third party that he or she is lacking independence. Independence is, 
therefore, an issue of vital importance to our business community in general, and to the 
accounting profession in particular. 
I should be grateful if you would cooperate with me in this study by completing the attached 
questionnaire. This should require not more than thirty minutes of your time. I can assure 
you that your responses will be treated in the strictest of confidence and that subsequent to 
initial processing, they will not be identifiable to you. 
I will be happy to send you a brief summary report of the results of this study, if you so 
wish. To obtain this report, please indicate to this effect at the end of the questionnaire. 
Again be assured that your responses will remain confidential. 
Many thanks for your assistance and'cooperation in this matter. 
Yours sincerely 
Mary Kilcommins B. Comm, MBS, DPA, ACA. 
Lecturer in Accounting 
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DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL 
AN IRISH STUDY 
ON 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND 
ITS EFFECTS 
ON 
FINANCIAL STATEMENT RELIABILITY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Perceptions of Auditor Independence and the Effects on the 
Perceived Reliability of Financial Statements in Ireland 
Introduction: 
* Information about your views and perceptions are sought in this questionnaire. 
* If possible, please respond to each question, and each part of every question. 
* There are no wrong or right answers - it is your perceptions which are important. 
Explanation of some of the terms that follow: 
(You may wish to refer to these as you complete the questionnaire) 
Auditors: Registered external auditors performing statutory company 
audits. 
4rditor Independence: This is defined as the auditor's ability to be, and be seen to be, 
objective and impartial, i. e., free from bias towards any of the 
parties in relation to whom he or she is acting. 
: je of Audit Firm: Big Six firms include: Arthur Andersen; Coopers and Lybrand; St 
Craig Gardner/ Price Waterhouse; Deloitte and Touche; Ernst 
and Young; and Stokes Kennedy Crowley/ KPMG. 
Non-Big Six firms include all other firms. 
Audit Committee: 
Nonaudit Services (NAS): 
This is a committee composed of non-executive directors whose 
role is to act as a proxy for shareholders in matters concerning 
the audit, including questions of appointment, remuneration and 
accountability of auditors. 
Nonaudit services, or NAS for short, is defined for the 
purposes of this study as the provision of taxation advice, the 
design and installation of financial and cost accounting systems, 
and the provision of corporate financial services. 
liab'l' " Information has the quality of reliability when it is free from 
material error and bias and can be depended upon by users to 
represent faithfully in terms of valid description that which it 
either purports to represent or could reasonably be expected to 
represent. 
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For Questions 1 to 17, please tick one response unless otherwise stated. 
Questions 1 to 5 require general information about yourself. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
how long have you been working as a corporate bank lender? 
(a) Under 5 years 
(b) Between 5 and 10 years 
(c) Over 10 years 
Which of the following statements would best describe the type 
of work that you do? 
(a) Responsible for sanctioning loans 
(b) Reviewing loan applications but the final decision is 
referred to a further authority for approval 
(c) Other (please describe) 
Which of the following age brackets do you fall within? 
(a) Under 30 years 
(b) Between 30 and 40 years 
(c) Between 41 and 50 years 
(d) Over 50 years 
Have you any accounting experience? 
(a) Accounting course at college 
(b) Worked as an accountant 
(c) Qualified Chartered Accountant (ACA/FCA) 
(d) Qualified Certified Accountant (ACCA) 
(e) Qualified Management Accountant (CIMA) 
(0 Other (please specify) 
(If your response to this question is (c), "Qualified Chartered Accountant', 
please answer Question 5" otherwise please go to Question 6") 
Which of the following would best describe the organisation that 
you trained with as a chartered accountant? 
(a) Big Six firm 
(b) Non-Big Six firm 
(c) Other (Please specify) 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
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6. Are there any particular instances, which come to mind, where you 
have suspected a lack of auditor independence? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
7. 
8. 
9. 
(If your response to this question is (b), "No", please go to Question 9: 
otherwise please answer Questions 7 and 8. ) 
() 
() 
In those instances where you have suspected a lack of auditor independence, what 
gave rise to such suspicions? (Please tick any which are appropriate) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(fl (g) 
(h) 
Audit was performed by a Big Six audit firm 
Audit was performed by a non-Big Six audit firm 
Auditor continued in office for the same client for more than 10 years 
Auditor continued in office for the same client for less than 10 years 
The company did not have an audit committee 
Audit firm provided nonaudit services to the audit client company 
Disproportionate audit fee income 
Other (please specify) 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
Over the past five years, would you say that the number of cases, where 
you have suspected lack of independence has: 
(a) increased significantly? 
(b) increased to some extent? 
(c) remained constant? 
(d) decreased to some extent? 
(e) decreased significantly? 
Do you use audited financial statements for lending decisions? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
(If your response to this Question is (d), "Rarely", or (e), "Never", 
please go to Question 18. otherwise please go to Question 1 D. ) 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
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10. What importance do you attach to audited financial statements for 
lending decisions? 
(a) Very important () 
(b) Important () 
(c) Moderately important () 
(d) Slightly important () 
(e) Unimportant () 
11. When using audited financial statements for lending decisions, do you 
specifically consider their reliability? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
{If your response to this question is (d), "Rarely", or (e), "Never', 
please go to Question 14, otherwise please go to Question 12. ) 
12. In assessing the reliability of the financial statements, how often 
do you specifically consider the independence of the auditor? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
13. 
(If your response to this question is (d), "Rarely", or (e), "Never", 
please go to Question 14, otherwise please go to Question 13. ) 
If you perceived the auditor not to be independent, how would this impact 
on your assessment of the reliability of the audited financial statements? 
(a) Increase significantly 
(b) Increase to some extent 
(c) Remain constant 
(d) Decrease to some extent 
(e) Decrease significantly 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
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14. In deciding on the amount to lend to a company, how often do you 
specifically consider the independence of the auditor? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
15. 
16. 
17. 
(If you response to this question is (d), "Rarely", or (e), "Never", 
please go to Question 16, otherwise please go to Question 15. ) 
If you perceived the auditor no to be independent, how would this impact 
on the amount that you would lend to a company? 
(a) Lend more 
(b) No effect 
(c) Lend less 
(d) Would not lend at all 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
Do you specifically consider the independence of the auditor when deciding 
on the use of alternative sources of financial information about the company? 
(a) Always () 
(b) Often () 
(c) Sometimes () 
(d) Rarely () 
(e) Never () 
(If your response to this question is (d), "Rarely", or (e), "Never", 
please go to Question 18, otherwise please go to Question 17. ) 
If you perceived the auditor o to be independent, how would this impact 
on your requirement for alternative sources of information about the company? 
(a) Increase significantly 
(b) Increase to some extent 
(c) Remain constant 
(d) Decrease to some extent 
(e) Decrease significantly 
() 
() 
() 
() 
() 
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For Questions 18 to 28, please indicate your level of agreement, by circling the 
appropriate number on a scale of 1 to 5. 
1= Strongly agree (SA) 
2= Agree (A) 
3= Undecided (U) 
4= Disagree (D) 
5= Strongly disagree (SD) 
Agreement Level 
SA----A----U----D----SD 
18. An auditor's independence is likely to be impaired if 
the auditor: 
(a) becomes dependent on the audit client? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) becomes closely connected with client 
management? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) succumbs to management pressures in relation 
to the treatment of contentious issues? 1------2------3------4------5 
19. An auditor is more likely to become dependent on the 
audit client when the: 
(a) audit is performed by a non-Big Six audit firm? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) audit market is highly competitive? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) client does not have an audit committee? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) auditor provides NAS to the audit client? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) auditor continues in office for the same client 
over a prolonged period of time? 1------2------3------4------5 
20. An auditor is more likely to become closely connected 
with client management when the: 
(a) audit is performed by ä non-Big Six audit firm? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) audit market is highly competitive? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) client does not have an audit committee? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) auditor provides NAS to the audit client? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) auditor continues in office for the same client 
over a prolonged period of time? 1------2------3------4------5 
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Agreement Level 
SA----A----U----D----SD 
21. An auditor is more likely to succumb to management 
pressures in relation to contentious issues when the: 
(a) audit is performed by a non-Big Six audit firm? 1------2------3------4----__5 
(b) audit market is highly competitive? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) client does not have an audit committee? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) auditor provides NAS to the audit client? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) auditor continues in office for the same client 
over a prolonged period of time? 1------2------3------4------5 
22. Non-Big Six audit firms when compared with Big Six 
audit firms: 
(a) 
(b) 
23. 
are less independent? 
tend towards a more personalised mode of client 
service? 
The greater the level of competition which exists in 
the auditing environment, the more likely it is that 
auditors will: 
1------2------3------4------5 
1------2------3------4------5 
(a) be less independent? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) omit audit procedures that should be performed? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) rely on management representations? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) be replaced by less rigorous auditors? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) tender artificially low prices to obtain the audit? 1------2------3------4------5 
24. When an auditor continues in office for the same 
client over a prolonged period of time, the: 
25. 
(a) auditor will be less independent? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) client will consider the auditor as more valuable? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) client's dependence on the auditor will increase? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) the auditor will be less innovative regarding 
auditing techniques? 1------2------3------4------5 
The independence of the auditor is enhanced if a 
company's audit committee is responsible for the: 
(a) selection of the auditor? 
(b) determination of the auditors' fees? 
(c) dismissal of the auditor? 
1------2------3------4------5 
1------2------3------4------5 
1------2------3------4------5 
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26. The existence of an audit committee in a company 
ensures that the auditor is less likely to: 
Agreement Level 
SA ----A ----U----D SD 
(a) be independent? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) rely on management representations? 1------2------3------4------5 
27. The independence of the auditor, for the purposes 
of the audit, is decreased if NAS is: 
(a) provided to audit clients by personnel 
involved in the audit? 25 
(b) provided to audit clients by a separate 
department within the audit firm? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) provided to non-audit clients only? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) not provided at all? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) provided by the auditor to all clients but 
full disclosure is made in the client's 
financial statements? 
28. As the level of NAS provided by the auditor 
to an audit client increases, the auditor [nay: 
1------2------3 ------4------5 
(a) in effect become an employee of the company? 1------2------3------4------5 
(b) have a financial interest in the success of the 
business? 1------2------3------4------5 
(c) hesitate qualifying the audit report in fear of 
losing the revenue generated by NAS? 1------2------3------4------5 
(d) be placed in a position of auditing his/her 
own decisions? 1------2------3------4------5 
(e) have an increased ability to withstand client 
pressure? 1------2------3------4------5 
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Questions 29 to 36 refer to a variety of audit situations. For each situation, please 
indicate how often you would consider the auditor to be independent. by circling the 
appropriate number on a scale of 1 to 5. 
1= Always (A) 
2= Often (0) 
3= Sometimes (S) 
4= Rarely (R) 
5= Never (N) 
29. You have been informed that the company 
has had the same audit firm for: 
Auditor Considered 
to be Independent 
A- -0-------S-------It"- N 
(a) 20 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) 10 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) less than 10 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
30. You have been informed that the partner in 
charge of the company's audit has been in 
charge for: 
31. 
32. 
(a) 20 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) less than 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
You have been informed that the manager in 
charge of the company's audit has been in 
charge for: 
(a) 20 years 1--------2----"---3--------4--------5 
(b) 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) less than 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
You have been informed that during the 
current audit, the company made an offer 
of employment to the: 
(a) audit partner 
(b) audit manager 
(c) audit senior 
1--------2--------3 --------4--------5 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
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Auditor Considered 
to be Independent 
A-------0-------S-------R-------N 
33. It has come to your attention that the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a 
supervisory position on the company's audit 
which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
34. It has come to your attention that the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a 
non-supervisory position on the company's 
audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
35. It has come to your attention that one of the 
company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted in a supervisory position 
on the company's audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
36. It has come to your attention that one of 
the company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted in a non-supervisory position 
on the company's audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 
(c) over 18 months ago 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
267 
Perceptions of Auditor Independence and the Effects on the 
Perceived Reliability of the Financial Statements in Ireland 
Questions 37 to 48 refer to a variety of audit situations. For each situation, please 
indicate how often you would consider the financial statements to be reliable. by 
circling the appropriate number on a scale of 1 to 5. 
1= Always (A) 
2= Often (0) 
3= Sometimes (S) 
4= Rarely (R) 
5= Never (N) 
37. From a company's financial statements, you 
observe that the audit is performed by a: 
38. 
39. 
Financial Statements Considered 
to be Reliable 
A-------0- S-------R-------N 
(a) Big Six audit firm 1-----"--2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) Non-Big Six audit firm 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
The audit of a company is undertaken in an 
audit environment which is considered to: 
(a) be highly competitive 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) have low competition 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
From the company's audited financial 
statements, you note that the company: 
(a) has an audit committee 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) does not have audit committee 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
40. You have been informed that NAS has been 
provided to the company by: 
(a) personnel involved in the audit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) a separate department within the firm 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) an audit firm not involved in the audit 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(d) the auditor to all clients, but full disclosure 
is made in the client's financial statementsl--------2--------3--------4--------5 
41. You have been informed that the company 
has had the same audit firm for: 
(a) 20 years 1-"------2--------3"-------4--------5 
(b) 10 years 1--------2" ------3--------4------ -5 (c) less than 10 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
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42. You have been informed that the partner 
in charge of the company's audit has 
been in charge for: 
Financial Statements Considered 
to be Reliable 
A-------0-------S-------R-------N 
(a) 20 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) less than 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
43. You have been informed that the manager 
in charge of the company's audit has 
been in charge for: 
(a) 20 years 1--------2--------3--------4----"---5 
(b) 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) less than 7 years 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
44. It has come to your attention that during the 
current audit, the company made an offer of 
employment to the: 
(a) audit partner 1--------2--------3----____4----"---5 
(b) audit manager 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) audit senior 1--------2-------- 3--------4-------"5 
45. It has come to your attention that the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a 
supervisory position on the company's audit 
which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
46. You have been informed that the company's 
financial controller had previously acted in a 
non-supervisory position on the company's 
audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--- 3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
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Financial Statements Considered 
to be Reliable 
A-------0-------S-------R-------N 
47. You have been informed that one of the 
company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted in a supervisory position 
on the company's audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
48. It has come to your attention that one of the 
company's non-financial personnel had 
previously acted in a non-supervisory position 
on the company's audit which was conducted: 
(a) less than 6 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(b) between 6 and 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
(c) over 18 months ago 1--------2--------3--------4--------5 
Please use this space for any additional comments on the issues addressed by this 
questionnaire. If needed, please use the back of this page as well. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------ýý_ý- - ____------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- -- --------------- -- -- - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-------------- --------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
- 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Would you like to receive a summary of the findings, when available? Yes () 
No () 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
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Wording of Questions Altered to Reflect Specific Nature of Respondents' Work 
Q 1. How long have you been working as an investment manager/ analyst? 
(a) Under 5 years 
(b) Between 5 and 10 years 
(c) Over 10 years 
Q 2. Which of the following statements would best describe the type of work that you do? 
(a) Responsible for sanctioning investments? 
(b) Reviewing investment proposals but the final decision is referred to a further 
authority 
(c) Other 
Q 9. Do you use audited financial statements for investment decisions? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
Q 10. What importance do you attach to audited financial statements for investment 
decisions? 
(a) Very important 
(b) Important 
(c) Moderately important 
(d) Slightly important 
(e) Unimportant 
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Q 11. When using audited financial statements for investment decisions, do you specifically 
consider their reliability? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
Q 14. In deciding on the amount to be invested in a company, how often do you specifically 
consider the independence of the auditor? 
(a) Always 
(b) Often 
(c) Sometimes 
(d) Rarely 
(e) Never 
Q 15. If you perceived the auditor not to be independent, how would this impact on the 
amount that you would recommend for investment in a company? 
(a) Recommend more 
(b) No effect 
(c) Recommend less 
(d) Would not recommend at all 
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Interview Guide 
Demographics: 
* Length of time working as corporate lender/investment manager/ analyst 
* Description of work 
responsible for sanctioning loans/investments 
- final decision is referred to a further authority 
other 
* Accounting experience 
* Worked with a Big Six firm 
Use of financial statements: 
* Frequency 
* Importance 
* Reliability 
* Independence of auditor affect 
reliability 
loan/investment decision 
alternative sources of information used 
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Independence: 
* Ever suspected a lack of auditor independence 
* What gave rise to such suspicions 
Specific Independence Issues: 
* Size of Audit Firm 
Big Six/non-Big Six 
dependency 
closely connected with management 
* Competition in the Audit Market 
tendering 
lowballing 
succumb to management pressure 
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* Audit Committees 
selection of auditor 
deal with audit issues 
NEDS 
* Audit Tenure 
familiarity 
dependency 
less innovative 
rotation of audit partner/manager 
rotation of audit firm 
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* Nonaudit Services 
provision of taxation, corporate finance and computer advice 
- dependency: fees 
- succumb to management pressures 
- separate department 
- prohibit 
* Client Employment 
familiarity with audit techniques 
relationships with current auditors 
seniority of audit personnel 
time lag 
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General: 
* Characteristics of the Irish Market 
Small 
Reputation 
Litigation 
* Audit Regulation 
Self-regulated 
Ethical Rules 
Government intervention 
* Relationships with Auditors 
Communicate directly 
Rely on strong management 
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Interview Matrices 
Matrix 1: Importance of Financial Statements for Decision Making Purposes 
a b c d e f g h 
L1   
L2    
L3   
IA    
L5  
L6   
L7- 
8 LL   
L9    
L10    
Lil   
L12   / 
L13    
L14   
L15   
(Refer to Key Code on p. 281) 
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Matrix 1 (cont. ) 
a b c d e f g h 
IM1   
IM2   
IM3    
IM4   
IM5   
IM6   
IM7   
IM8   
Al   
A2  
A3   ,  
A4   
AS  
A6  
A7  
Total 13 14 3 8 12 5 5 3 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 281) 
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Matrix 1 (cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Financial statements are crucial to our decisions. 
b: Would not make a decision without first seeing the financial statements. 
c: Financial statements help us to see the complete picture. 
d: Financial statements are used to confirm what we already know about the company. 
e: Financial statements are not the only criterion that we would use. 
f: Financial statements are not the decision making tool. 
g: As a follow on from (e) or (f), interviewees stated that they would also assess the 
management of the company, or review the company's management accounts. 
h: Additional responses: 
L13 stated that financial statements would be used in conjunction with information 
which pertains to the present and the future. 
Al stated that financial statements were important particularly if they included a 
qualified auditor's report. 
A7 stated that one would look behind the financial statements and make adjustments. 
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Matrix 2: Previous Instances where Auditors were Suspected not to be Independent 
a b c d c f g 
L1    
L3   
L5  
L6  
L7   
L9  
L13  
L15  
IM3  
IM4  
IM5  
IM6  
IM7   
A2    
A3   
A7   
Total 5 5 5 6 2 1 2 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 283) 
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Matrix 2 (cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Audits performed by non-Big Six firms. 
b: The size of fees relative to the size of the audit firm. 
c: The influence that directors of companies exert over the auditors. 
d: The size of the company relative to the size of the audit firm. 
e: Provision of NAS by audit firms. 
f: Relationship between auditors and management. 
g: Audits performed by Big Six firms. 
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Matrix 3: Audit Firm Size and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d e f g h i 
L1  
L2   
L3    
L4    
L5    
L6    
L7  
L8   
L9     
L10    
L11   
L12    
L13   
L14     
L15    
(Refer. to Key Code on p. 286) 
284 
Appendix G 
Matrix 3 (cont. ) 
a b c d e f g h i 
IM1  
IM2      
IM3   
IM4    
IM5   
IM6  
IM7   
IM8    
Al  
A2  
A3    
A4    
A5  
A6   
A7  
Total 23 6 11 6 4 7 7 3 3 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 286) 
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Matrix 3 (cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: More confidence in the independence of Big Six firms than in non-Big Six firms. 
b: Size does not influence our perceptions of auditor independence. 
c: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because the former firms 
are more dependent on fees. 
d: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because of the lack of 
structures in place in non-Big Six firms. 
e: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because the former firms 
offer a more personalised mode of client service. 
f: Confidence in the independence of Big Six firms because of the importance of their 
reputation to them. 
g: Big Six firms deal with higher profile companies than non-Big Six firms, and 
therefore, have more confidence in them. 
h: Would extend our confidence beyond the Big Six firms to include the medium sized 
firms. 
i: Additional responses: 
L4 stated that he had more confidence in the independence of the Big Six firms 
because they were more professional than non-Big Six firms. 
IM8 stated that he had more confidence in the independence of Big Six firms because 
they had a greater spread of expertise. 
A7 stated that he had no confidence in the independence of Big Six firms because 
they provide NAS to audit clients. 
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Matrix 4: Audit Market Competition and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d e f g 
L1    
L2  
L3   
L4   
L5   
L6  
L7  
L8   
L9    
L10  
L11  
L12   
L13   
L14     
L15   
(Refer to Key Code on p. 289) 
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Matrix 4 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g 
IMi  
IM2  
IM3    
IM4     
IM5  
IM6  
IM7   
IM8    
Al   
A2   
A3  
A4  
A5  
A6  
A7   
Total 3 7 6 5 12 4 8 5 5 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 289) 
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Matrix 4 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: High competition is good. 
b: High competition affects audit fee income and not audit quality. 
c: High competition would not encourage Big Six firms to cut back on the amount of 
audit work performed because it may result in a sacrifice of their professionalism. 
d: High competition may result in a cut in audit income but this is more than 
compensated for by way of income from NAS. 
e: High competition may lead to cutbacks in the amount of audit work undertaken. 
f: High competition may result in Big Six firms sending out more junior audit staff. 
g: High competition would not result in Big Six firms cutting back on the amount of 
work that they would perform because it may result in them losing their reputation. 
h: High competition would not lead to cutbacks in the amount of audit work undertaken. 
is High competition would not lead to cutbacks in the audit work undertaken because 
auditors fear litigation. 
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Matrix 5" Auditor Appointment 
a b c d 
L1   
L2   
L3   
IA  
L5   
L6   
L7   
L8  
L9  
L10    
L11   
L12   
L13   / 
L14  
L15   
(Refer to Key Code on p. 292) 
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Matrix 5 (Cont. ) 
a b c d 
IM1   
IM2   
IM3    
IM4   
IM5   
IM6   
IM7   ./ 
IM8   
Al    
A2  
A3   
A4  / 
A5   
A6   
A7    
Total 22 21 10 8 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 292) 
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Matrix 5 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Directors appoint auditors. 
b: Shareholders have little to no involvement in auditor issues. They only ratify the 
directors' decision. 
C: The directors are seen to be the auditor's client because they pay the auditor. 
d: Shareholders have no power because their interests are so diversified. 
292 
Appendix G 
Matrix 6: Audit Committees and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d c f g 
L1   
L2  
L3     
IA  
L5    
L6   
L7  
L8  
L9  
L10    
L11     
L12   
L13 
L14   
L15    / 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 295) 
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I 
Matrix 6 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g Ii 
IMl   
IM2     
IM3     
IM4    
IM5     
IM6  / 
IM7 
IM8     
Al   
A2     
A3    
A4   
A5  
A6  
A7   
Total 16 7 3 14 13 7 6 5 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 295) 
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Matrix 6 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Audit committees enhance auditor independence. 
b: Audit committees may enhance auditor independence depending on the role played 
by the non-executive directors. 
C: Audit committees may enhance auditor independence if the non-executive directors 
are independent. 
d: Audit committees provide auditors with an additional channel of communication. 
e: Audit committees should be responsible for auditor appointment/ remuneration. 
f: Audit committees are made up of independent non-executive directors. 
g: Audit committees are not relevant for the smaller company. 
h: Audit committees should enhance auditor independence but based on their experience 
of such committees, interviewees believed that this objective was not achieved. 
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Matrix 7: Audit Tenure and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d e f g li 
L1    No 
L2    No 
L3   Yes 
LA  No 
L5  No  
L6    No 
L7    No 
L8  No  
L9    No 
L10    No 
L11     No 
L12   No  
L13   No 
L14  No 
L15   No  
(Refer to Key Code on p. 298) 
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Matrix 7 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g li 
IM1    No 
IM2   No 
IM3   Yes 
IM4    Yes 
IM5  No 
IM6   No 
IM7  No  
1M8   Yes 
Al    Yes 
A2  No 
A3   No 
A4    No  
A5  No 
A6  No 
A7  Yes 
Total 16 12 4 12 13 5 24 No 
6 Yes 7 
6 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 298) 
297 
Appendix G 
Matrix 7 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: 
b: 
C: 
d: 
e: 
f: 
g: 
h: 
Favoured long audit tenure because it ensures that the auditor has a good knowledge 
of the company's business. 
Long audit tenure may result in the development of a cosy relationship between the 
auditor and company management. 
Long audit tenure may result in a staleness in the audit approach. 
Favour the rotation of audit personnel because it ensures that no cosy relationship will 
develop between the auditor and company management. 
Favour the rotation of audit personnel because it brings a freshness to the audit. 
Not in favour of rotating audit personnel if independence at issue. 
Favour the rotation of audit firms (Yes/No). 
Audit regulation ensures that standards are not compromised because of long audit 
tenure. 
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Matrix 8: Provision of NAS and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d e f g 11 i 
L1 No  No Yes A NE 
L2 No  No Yes A P 
L3 No  No Yes A R 
L4 No  No Yes A R 
L5 No No Yes A P 
L6 No   No Yes A NE 
L7 No    No Yes A NE 
L8 No No Yes A NE 
L9 No No Yes A C 
L10 No  No Yes A R 
FLI 
Yes Yes No D I 
L12 No  No Yes A P 
L13 No  No Yes A NE 
L14 No No Yes A P 
L15 No  No Yes A P 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 301) 
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Matrix 8 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g 
IMl No No Yes A NE 
IM2 No No Yes A P 
IM3 No  No Yes A P 
IM4 No  No Yes A C 
IM5 No  No Yes A R 
IM6 Yes Yes No D I 
IM7 No  No Yes A NE 
IM8 No    No Yes A R 
Al No No Yes A NE 
A2 Yes No Yes D I 
A3 No Yes Yes A P 
A4 No No Yes A C 
A5 No   No Yes A NE 
A6 No No Yes A NE 
A7 Yes Yes No D I 
Total 26 No 
4 Yes 
9 4 3 6 26 No 
4 Yes 
3 No 
27Yes 
26 A 
4D 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 301) 
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Matrix 8 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: The provision of NAS perceived to decrease independence (Yes/No). 
b: The non-Big Six firms do not separate audit from NAS and are perceived to be less 
independent as a result. 
c: Interviewees would have recommended to companies to seek NAS from audit firms 
because they are the persons with such expertise. 
d: The provision of NAS is good because it ensures that the standards applied to the 
audit will be high. 
e: The provision of NAS is good because it ensures that the auditor had a good 
knowledge of the company's business. 
f: Audit firms should be prohibited from providing NAS to audit clients - Yes/No. 
g: The provision of NAS should be by separate personnel within the audit firm - 
Yes/No. 
h: The provision of NAS would not result in the auditor hesitating to qualify the audit 
report or succumbing to management pressures (A: Agree; D: Disagree). 
i: Their reasons for agreeing/ disagreeing fell into the following categories: 
NE: 
P: 
R: 
C: 
I: 
No evidence to suggest that they are behaving in this manner (n=10). 
Auditors are too professional to behave in this manner (n=8). 
Their reputation is too important to behave in this manner (n=5). 
Audit firms have sufficient checks to ensure that audit standards are not 
being compromised (n=3). 
There is an incentive in terms of fee income for them to behave in this 
manner (n=4). 
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Matrix 9: Client Employment and Perceived Auditor Independence 
a b c d e f g 
L1  N    
L2  D      
L3  D      
L4  D   ý/ 
L5 D      
L6 Y    
L7  N    
L8 N    
L9  D     
L10  N  / 
L11 Y   
L12 Y    
L13  N   ý/ 
L14  N    
L15 N  ý/ 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 304) 
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Matrix 9 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g h i 
IM1  N   
IM2 N       
IM3 D   
IM4  N     
IM5 N  
IM6  Y   
IM7 Y    
IM8  N     
Al N   
A2  N    
A3  N    
A4  N  ý/ 
A5 N  
A6 N   
A7  N  
Total 17 19 N 
5Y 
6D 
13 11 8 10 7 10 30 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 304) 
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Matrix 9 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate Lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Natural progression for trainee auditors to move onto industry and commerce. 
b: Client employment is perceived to impair auditor independence (Y: Yes; N: No; 
D: Depends). 
C: Lack of power of individuals leaving audit firm. 
d: Audit techniques not unique to audit firm. 
e: In earlier years, independence may be impaired but not as the years progress and new 
persons become involved in the audit. 
f: Independence may be impaired if the person leaving the audit firm is a senior person. 
g: Client employment can impact on auditor independence based on the ex-auditor's 
knowledge of auditing techniques. 
h: Client employment can work to the benefit of the company and to the standard of 
audit performed. 
is If offer of employment made during the current audit, the auditor should withdraw 
from the audit because there is a conflict of interest. 
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Matrix 10: Assessment of the Reliability of Financial Statements 
a b c d e f 
L1  
L2   
L3  
L4  
L5   
L6  
L7  
L8  
L9  
L10  
L11  
L12  
L13  
L14  
L15  
(Refer to Key Code on p. 307) 
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Matrix 10 (Cont. ) 
a b c d c f 
IM1  
IM2   
IM3  
IM4   
IM5  
IM6  
IM7  
IM8  
Al  
A2  
A3   
A4  
A5  
A6  
A7   
Total 
J8 
9 8 4 6 1 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 307) 
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Matrix 10 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: 
b: 
C: 
d: 
e: 
Financial statements at PLC level are reliable because of the Stocks Exchange 
requirements. 
Financial statements at non-PLC level are not reliable because they are prepared for 
taxation purposes and are, therefore, understated. 
Financial statements are reliable because they are audited. 
Financial statements are reliable if the information coincides with our expectations. 
The reliability of financial statements is not specifically assessed. Instead, we assess 
the management of the company and use this as a proxy for the reliability of financial 
statements. 
f: Based on past experience, never assume that financial statements are reliable. 
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Matrix 11: Effects of a Perceived Lack of Auditor Independence on the 
Reliability of Financial Statements 
a b c d 
L1  
L2  
L3  
L4  
L5  
L6  
L7  
L8  
L9  
L10  
L11  
L12  
L13  
L14  
L15  
(Refer to Key Code on p. 310) 
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Matrix 11 (Cont. ) 
a b c d 
IM1  
IM2  
IM3  
IM4  
IM5  
IM6  
IM7  
IM8  
Al  
A2  
A3  
A4  
A5  
A6  
A7  
Total 21 6 1 2 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 310) 
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Matrix 11 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: 
b: 
C: 
d: 
If auditor perceived not to be independent, financial statements perceived to be less 
reliable. 
The independence of the auditor is not considered in our assessment of the reliability 
of financial statements. 
If the auditor is perceived not to be independent this would have no effect on my 
assessment of the reliability of financial statements because it is more my view of 
management than of the auditor which is important in such as assessment. 
The effect of a lack of auditor independence on the reliability of the financial 
statements is dependent on the level that independence is lacking. 
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Matrix 12: Effects of a Perceived Lack of Auditor Independence on 
Decision Making 
a b c d c 
L1  
L2  
L3  
L4  
L5  
L6  
L7  
L8 
L9  
L10  
L11  
L12  
L13  
L14  
L15  
(Refer to Key Code on p. 313) 
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Matrix 12 (Cont. ) 
a b c d c 
IM1  
IM2  
IM3  
IM4  
IM5  
IM6  
IM7  
IM8  
Al  
A2  
A3  
A4  
A5  
A6 
A7  
Total 12 6 5 3 4 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 313) 
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Matrix 12 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: If we perceived the auditor not to be independent, then we would not lend/ invest. 
b: If we perceived the auditor not to be independent we may or may not lend/ invest 
depending on the level of non-independence. 
C: If we perceived the auditor not to be independent we may or may not lend/ invest. 
The decision would depend on the outcome from the additional information that we 
would seek. 
d: It would be unusual for us to worry about the independence of the auditor in making 
such lending/ investment decisions. 
e: The independence of the auditor is not important for such decisions. Our assessment 
of management is more important. 
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Matrix 13: Size of Irish Market 
a b c d c f 
L1  
L2   
L3   
L4  
L5  
L6  
L7   
L8    
L9   
L10   
L11   
L12  ý/ 
L13  
L14   
L15    
(Refer to Key Code on p. 316) 
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Matrix 13 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f 
IM1    
IM2   
IM3    
IM4    
IM5  
IM6  %/ 
IM7   
IM8  
Al   
A2   
A3   
A4   / 
A5   
A6  
A7  
Total 7 23 3 15 7 2 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 316) 
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Matrix 13 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Not discussed at interview. 
b: Irish audit market is small. 
C: Less independence in a small market because closer relationships develop between the 
auditor and the client or the auditor is more lenient to clients so as not to lose 
accounts. 
d: Small market encourages independent behaviour because should auditors misbehave, 
the market will find out about this earlier than in a larger market and auditors will 
fear losing their reputations. 
e: Small market encourages independent behaviour because of the limited number of 
clients available to auditors. They must behave if they are to maintain these clients. 
f: Lack of evidence in an Irish context, of auditors not behaving independently. 
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Matrix 14: Fear of Litigation 
a b c d e f 
L1  
L2  
L3  
L4  
L5  
L6    
L7  
L8  
L9  ý/ 
L10  
Lil  
ý/ 
L12  
L13  ý/ 
L14  ý/ 
L15  ý/ 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 319) 
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Matrix 14 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f 
IM1  
IM2 , 
IM3 ` 
IM4   
IM5   
IM6  
IM7    
IM8    
Al  
A2  
A3  
A4  
A5   
A6  
A7   
Total 11 3 16 4 9 2 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 319) 
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Matrix 14 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Issue not addressed at interview. 
b: Auditors do not fear litigation in Ireland. 
c: Auditors are beginning to fear litigation in Ireland. 
d: This fear of litigation is related to the high cost of professional indemnity insurance 
that they have to carry. 
e: Their fear of litigation encourages them to behave more independently. 
f: Their fear of litigation does not encourage them to behave more independently. 
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Matrix 15: Audit Regulation 
a b c d f g 
L1   
L2  
L3  
IA  
L5    
L6    
L7    
L8   
L9    
L10   
L11    
L12   
L13     
L14   
L15    
(Refer to Key Code on p. 322) 
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Matrix 15 (Cont. ) 
a b c d e f g 
IM1  
IM2    
IM3    
IM4      
IM5    
IM6   ,/ 
IM7    ,/ 
IM8    
Al  
A2  
A3   
A4   
A5  
A6  
A7  ý/ 
Total 7 19 15 7 4 2 3 8 5 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 322) 
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Matrix 15 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
L: Corporate lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Issue not addressed at interviews. 
b: Favour self-regulation. 
C: Profession's past record at regulating itself has proved to be successful. 
d: Profession has the expertise to regulate itself. 
e: Favour independent regulation because it is healthier. 
f: Favour independent regulation because it results in higher standards. 
g: Self-regulatory body will not impose undue penalties on itself. 
h: No evidence to suggest that outside regulation necessary. 
i: Additional responses: 
L6 did not think that there had been many cases recently which would have brought 
the profession in to disrepute. 
L7 argued that independent regulation would just result in more bureaucracy. 
IM4 perceived that self-regulation was preferable to a very complicated framework 
of legislation because if people feel that they are being regulated by the law, then they 
comply with the letter of the law and forget about the spirit of the law. 
IM7 believed that another tier of supervision would not be of any benefit. 
A4 believed that the ultimate penalty is that if their reputation is on the line, they will 
take this very seriously. 
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Matrix 16: Impact of Group on the Perceived Importance of Financial Statements 
Group a b c d c f g 
L 60% 73% 13% 7% 47% 7% 20% 
n=15 
IM 50% 38% 13% 25% 25% 50% 13% 
n=8 
A 0% 0% 0% 71% 43% 0% 14% 
n=7 
Key to Code: 
L: Lenders 
IM: Investment managers 
A: Analysts 
a: Financial statements are crucial to our decisions (n=13). 
b: Would not make a decision without first seeing the financial statements (n=14). 
c: Financial statements help us to see the complete picture (n=3). 
d: Financial statements are used to confirm what we already know about the company 
(n = 8). 
e: Financial statements are not the only criterion that we would use (n=12). 
f: Financial statements are not the decision making tool (n=5). 
g: As a follow on from (e) or (f), interviewees stated that they would also assess the 
management of the company, or review the company's management accounts (n=5). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage 
of the total number of interviewees per group, e. g. - Lender (a): 9/15=60% (taken 
from Matrix 1). 
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Matrix 17: Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack 
of Auditor Independence on Responses relating to Audit Firm Size 
Group: 
FF--7 a b c d c f g h 
L 93% 7% 40% 13% 20% 33% 33% 13% 
n=15 
IM 75% 25% 50% 25% 13% 13% 13% 13% 
n=8 
A 43% 43% 14% 29% 0% 14% 14% 0% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d c f g 11 
<40 81% 19% 52% 24% 10% 24% 24% 14% 
n=21 
>40 67% 22% 0% 11% 22% 22% 22% 0% 
n=9 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 326) 
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Matrix 17 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
a b c d e f g li 
(i) 67% 33% 44% 22% 0% 0% 22% 22% 
n=9 
(ii) 71% 21% 29% 21% 14% 36% 21% 7% 
n=14 
(iii) 100% 0% 43% 14% 29% 29% 29% 0% 
n=7 
Perviously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
a b c d f g 1i 
Yes 75% 19% 44% 19% 13% 13% 13% 19% 
n=16 
No 78% 21% 29% 21% 14% 36% 36% 0% 
n=14 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 326) 
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Matrix 17 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: More confidence in the independence of Big Six firms than in non-Big Six firms 
(n=23). 
b: Size does not influence our perceptions of auditor independence (n=6). 
C: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because the former firms 
are more dependent on fees (n=11). 
d: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because of the lack of 
structures in place in the former firms (n=6). 
e: Non-Big Six firms are less independent than Big Six firms because the former firms 
offer a more personalised mode of client service (n=4). 
f Confidence in the independence of Big Six firms because of the importance of their 
reputation to them (n=7). 
g: Big Six firms deal with higher profile companies than non-Big Six firms, and 
therefore, have more confidence in them (n=7). 
h: Would extend our confidence beyond the Big Six firms to include the medium sized 
firms (n=3). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g. Group - Lender (a): 14/15 =93 %, taken from 
Matrix 3. 
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Matrix 18: Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack of 
Auditor Independence on Responses relating to Audit Market Competition 
Group: 
a b c d e f g 1i 
L 13% 33% 33% 20% 33% 13% 20% 27% 0% 
n=15 
IM 0% 13% 13% 25% 38% 13% 50% 13% 38% 
n=8 
A 14% 14% 0% 0% 57% 14% 14% 0% 29% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d e f g 
<40 10% 24% 14% 14% 48% 10% 24% 19% 14% 
n=21 
>40 11% 22% 33% 22% 22% 22% 33% 11% 22% 
n=9 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 329) 
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Matrix 18 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
abcdef 
(i) 0% 11% 0% 22% 67% 11% 
n=9 
(ii) 21% 43% 29% 14% 29% 21% 
n=14 
(iii) 0% 0% 29% 14% 29% 0% 
n=7 
Previously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
abcdef 
Yes 6% 31% 25% 19% 44% 19% 
n=16 
No 14% 14% 14% 14% 36% 7% 
n=14 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 329) 
a b c d e f 
(i) 0% 11% 0% 22% 67% 11% 22% 11% 11% 
n=9 
(ii) 21% 43% 29% 14% 29% 21% 14% 14% 14% 
n=14 
(iii) 0% 0% 29% 14% 29% 0% 57% 29% 29% 
n=7 
a b c d e f g 1i i 
Yes 6% 31% 25% 19% 44% 19% 19% 19% 19% 
n=16 
No 14% 14% 14% 14% 36% 7% 36% 14% 14% 
n=14 
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Matrix 18 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: High competition is good (n=3). 
b: High competition only affects audit fee income (n=7). 
C: High competition would not encourage Big Six firms to cut back in the audit work 
performed because it may result in a sacrifice of their professionalism (n=6). 
d: High competition may result in a cut in audit income but this is more than 
compensated for by way of income from NAS (n=5). 
e: High competition may lead to cutbacks in the amount of audit work performed 
(n=12). 
f: High competition may result in Big Six firms sending out more junior audit staff 
(n=4). 
g: High competition would not encourage Big Six firms to cut back on the amount of 
work performed because it may result in them losing their reputation (n=8). 
h: High competition would not lead to cutbacks in the amount of audit work performed 
(n=5). 
is High competition would not lead to cutbacks in the audit work performed because 
auditors fear litigation (n=5). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g., Group - Lender (a): 2/15 =13 %, taken from 
Matrix 4. 
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Matrix Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicious of a Lack of 
Auditor Independence on Responses relating to Audit Committees 
Group: 
a b c d c f g 1ý 
L 47% 27% 0% 33% 40% 27% 27% 13% 
n=15 
IM 63% 13% 13% 75% 63% 25% 25% 25% 
n=8 
A 57% 29% 29% 43% 29% 14% 0% 14% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d c f 9 11 
<40 52% 33% 14% 52% 52% 24% 10% 14% 
n=21 
>40 56% 0% 0% 33% 22% 22% 44% 22% 
1 n=9 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 332) 
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Matrix 19 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
a b c d e f fi Iý 
(i) 56% 22% 11 % 44% 33% 0% 11 % 22% 
n=9 
(ii) 50% 29% 7% 43% 36% 36% 7% 14% 
n=14 
(iii) 57% 14% 14% 57% 36% 29% 57% 14% 
n=7 
Previously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
a b c d c f g h 
Yes 38% 31% 19% 56% 56% 6% 25% 25% 
n=16 
No 71% 14% 0% 36% 29% 43% 14% 7% 
n=14 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 332) 
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Matrix 19 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: Audit committees enhance auditor independence (n= 16). 
b: Audit committees may enhance auditor independence depending on the role played 
by the non-executive directors (n=7). 
c: Audit committees may enhance auditor independence if the non-executive directors 
are independent (n=3). 
d: Audit committees provide auditors with an additional channcl of communication 
(n=14). 
c: Audit committees should be responsible for auditor appointment/ remuneration 
(n=13). 
f: Audit committees are made up of independent non-executive directors (n=7). 
g: Audit committees are not relevant for the smaller company (n=6). ' 
II: Audit committees should enhance auditor independence but based on their experience 
of such committees, interviewees believed that this objective was not achieved (n=5). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g., Group - Lender (a): 7/15=47%, taken from 
Matrix 6. 
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Matrix 20: Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack of 
Auditor Independence on Responses relating to Audit Tenure 
Group: 
a b c d c f g 1ý 1 
L 60% 47% 13% 53% 47% 7% 7% 93% 27% 
n=15 
IM 25% 25% 25% 38% 75% 13% 37% 63% 13°Io 
n=8 
A 71% 43% 0% 14% 0% 43% 29% 71% 14% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d c f g 
<40 48% 48% 10% 38% 43% 24% 24% 76% 14% 
n=21 
>40 67% 22% 11% 44% 44% 0% 11% 89% 33% 
n=9 
11 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 335) 
333 
Appendix G 
Matrix 20 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
a b c d e f g 
(i) 56% 33% 11 % 33% 33% 22% 11 % 89% 22% 
n=9 
(ii) 64% 50% 14% 43% 36% 21% 21% 79% 14% 
n=14 
(iii) 29% 29% 14% 43% 71% 0% 29% 71% 29% 
n=7 
Previously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
a b c d c f 9 
Yes 38% 44% 19% 38% 44% 19% 25% 75% 19% 
n=16 
No 71% 36% 7% 43% 43% 14% 14% 86% 21% 
n=14 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 335) 
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Matrix 20 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: Favoured long audit tenure because it ensures that the auditor has a good knowledge 
of the company's business (n=16). 
b: Long audit tenure may result in the development of a cosy relationship between the 
auditor and company management (n=12). 
c: Long audit tenure may result in a staleness in the audit approach (n=4). 
d: Favour the rotation of audit personnel because it ensures that no cosy relationship will 
develop between the auditor and company management (n=12). 
e: Favour the rotation of audit personnel because it brings a freshness to the audit 
(n=13). 
f: Not in favour of rotating audit personnel if independence at issue (n=5). 
g: Favour the rotation of audit firms (n=6). 
h: Not in favour of rotating audit firms (n=24). 
i: Audit regulation ensures that standards are not compromised because of long audit 
tenure (n=6). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g., Group -Lender (a): 9/15=60%, taken from 
Matrix 7. 
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Matrix 21: Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack of 
Auditor Independence on Responses relating to NAS Provision 
Group: 
a b c d c f g h 
L 93 % 27% 13% 20% 27% 93 % 93% 93% 
n= 15 
IM 88% 63% 13% 0% 13% 88% 88% 88% 
n=8 
A 71% 0% 14% 0% 14% 71% 86% 71% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d c f g 
<40 86% 19% 10% 10% 14% 86% 90% 86% 
n=21 
>40 89% 56% 22% 11% 33% 89% 89% 89% 
n=9 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 338) 
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Matrix 21 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
a b c d c f g 1i 
(i) 89% 22% 11% 11% 22% 78% 89% 89% 
n=9 
(ii) 79% 14% 14% 7% 14% 86% 86% 79% 
n=14 
(iii) 100% 71% 14% 14% 28% 100% 100% 100% 
n=7 
Previously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
a b c d e f g 11 
Yes 
n=16 
81% 50% 6% 12% 12% 81% 88% 81% 
No 
n=14 
93% 7% 21% 7% 29% 93% 93% 93% 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 338) 
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Matrix 21 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: The provision of NAS is not perceived to decrease auditor independence (n=26). 
b: The non-Big Six firms do not separate audit from NAS and are perceived to be less 
independent as a result (n=9). 
c: Interviewees would have recommended to companies to seek NAS from audit firms 
because they are the persons with such expertise (n=4). 
d: The provision of NAS is good because it ensures that the standards applied to the 
audit will be high (n=3). 
e: The provision of NAS is good because it ensures that the auditor has a good 
knowledge of the company's business (n=6). 
f: Audit firms should not be prohibited from providing NAS to audit clients (n=26). 
g: The provision of NAS should be by separate personnel within the audit firm (n=27). 
h: The provision of NAS would not result in the auditor hesitating to qualify the audit 
report or succumbing to management pressures (n=26). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g. Group -Lender (a): 14/15=93%, taken from 
Matrix 8. 
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Matte Impact of Interviewees' Profile and Previous Suspicions of a Lack of 
Auditor Independence on Responses relating to Client Employment 
Group: 
a b c d e f g li 1 
L 60% 47% 47% 47% 33% 33% 33% 33% 100% 
n=15 
IM 50% 63% 13% 25% 38% 63% 25% 38% 100% 
n=8 
A 57% 100% 71% 29% 0% 0% 0% 29% 100% 
n=7 
Age: 
a b c d c f g It i 
<40 57% 67% 57% 29% 29% 33% 19% 38% 100% 
n=21 
>40 56% 56% 11% 56% 22% 33% 33% 22% 100% 
n=9 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 341) 
339 
Appendix G 
Matrix 22 (Cont. ) 
Nature of Work Experience: 
abcdef 
(i) 44% 56% 33% 11% 33% 33% 
n=9 
(ii) 79% 57% 64% 36% 21% 29% 
n=14 
(iii) 29 % 86% 14% 71% 29% 43% 
n=7 
Previously Suspected a Lack of Auditor Independence: 
abcdef 
Yes 63% 56% 44% 31% 25% 38% 
n=16 
No 50% 71% 43% 43% 29% 29% 
n=14 
(Refer to Key Code on p. 341) 
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a b c d e f g 
(i) 44% 56% 33% 11% 33% 33% 33% 44% 100% 
n=9 
(ii) 79% 57% 64% 36% 21% 29% 29% 21% 100% 
n=14 
- 
1 1 
(iii) 29% 86% 14% 71% 29% 43% 0% 43% 100% 
n=7 
a b c d e f g 
Yes 63% 56% 44% 31% 25% 38% 25% 38% 100% 
n=16 
No 50% 71% 43% 43% 29% 29% 21% 29% 100% 
n=14 
Appendix G 
Matrix 22 (Cont. ) 
Key to Code: 
a: Natural progression for trainee auditors to move onto industry and commerce (n= 17). 
b: Client employment is not perceived to impair auditor independence (n= 19). 
c: Lack of power of individuals leaving audit firm (n=13). 
d: Audit techniques not unique to firm and therefore, knowledge of techniques is not an 
issue (n=11). 
e: In earlier years, independence may be impaired but not as the years progress and new 
persons become involved in the audit (n=8). 
f: Independence may be impaired if the person leaving the audit firm is a senior person 
(n=10). 
g: Client employment can impact on auditor independence based on the auditor's 
knowledge of auditing techniques (n=7). 
h: Client employment can work to the benefit of the company and to the standard of 
audit performed (n =10) . 
i: If offer of employment made during the current audit, the auditor should withdraw 
from the audit because there is a conflict of interest (n=30). 
Group: L: Lenders; IM: Investment managers; A: Analysts 
Nature of Work Experience: (i) Authority to sanction proposals; (ii) Review proposals but 
final decision is referred to a higher authority; (iii) Combination of (i) and (ii). 
Percentages are calculated on the basis of the number of responses as a percentage of the 
total number of interviewees per category, e. g., Group -Lender (a): 9/15=60%, taken from 
Matrix 9. 
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